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Introduction 
What does it mean to understand someone else? At the 
centre of contemporary discourse regarding interpersonal 
understanding, we find the conception of an individual’s 
theory of mind: a theory of the mind of the other. The aim of 
this thesis is to scrutinise this discourse—what we might 
call the philosophy of theories of mind.1 The claim that a theory 
of mind, or, in other words, “mindreading” or 
“mentalising”, is a fundamental capacity that grounds 
human social life is popular within both modern 
philosophical and psychological theorising on 
interpersonal understanding. This claim also surfaces in 
evolutionary psychology, in theories of child development, 
in theories of autism as well as in philosophy on emotions 
and in moral philosophy. For instance, the psychologists 
Helen L. Gallagher and Christopher D. Frith (2003) write: 
One aspect of social cognition sets us apart from other 
primates. It underpins our ability to deceive, cooperate 
and empathize, and to read others’ body language. It 
also enables us to accurately anticipate other people’s 
behaviour, almost as if we had read their minds. This 
exceptional capacity is known as having a ‘theory of 
mind’, or mentalizing. It underlies our ability to 
explain and predict the behaviour of ourselves and 
                                                          
1 “Theory of mind” should not be confused with “philosophy of mind”. 
Philosophy of mind is not the name of a theory but a philosophical field 
of research, concerned with questions about human or animal 
understanding. “Theory of mind” is, however, a theoretical perspective 
on interpersonal understanding. 
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others by attributing to them independent mental 
states, such as beliefs, desires, emotions or intentions. 
(Gallagher and Frith 2003, p. 77) 
The anthropologist John Tooby and the psychologist Leda 
Cosmides (1997) write:  
We are ‘mindreaders’ by nature, building 
interpretations of the mental events of others and 
feeling our constructions as sharply as the physical 
objects we touch. Humans evolved this ability because, 
as members of an intensively social, cooperative, and 
competitive species, our ancestors’ lives depended on 
how well they could infer what was on one another’s 
minds. (Tooby and Cosmides 1997, p. xvii)  
The philosopher Alvin I. Goldman (2006) writes:  
[...] Homo sapiens is a particularly social species, and 
one of its social characteristics is especially striking: 
reading one another’s minds. People attribute to self 
and others a host of mental states, ranging from beliefs 
and aspirations to headaches, disappointments, and fits 
of anger. [...] Mentalizing may be the root of our 
elaborate social nature. Would there be language and 
discourse without mentalizing? Would the exquisitely 
coordinated enterprises of cultural life, the structures of 
love, politics, and games, be what they are without 
participants’ attending to the mental states of others? 
(Goldman 2006, p. 3) 
On the surface such descriptions can look all right. As 
Gallagher and Frith note, is it not a central aspect of human 
INTRODUCTION 
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life that we can understand other people’s “body language” 
and that we can explain and predict the behaviour of other 
people? As Tooby and Cosmides note, is it not important 
for human survival that we cooperate with each other? 
And, as Goldman points out, is it not an important part of 
our life with each other that we can understand that other 
people have beliefs, aspirations, headaches, 
disappointments and fits of anger? However, theory-of-
mind theorists do not merely claim that people cooperate 
or that we can reflect on other people’s beliefs, intentions 
and feelings. They want to make larger claims. According 
to theory-of-mind theorists, human social life and 
interpersonal understanding is based on a general mental 
system or function of “mentalising” or “mindreading”. A 
uniting feature among theory-of-mind theories is the 
assumption that interpersonal understanding can be 
regarded as some sort of general cognitive function or 
method of “mindreading”. Another uniting feature among 
these theories is that it is assumed that we can study these 
mindreading functions through empirical research. It is 
often assumed that these functions can be tested by 
psychological experiments.  
Theory-of-mind theories have gained popularity during 
the last 30 years alongside the increased popularity of 
cognitive science. Cognitive science has, again, had a large 
interdisciplinary influence, which is also reflected in the 
fact that theory-of-mind theories can be found among such 
various disciplines as philosophy, developmental 
psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology etc.  
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
4 
 
While theory-of-mind theories are constantly gaining in 
popularity there is also an increasing number of critical 
works directed at theory-of-mind theories. 2  Among 
contemporary critical works can, for instance, be 
mentioned Peter Hobson’s Autism and the Development of 
Mind (1993), Dan Zahavi’s Subjectivity and Selfhood (2005), 
Vasudevi Reddy’s How Infants Know Minds (2008), and the 
anthology Against Theory of Mind (2009) edited by Ivan 
Leudar and Alan Costall. My thesis can be seen as a 
contribution to this contemporary critical discussion of 
theory-of-mind theories.  
                                                          
2 Theory-of-mind theories are also sometimes called “folk-psychological” 
theories. When theory-of-mind theories are referred to as folk 
psychological theories, it is suggested that theory-of-mind theories 
concern a kind of general mental function or capacity to reason about 
other people. The theoretical field of folk psychology has been criticized 
by so called eliminative materialists. According to eliminative 
materialism our every-day conceptions of beliefs and intentions are 
based on a flawed, superficial understanding of the minds of other 
people. Eliminative materialists, such as Paul Churchland, argue that a 
true understanding of other people ought to be based on neuroscientific 
findings. I will not discuss the debate on eliminative materialism in this 
thesis. It is, however, important to note that my criticism of theory of 
mind in this thesis is not similar to the criticism of folk psychology by 
eliminative materialists. According to eliminative materialists, 
proponents of theory of mind (folk psychology) are entangled in 
conceptual confusions when they talk of people having intentions and 
beliefs. According to them we ought to avoid such conceptual confusion 
by instead talking of nerve reactions in the brain. Even though I also 
argue that theory-of-mind theorists are entangled in conceptual 
confusion I do not agree with the eliminative materialists. It is in no 
sense a lesser conceptual confusion if we decide to talk merely of brain 
states instead of beliefs and intentions. 
INTRODUCTION 
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The aim of this thesis is not to discuss critically the 
whole theoretical field of theory-of-mind theories. Rather 
the aim is to scrutinise certain specific influential theory-of-
mind theories that are connected with empirical research. 
Empirical research has a central importance in theory-of-
mind theories, giving the theories credibility in various 
scientific discussions. I argue that the empirical research is 
often based on certain problematic assumptions about 
interpersonal relations as well as on various conceptual 
confusions. However, before saying more about the 
relation between theory-of-mind theories and their 
connection to empirical research, I shall describe the varied 
theoretical field of theory of mind. 
Two theoretical orientations within theory of 
mind 
Important to note is that the field of theory-of-mind theory 
does not consist of one theory but of a large number of 
different theories. My use of the concept “theory-of-mind 
theory” ought therefore to be understood as an umbrella 
concept comprising a large number of different theories. 
However, even if there are a large number of different 
theory-of-mind theories, one can also roughly sort them 
into two kinds of theoretical orientations. One theoretical 
approach can broadly be described as emotivistic, while 
the other can be described as rationalistic. According to the 
emotivistic theories, interpersonal understanding is 
dependent on man’s capacity to imagine how another 
person feels and to feel that emotion himself. The 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
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rationalistic theory-of-mind theories tend, on the other 
hand, to emphasise reflection and reasoning as the basis 
for interpersonal understanding. In what follows I shall 
give a rough outline of these two theoretical fields within 
theory of mind. Often a distinction is made between 
simulation theory and theory theory. This distinction is to a 
large degree the same as my distinction between 
emotivistic and rationalistic theories. However, the 
expressions “simulation theory” and “theory theory” are 
concerned with a fairly specific contemporary debate in 
philosophy and psychology. I have therefore chosen to use 
the broader distinctions “emotivistic” and “rationalistic” 
theories in this introduction, since I include theorists that 
would not consider themselves to be part of the specific 
debate between simulation theory and theory theory. I will, 
however, refer to simulation theory in chapter two.  
It is also important to note that the concept of “theory of 
mind” is not used in a unitary way. Some researchers use 
the concept “theory of mind” in a specific sense, meaning a 
mental capacity (or calculating function) to reason about 
other minds. Thus, some theorists distinguish between 
“theory of mind” and “empathy”.3 Some researchers use 
the concept in a more general sense, meaning a general 
cognitive function of interpersonal understanding, 
including emotional reactions. Some of the researchers that 
I discuss do not use the concept “theory of mind” at all. I 
use the concept “theory-of-mind theory” in a broad sense, 
                                                          
3  For instance, Andrew Meltzoff (2002) distinguishes between 
“empathy” and “theory of mind”.  
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including both emotivistic theories (such as theories on 
empathy) as well as rationalistic theories on interpersonal 
understanding, and even though the researchers 
themselves might not at all use the concept of “theory of 
mind”.  
I should also point out that the theorists that I will 
discuss in this thesis cannot all be explicitly defined as 
theory-of-mind theorists. Only some of them would define 
themselves as such.4 Thus it would not be correct to define 
Martha Nussbaum as a theory-of-mind theorist even if I 
will maintain that her conception of empathy is reflective 
of a certain kind of cognitive conception of interpersonal 
understanding that is common within theory-of-mind 
theories. Proponents of theory-of-mind are in this sense not 
a strictly defined group of theorists, neither is the concept 
of “theory of mind” always used in a unitary way. My aim 
is then not to specifically discuss only theorists who talk of 
“theory of mind”. Rather, what I want to do is to discuss 
certain kind of recurring (problematic) cognitive 
conceptions of interpersonal understanding and their 
relation to empirical research.  
1. Emotivistic theory-of-mind theories 
Within emotivistic theory-of-mind theories a central 
concept that often comes up is the concept of empathy. It is 
important to note that when philosophers and 
psychologists talk of empathy or sympathy they often 
                                                          
4 Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and also Simon Baron-Cohen might define 
themselves as theory-of-mind theorists. 
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mean something different and more specific than we do in 
ordinary life. In ordinary life when we say that a person is 
empathic we generally mean that the person cares for other 
people, that he or she is compassionate and considerate. 
However, when philosophers and psychologists talk of 
empathy the meaning is often different. Even if the concept 
of empathy is often considered to have a connection with 
compassion it is frequently thought to be a cognitive 
function or method that enables us to understand other 
minds and that, as a consequence, can make us inclined to 
care for others.  
There are also many different words used for what 
broadly can be said to be the same phenomenon. 
Philosophers and psychologists talk for instance of 
“simulation”, “sympathy”, “empathy”, “retributive 
emotions”, “Einfühlung” etc. Not only do theorists use 
different words but they also often mean slightly different 
things by these words.  
The term “empathy” is itself of modern origin. The term 
was originally coined by the psychologist Edward 
Titchener (1909). Titchener was himself influenced by the 
psychologist Theodor Lipps’ (1897) theory about 
“Einfühlung”. Lipps’ theory on Einfühlung was originally 
concerned with aesthetics, discussing optical illusions. 
Titchener, however, shifted the theoretical focus to 
psychology. However, even if the concept “empathy” itself 
is of modern origin, the perspective can be traced back to 
David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s ideas on sympathy. In A 
Treatise of Human Nature ([1739-40] 1978) Hume writes: 
INTRODUCTION 
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No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both 
in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity 
we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, 
however different from, or even contrary to our own. 
[...] When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at 
first known only by its effects, and by those external 
signs in the countenance and conversation, which 
convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted 
into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force 
and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and 
produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. 
(Hume [1739-40] 1978, pp. 316-317) 
According to Hume, human beings have an inclination to 
“sympathise” with others. This inclination he explains as 
consisting of a kind of analogical mental function. When I 
see another person who is happy or sad I will get an idea 
of the other person’s emotion. This idea will then turn into 
the emotion itself. Hume also distinguishes between 
sympathy and compassion. While sympathy is a kind of 
general mental function that enables us to feel the same as 
another person, he defines compassion as concern for the 
other. Still he suggests that compassion is dependent on 
the mental function of sympathy.  
Adam Smith’s conception of sympathy, in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments ([1759] 2002) largely resembles Hume’s. 
According to Smith, human beings have a natural 
inclination to care for other people. This he explains as 
deriving from a function of our imagination. We care for 
others because we have a capacity to imagine ourselves in 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
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the other person’s situation. Both Hume’s and Smith’s 
models can be described as consisting of an argument of 
analogy. Their interest in sympathy concern moral 
philosophy, and then, among other things, the origins of 
compassion. However, their way of explaining compassion 
is of a cognitive character. Even though Hume and Smith 
do not use the word empathy but talk of sympathy, their 
theories of sympathy have much in common with modern 
theories on empathy.  
One theoretical field where Smith’s theory of sympathy 
has been influential is evolutionary psychology. For 
instance, Charles Darwin’s reflections on the “social 
instinct” in The Origin of Species and the Descent of Man 
([1859, 1871] 1872) have much in common with Smith’s 
reflections on sympathy. Likewise Edward Westermarck’s 
reflections on “retributive emotions” in The Origin and 
Development of the Moral Ideas (1917) resemble both Smith 
and Darwin. In modern evolutionary psychology, the 
primatologist and ethologist Frans de Waal (2009) also 
reflects on the evolutionary origins of human social life. In 
quite a similar manner as Darwin and Westermarck, he 
considers empathy as a basic, natural, emotional-cognitive 
function that motivates us to care for others. The 
suggestion is that our care for each other, or in more 
popular words “altruism”, is based on a certain kind of 
emotional-cognitive function. This function makes us feel 
and imagine in an analogical sense, thereby making us 
inclined to care for others. 
However, theories of empathy are also often of a more 
purely cognitive character, and then not concerned with 
INTRODUCTION 
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moral philosophical questions such as compassion. Such 
cognitively oriented theories are dominant among modern 
theories on empathy. They are prominent in 
developmental psychology and in cognitive science. One 
popular theory in cognitive science is that empathy 
consists of a brain mechanism. Researchers in neuroscience, 
such as Giacomo Rizzolatti (2005), have claimed that there 
are so called “mirror neurons” that enable us to interpret 
others. Briefly, the theory about mirror neurons consists in 
the idea that our emotional and bodily responses to other 
people’s emotions are based on a certain neural system 
that “mirrors” other people’s emotions and behaviour. It is 
claimed that this mirror neuron function enables me to feel 
the same as you feel in a certain situation and thereby 
enables me to understand you. The “mirror neuron” 
phenomenon has been studied empirically through brain 
research on both apes and human beings.  
Also in developmental psychology the cognitive focus 
on empathy has been central. One researcher in this field is 
the psychologist Andrew Meltzoff. According to Meltzoff 
(2002), empathy derives from the infant’s capacity to 
imitate other people’s bodily expressions. Meltzoff has 
conducted empirical tests with newborn infants, indicating 
that infants have a natural capacity to imitate other 
people’s facial expressions. According to Meltzoff, the 
empirical research indicates that imitation is an important 
natural mechanism that eventually enhances the child’s 
capacity for empathy and mindreading.  
However, the concept of empathy also surfaces in 
contemporary philosophical discussions and especially so 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
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in the philosophy on emotion. For instance, Peter Goldie 
(2000), Martha Nussbaum (2001) and Karsten R. Stueber 
(2006) discuss empathy. Contemporary philosophical 
theories on empathy are often also influenced by empirical 
research. According to Stueber, empathy consists of two 
levels; basic empathy which originates from the mirror 
neuron function, and re-enactive empathy that, according to 
him, cannot be understood as a brain function but ought to 
be considered as a matter of reasoning, requiring a capacity 
to imagine the other person’s larger life context, including 
his life history and his ways of reasoning. Stueber then 
does not consider empathy merely as a momentary 
emotional state mirroring another person’s current 
emotional state. In Stueber’s theory on empathy one can 
see how philosophical theory can be influenced by 
empirical research, such as the research on mirror neurons. 
At the same time, however, Stueber’s conception of 
empathy has a broader scope than the empirical research, 
encompassing more reflective capacities to reason than the 
mirror neuron theory suggests. Peter Goldie’s theory on 
empathy resembles that of Stueber. Also Martha 
Nussbaum’s philosophical reflections on empathy are 
influenced by empirical research. According to her, there is 
an empirically observable link between empathic 
imagination and compassion. In her work she refers to 
certain psychological experiments concerning the relation 
between empathy and compassion that have been made by 
Daniel C. Batson (1991).  
In this sense, theoretical discussions concerning 
empathy span over many theoretical fields (evolutionary 
INTRODUCTION 
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psychology, developmental psychology, philosophy of 
emotions etc.), and concern many different concepts 
(sympathy, Einfühlung, empathy, retributive emotions, 
social instincts, mirror neurons, imitation, re-enactive 
empathy etc.) As one can see from the description above, 
theories of empathy also concern many different levels.  
Some talk of brain mechanisms, some talk of a capacity to 
imitate and decipher bodily expressions, some talk of our 
emotional responsiveness to others, and some talk of 
reflective imagination requiring a large acquaintance with 
the other person’s patterns of thinking.  
Another difference is that while some researchers who 
discuss empathy claim that it consists in an effort of 
analogical imagination, i.e. to imagine oneself in the other 
person’s situation, others point out that the other person 
can be truly different from me and that mere analogical 
imagination will often not enable us to understand the 
other person. The importance of being aware of the other 
as having a different perspective is already argued by 
Smith ([1759] 2002). In contemporary philosophy and 
psychology it is claimed by, among others, Batson (1991), 
Goldie (2006), Nussbaum (2001) and Stueber (2006).  
Despite many differences in the theories of empathy, 
there are some central shared assumptions that underlie 
these theories. As I have already maintained, one central 
assumption is that interpersonal understanding in some 
sense works by analogical imagination or by analogical 
bodily or emotional reactions. Another central idea that 
unites the theorists on empathy is the idea that human 
beings are naturally social beings. In this sense empathy 
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theorists are often critical of an old tendency (both within 
philosophy as well as within psychology) to assume that 
man originally is a lonely individual who cares only for 
himself. Several of these theorists expressly take a stance 
against such a conception of human life (for instance Smith, 
de Waal and Meltzoff). A third uniting feature among 
empathy theorists is that human social life and 
interpersonal understanding are, in some sense, considered 
to be based on our spontaneous emotional responsiveness 
to each other. Here one can again see a critical stance 
towards certain rationalistic orientations within both 
philosophy and psychology.  
2. Rationalistic theory-of-mind theories 
Above I have described a group of theory-of-mind theories 
that are all in some sense based on a conception of 
interpersonal understanding as consisting in an emotional-
cognitive analogical method or function of imagination. 
However, there are also theory-of-mind theories that have 
a more rationalistic character. Often the emotivistic and 
rationalistic conceptions blend into each other and often 
researchers embrace both conceptions. Still one might say 
that some theories have a more rationalistic orientation 
while other theories are more emotivistic in kind.  
A uniting feature of rationalistic theory-of-mind 
theories is the assumption that we understand other 
people by using some sort of calculating method or 
function of reasoning. The rationalistic perspective, 
however, is often combined with various kinds of 
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emotivistic theories of interpersonal understanding, 
including theories of empathy. In this sense the distinction 
between emotivistic and rationalistic theory-of-mind 
theories should not be seen as very sharp.  
As with the emotivistic theoretical conception, there are 
also many different theories within the rationalistic 
conception of theory of mind. One strong branch of 
rationalistic theory-of-mind theories lies within 
evolutionary psychology. According to Leda Cosmides 
and John Tooby (2008), who work within the field of 
evolutionary psychology, human beings have throughout 
our evolutionary history developed an unconscious, 
algorithmic reasoning mechanism that enables us to predict 
and explain other people’s behaviour and thoughts. 
According to them, this mental algorithmic system consists 
of modules that are designed for various survival purposes. 
Some of these algorithmic modules are designed to enable 
the individual to decipher other people’s behaviour and 
thereby predict their actions, enabling the individual to 
manipulate others. Cosmides and Tooby are influenced by 
William D. Hamilton’s (1964) and John Maynard Smith’s 
(1982) sociobiological theories. The allusion to an 
algorithmic biological mechanism derives from this 
influence. However, one can also see an older influence 
from Thomas Hobbes’ ([1651] 1996)5 rationalistic political 
theory of the social contract.  
Another strong field in rationalistic theory-of-mind 
theories concerns research on autism, which can also be 
                                                          
5 See, for instance, Hobbes, ([1651] 1996) Leviathan, chapters 13–15. 
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said to be a part of developmental psychology. Children 
with autism often appear to be unaware of people. This 
was an observation that was strikingly described already 
by the psychiatrist Leo Kanner (1943). Kanner describes 
how the children he studied seemed to be aware of 
physical objects, playing with toys etc., while they seemed 
to be almost completely unaware of their parents or other 
people, not responding to these other people or taking any 
interest in them. When children with autism grow older 
they often do gain some understanding of other people, 
though some remain largely unresponsive to others. Still 
most people with autism struggle throughout their life 
with various degrees of difficulties of comprehending 
other people and of managing in social situations. Autistic 
persons can also tend to have peculiar problems with 
language, such as a rigid way of talking, insensitivity to the 
tone of voice, tendencies for echolalia etc.6 According to 
proponents of theory of mind, the many social and 
linguistic problems that persons with autism struggle with, 
reflect a basic inability to see that other people have minds, 
i.e. to see that people have intentions, thoughts, feelings etc. 
A major figure in the field of autism research and theory of 
mind is the psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen. Baron-
Cohen (1997) claims that autism derives from certain 
dysfunctions in the brain, especially a dysfunction in the so 
called “Theory of Mind Mechanism”. According to Baron-
Cohen, these dysfunctions lead to “mindblindness” i.e. an 
                                                          
6 For a fuller description of autism see: American Psychiatric Association 
(2013), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Fifth Edition. 
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inability to theorise about other people’s intentions and 
beliefs. Baron-Cohen’s theory on autism is also influenced 
by Tooby and Cosmides’ evolutionary theories on the 
origins of human social life. It is largely with their 
theoretical perspective as a background that Baron-Cohen 
constructs his theory on autism as mindblindness.7 
I have now tried to give a broad description of the 
various theories within the field of theory-of-mind theory. 
I have claimed that one can divide theory-of-mind theories 
into two theoretical orientations; an emotivistic orientation 
and a rationalistic orientation. However, I have also 
maintained that it is important to note that there are many 
different perspectives within these two orientations of 
theory of mind. It is important to be aware of this diversity, 
but it is also important to see that this diversity comprises 
a certain unitary pattern of theoretical thinking.  
Some general theoretical problems with theory-
of-mind theories 
There are certain problematic theoretical assumptions that 
the theory-of-mind theories share. To begin with, they are 
all based on the assumption that interpersonal 
understanding is an epistemological matter. That is, the 
                                                          
7 In his book Mindblindness, an Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (1997) 
Baron-Cohen reflects extensively on the evolutionary origins of 
interpersonal understanding, referring to research by Tooby and 
Cosmides. Their close theoretical connection is also reflected in the fact 
that Tooby and Cosmides have written the foreword to Baron-Cohen’s 
book.  
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theories are based on the assumption that to understand 
another person means to have certain information about 
that person. However, in his book Love and Human 
Separateness (1987) Ilham Dilman distinguishes between 
two forms of knowing another person. He writes:  
We say we know someone with whom we have 
worked, someone by whose side we have fought. In 
this sense we know a friend, a comrade, a colleague, a 
neighbour; a husband knows his wife and a wife her 
husband. Here ‘I know him’ means more than ‘I know 
what he is like’, though it includes that. In an important 
sense of ‘know’ if I know him there are certain things I 
can ask of him, certain things I can say to him which I 
cannot ask of or say to a stranger. (Dilman 1987, p. 121) 
On the one hand knowing a person can mean that we have 
information about certain things concerning the person, i.e. 
we “know what he is like”. However, Dilman claims that 
there is also another form of knowing a person that is 
integral to our standing in a personal relationship. 
According to proponents of theory of mind, there is 
basically only one form of understanding or knowing 
another person, that is, to “know what the other is like”. It 
is with this conception of understanding as a starting point 
that the theorists try to explain what it means that we are 
social beings. This can, in other words, be described as an 
epistemological conception of understanding. Dilman 
suggests, however, that the other form of knowing is of 
more fundamental importance if we want to understand 
what it means that we are social beings and what it means 
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to understand another person. He argues that the concepts 
of knowledge and understanding in an important sense 
gain their meaning through our ways of being involved 
with each other, through talking and doing things together, 
and then also through sharing close relationships.  
The epistemological conception of understanding that 
can be discerned in theory-of-mind theories is reflected in 
several more specific forms of explaining interpersonal 
understanding. These are; a tendency to consider a third-
person perspective as basic for what it means to 
understand other people, a tendency to consider 
interpersonal understanding as based on an analogical 
mechanism of imagination, and a tendency to consider the 
human being in body-mind dualistic terms. I shall briefly 
describe these three patterns of ideas. 
As I maintained above, one central assumption of 
theory-of-mind theories is that interpersonal 
understanding consists in a third-person perspective. This 
largely forms how interpersonal understanding is 
described. For instance, according to Alvin I. Goldman 
(2006, p. 3), a central social feature of human life is that we 
attribute mental states to self and others. Jane Heal (1995) 
writes “We frequently make judgements about the 
thoughts and feelings of those about us. We use those 
judgements in explanations and as the basis for predictions 
of their future thoughts and actions.” (Heal 1995, p. 33) 
Statements like these are very common within theory-of-
mind theories. The assumption is that interpersonal 
understanding can be described as a matter of predicting, 
judging, explaining, describing, recognizing, making sense of 
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and attributing mental states to other minds. Indeed we do 
often predict, explain and try to make sense of other 
people’s behaviour. The problem arises when philosophers 
or psychologists claim that this is the one and only or the 
most basic or the most important way in which we 
understand other human beings. That is, there is a 
tendency to describe interpersonal understanding as if it 
generally and basically consisted in a third-person 
perspective where we think about the other person. The 
suggestion in theory-of-mind theories is then not merely 
that we quite often think about other people and wonder 
what they are up to. The suggestion is that such a 
perspective is basic for what it means to understand 
another person. This assumption is not often made explicit 
but is something that can be seen in the form of the 
arguments and in the form of the examples that are 
invoked in the theories. It is also an idea that can be seen in 
the way certain empirical observations are made and in the 
way experimental situations are constructed and results 
are described.  
Dilman claims, however, in the earlier quote, that it is in 
our mutual engagement with each other that questions 
about knowledge and understanding have meaning. This 
also means that it is a central part of what it means to 
understand another person that we can share a close 
personal relationship with him or her, that we can share a 
long life history with the other person, and that we can be 
engaged in conversations with each other; conversations 
that often get their character and meaning from the long 
shared life history.  
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The emphasis on thinking has also been criticised both 
inside and outside the branch of theory-of-mind theory. 
Empathy theorists have been critical of a too rationalistic 
and individualistic conception of human life. As I have 
noted earlier, empathy theorists consider the fact that we 
often respond spontaneously and emotionally to other people 
as an important expression of understanding. However, 
even if empathy theorists have an important hunch here 
about the spontaneous and emotional character of 
interpersonal understanding, their way of explaining this 
in analogical terms becomes problematic. Even if a third-
person perspective is not as explicit, the analogical model 
of explanation that empathy theorists work with is also 
ultimately based on a third-person conception of 
interpersonal understanding. It is a central assumption in 
theories on empathy that I observe others and then I feel the 
same as the other and then I understand how the other feels.  
However, the argument from analogy is not only 
problematic because it assumes that we generally 
understand other people by observing them (i.e. a third-
person perspective) rather than in some sense engaging 
with the other person. It is also problematic because it 
assumes that we can only understand other people 
indirectly, while it is assumed that we have privileged access 
to our own thoughts and feelings. According to Norman 
Malcolm (1972), this is a central assumption in empiricist 
philosophy. 
[…] for philosophers of an empiricist inclination it has 
seemed a matter of course that we learn from 
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introspection what thinking, remembering, and 
perceiving are. […] The ostensive definitions are 
‘private’; they take place in each one’s mind, no one 
else can be aware of, can directly know, those 
phenomena in my mind that I name ‘thinking,’ 
‘remembering,’ or ‘believing’. (Malcolm 1972, pp. 15-16) 
This assumption, that we understand the meaning of 
“mental” concepts by introspection, leads to the idea that 
we only understand other people indirectly. The argument 
from analogy then comes to seem like a good explanation 
of interpersonal understanding. The idea is that 
interpersonal understanding is dependent on an 
introspective first-person perspective which enables us to 
understand other people through analogical imagination. 
The above described tendencies are also connected with 
a tendency to talk of the human body as if it was a surface 
that we observe. The result is that a body-mind dualism is 
often implicit in theory-of-mind theories. The assumption 
is that by observing the other person’s physical movements 
I can infer what goes on in his mind. Generally theory-of-
mind theorists are not expressly body-mind dualists or 
solipsists. They do think we can understand other people’s 
bodily expressions, and they do think human beings are 
essentially social beings, and this is also their main interest. 
Many of the theory-of-mind theorists would probably be 
critical of classical body-mind dualism. But nevertheless I 
will claim that their way of explaining interpersonal 
understanding often rest on dualistic assumptions.  
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There are several reasons why theory-of-mind theorists 
tend to talk of the human body as a surface. One reason is 
that if interpersonal understanding is taken to consist in a 
third-person perspective, the human body also becomes 
something that we describe as something we observe. From 
such a point of view a surface perspective on other 
people’s bodies easily becomes appealing. Another, though 
related, reason why theory-of-mind theorists tend to talk of 
the body as a surface has to do with the idea that we 
understand other people through a mechanism or method 
of analogical imagination or analogical emotional reactions. 
If one thinks that interpersonal understanding takes an 
analogical form it becomes important that human beings 
are similar. And then it also becomes important that we 
have physically similar bodies. From this it easily follows 
that one adopts a kind of physiological-anatomical 
perspective on the human body. A third reason why 
theory-of-mind theorists tend to talk of the body as a 
surface has to do with the fact that they are influenced by 
psychology and psychology has a long history of influence 
from physiology. René Descartes is generally referred to as 
the father of body-mind dualistic thinking. However, 
Descartes was strongly influenced by modern medical 
science and physiology. In a somewhat similar sense 
physiology has had a strong influence on psychology. 
Much of the body-mind dualistic thinking that can be 
found in theory-of-mind theory is not in a clear sense 
influenced by Cartesian philosophy but rather by 
physiological and anatomical ways of speaking of the body 
that has also largely influenced psychology. Important to 
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see here is then that the “surface” perspective on the 
human body gets support from several aspects of theory-
of-mind theories. First, the tendency within theory-of-mind 
theories to assume that interpersonal understanding is 
epistemological in kind makes the researches inclined to 
assume that interpersonal understanding is based on a 
third-person perspective. Second, the assumption that 
interpersonal understanding is based on a third-person 
perspective makes the researchers inclined to talk of the 
human body as something we observe from a distanced 
viewpoint. Third, the fact that theory-of-mind theories are 
often based on the argument from analogy makes the 
researchers inclined to consider human bodies similar, 
which makes them pay attention to the similarity of bodily 
expressions. Fourth, theory-of-mind theories are closely 
linked with empirical research in psychology, which again 
is influenced by physiology. This makes the researchers 
even more inclined to stick to a physiological-anatomical 
way of speaking of the body.  
To conclude so far, I have above tried to point at some 
general problems of theory-of-mind theories. The main 
problems can be said to be that theory-of-mind theories are 
based on third-person, analogical, and also body-mind 
dualistic perspectives that are all reflective of an 
epistemological conception of interpersonal understanding. 
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The relationship between theory-of-mind 
theories and empirical research 
An important aspect of theory-of-mind theories is that they 
are deeply embedded in empirical research. A central aim 
of the thesis is therefore to reflect on the relationship 
between philosophical theory and psychological empirical 
research. One can say that there are two kinds of empirical 
source that theory-of-mind theories are based on. On the 
one hand many of our everyday experiences often seem to 
support the various theory-of-mind theories. On the other 
hand theory-of-mind theories are often connected with 
various kinds of experimental research. In this sense 
theory-of-mind theory can often appear to rest on a 
common-sense conception of human, and animal, life as 
well as on scientific findings.  
For instance, Andrew Meltzoff’s research on infants’ 
imitation of facial expressions is not merely reflective of a 
certain kind of philosophical theory that correlates with 
certain results in experimental research. Meltzoff’s research 
also reflects the fact that the human face is of great 
importance in our life with each other. There is also 
something fundamentally important in the facial contact 
we can have with a child. In this sense Meltzoff’s studies 
on imitation reflect the importance of the human face in 
real life. Further one might also note that imitation is 
connected with learning on a larger scale. Children learn 
from others and much of this learning does take the form 
of imitation.  
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The suggestion that there is an empirically observable 
link between empathic imagination and compassion can 
also appear to be reflected in our everyday experiences. 
Often we are emotionally moved by the sight of another 
person’s suffering. We can find it unbearable to look at an 
injured person. It is as if we feel the other person’s suffering. 
And often we also imagine other people’s suffering, we 
worry etc. Emotional reactions as well as imagination are 
in this sense often a central part of compassion. Often it is 
also the case that if we have experienced something similar 
to another person we also feel we understand how the 
other person feels. A common way of talking about 
compassion is that we say that we feel with the other 
person. Sometimes we might also say that we identify with 
the other. In the many versions of the Golden Rule there 
also seems to be a form of reasoning that is based on our 
capacity to imagine in an analogical sense: “Love thy 
neighbour as thyself”. Sometimes we use arguments from 
analogy when we try to make a child reflect on his own 
actions towards others; “Imagine how would you feel if 
you were left alone like that by your friends?!”. These ways 
of talking and these ways of responding emotionally to 
other people’s suffering seem to support the suggestion 
that compassion is based on an analogical method of 
imagination, a form of explanation that in some way or 
other often comes up in theory-of-mind theories.  
When it comes to the more rationalistic theory-of-mind 
theories there seem also to be an abundance of cases in real 
life that support these theories. We do often reflect on 
other people and wonder what a person might think. As I 
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have already mentioned, the theory-of-mind research on 
autism is also closely linked with the fact that children 
with autism do have severe social deficits that often have 
to do with inabilities to understand other people. 
Evolutionary theories that are connected with both 
rationalistic theories of theory of mind as well as with 
emotivistic theories can also appear commonsensical. We 
are all aware of the fact that many animals (including 
human beings) are social by nature. There are also many 
interesting similarities in how certain animals, such as apes, 
behave socially and how humans can behave. There are 
many cases where animals clearly respond with care 
towards others. In this sense the psychological empirical 
research on theory-of-mind theory gain support from our 
everyday observations of human and animal life.  
However, not only are theory-of-mind theories 
supported by a large number of observations in real life. 
As I have suggested, they also claim support from a large 
amount of experimental research. However, even though 
theories on theory of mind largely lean on empirical 
observations, I will argue that the empirical observations 
are often formed by the earlier described patterns of 
thinking such as a tendency to emphasise a third-person 
perspective of understanding, a tendency to consider 
interpersonal understanding to be based on analogical 
imagination and a tendency to talk of the human being in 
body-mind dualistic terms. If a researcher has a confused 
conception of interpersonal understanding the confusion 
will often not be solved by empirical research but merely 
enhanced. My intention is not to criticise psychological 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
28 
 
empirical research in general. I also agree with theory-of-
mind theorists that the empirical results in the research can 
be interesting and that we may learn something from the 
empirical research. My aim is to criticise how the results of 
the empirical research are interpreted, as well as to criticise 
how the design of the experiments are formed by 
problematic philosophical assumptions.  
The fact that empirical research can be problematic does 
not mean that empirical research always must be 
problematic. My critical discussion of empirical research is, 
I think, in line with what Peter Winch says. In The Idea of a 
Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1958) he writes: 
Philosophy, [...] has no business to be anti-scientific: if 
it tries to be so it will succeed only in making itself look 
ridiculous. Such attacks are as distasteful and 
undignified as they are useless and unphilosophical. 
But equally, and for the same reasons, philosophy must 
be on its guard against the extra-scientific pretensions 
of science. (Winch 1958, p. 2) 
Winch further argues that there is often a tendency to 
mistake philosophical questions for empirical ones. That is, 
it can be the case that one has a confused understanding of 
one’s original question. This confusion can make one 
inclined to think that the question can be solved by 
empirical observation. The point here is not that 
philosophers never can learn anything from empirical 
research or from observations of real life. Empirical 
research can be of great importance also for a philosopher, 
but if the original question is obscure the empirical 
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connection will also easily become so. In order for us to 
understand what we should do empirically we must know 
what our question means. And sometimes when we come 
to understand the character of our question we might also 
realise that the question cannot be answered by empirical 
observations. 
Another reason why empirical research can be 
problematic is that it may be too narrow in focus. This 
narrow focus can, again, be due to the confused character 
of our original question. In his Philosophical Investigations 
([1953] 2001) Ludwig Wittgenstein writes: “A main cause 
of philosophical disease—an unbalanced diet: one 
nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.” 
(Wittgenstein [1953] 2001, §593) Even if we make careful 
and detailed observations of a phenomenon, we might still 
have a too one-sided or too restricted focus. The reason we 
have a too restricted focus can, again, be because we are 
influenced by a certain philosophical theory.  
Theory-of-mind theorists often claim that they describe 
certain underlying cognitive features of interpersonal 
understanding. It is then also often assumed that by 
creating a restricted research environment we will be able 
to study such general cognitive functions. These 
assumptions are often reflected in a predilection for 
experimental research methods. Experimental research can 
be appealing because of the appearance of clarity in the 
results. The appearance of clarity in the results creates the 
impression that a general underlying cognitive mechanism 
can be discerned. At the same time, experimental research 
may be shaped by the research question in ways that affect 
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the results in problematic ways. One of my suggestions 
will be that proponents of theory of mind often tend to 
accept experimental research methods (and results) too 
readily. The reason for this is, however, not sloppiness, nor 
is the reason merely that the researcher is influenced by 
methods used in natural science (though I do think natural 
scientific research methods have had a great and 
problematic influence on certain fields of psychology). 
Rather there is often a certain form of experimental research 
that fits well with the conception of understanding that 
theory-of-mind theories rest on. Much of the experimental 
research within theory-of-mind theory is constructed in a 
kind of one-directional manner. The subject observes 
something or someone and then reacts to what he observes, 
or describes what he observes. That is, the situations are 
constructed as subject-object situations. Often the 
situations are also constructed in a passive sense where the 
subject should observe something rather than do something. 
This way of constructing experimental situations has been 
criticized by Urie Bronfenbrenner (1978). According to 
Bronfenbrenner, it is generally accepted among 
psychological researchers that human beings interact with 
each other and that development of understanding is 
integral to such interaction. However, even though this is 
generally acknowledged, it is seldom taken into account in 
empirical research practice. Instead researchers tend to 
construct experimental test situations that consistently take 
a one-directional form. Bronfenbrenner suggests that the 
one-directional form of psychological experiments derives 
from the influence from physics. For a long time physics 
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provided the ideal model for what it means to conduct 
objective scientific research.  
However, when it comes to theory-of-mind theories I 
claim that there is also another reason. The one-directional 
and passive form of the experiments are appealing if one 
has an epistemological (and often empiricist, though not 
necessarily8) perspective on interpersonal understanding. 
From such a perspective understanding is one-directional 
in its character. It is the subject who observes the object, 
even if the object happens to be another person. What is 
ignored then is how our understanding of each other has 
its meaning as part of our reciprocal responsiveness and as 
part of our personal relationships. The whole philosophical 
concept of other minds rests on such a one-directional 
(non-relational, non-engaged) conception of interpersonal 
understanding. The problem with the one-directional form 
                                                          
8  It is not only researchers of an empiricist kind that have been 
influenced by one-directional experimental research practice. Somewhat 
similarly one-directional experimental studies have also been made 
concerning logical understanding. Jean Piaget (1971) (1974) tested 
children’s development of logical reasoning. Another researcher that 
can be mentioned here is the sociologist A.R. Luria (1976) who studied 
illiterate people in remote areas of the Soviet Union. Both Piaget and 
Luria wanted to study the development of logical reasoning. I will not 
discuss Piaget or Luria at length here, or their conception of logical 
understanding. I merely want to note that it is not only empiricist 
philosophers or psychologists who are inclined to take a one-directional 
empirical research approach. In Experience and the Growth of 
Understanding (1978) D.W. Hamlyn discusses Piaget’s conception of the 
development of understanding. In In Defence of Informal Logic (2000) Don 
Levi discusses Luria’s empirical research.  
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of experimental research methods then, when it comes to 
theory-of-mind theories, is not only that the research can 
tend to be too restricted or narrow or that the research is 
too highly influenced by natural scientific research 
methods, but that the narrowness of the empirical research 
manifests a philosophical tendency to think of 
interpersonal understanding in third-person, analogical or 
body-mind dualistic terms, which are all in some sense 
epistemological perspectives on understanding.  
Does this mean that the problematic relationship 
between theory-of-mind theories and empirical research 
would be solved if the researchers simply stopped making 
experiments and instead were to observe “real life”? Not 
necessarily. As I have noted earlier, much of the empirical 
research that is connected with theory-of-mind theories is 
in some way or other inspired by certain observations of 
real life. It would be a mistake to say that the main 
problem with experimental research that is built on theory-
of-mind theory is that it is not concerned with real life. On 
the contrary, the empirical research often reflects our life in 
some way or other and the reason the researchers begin to 
construct experiments and to theorise is often the fact that 
they are intrigued by certain aspects of real life. It is then 
important to acknowledge that the patterns of thinking 
within theory-of-mind theories do not merely arise out of 
classical (problematic) philosophical assumptions (such as 
body-mind dualism, the argument from analogy or a third-
person perspective). Nor do they merely arise from 
tendencies to construct reductive empirical experiments on 
the basis of philosophical theories. On the contrary, theory-
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of-mind theories often mirror our life in one way or other, 
and often the empirical research does so too. This is a 
further reason why the theories in question can appear so 
convincing.  
Still, even if theory-of-mind theories reflect certain 
aspects of real life, it can also be the case that real life 
observations lead a researcher astray. One reason for this is 
that even when we observe real life situations we are often 
inclined to assume a reductive perspective. One such way 
is by merely sticking to what Wittgenstein calls a “one-
sided diet of examples”. In his article “Trying to Keep 
Philosophy Honest” (2005) Lars Hertzberg suggests, in line 
with Wittgenstein, that when we try to think of examples 
we often think merely of examples that fit well with our 
theory, or with our idea of how things are, and we ignore a 
large part of examples that might go against our thinking. 
This problem is, of course, not very easy to avoid since it is 
not always so easy to really see what examples actually are 
relevant or not for one’s question. 
Another way a reductive perspective can form our 
observations of real life is when we start to use a 
theoretical vocabulary to describe ordinary life situations. 
Hertzberg writes: “We test words on our tongue in the 
solitude of our study, and in doing so we grossly 
underestimate our inability to imagine the real life of the 
expressions we are considering.” (Hertzberg 2005, p. 81) 
Often the problem is also that a certain kind of professional 
theoretical vocabulary quickly gets accepted among 
philosophical or psychological theorists. In this sense the 
problem with how we get blinded by the use of certain 
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words is not merely an individual problem but largely a 
cultural problem in scientific discussions. This may 
concern words such as “altruism”, “empathy”, “theory of 
mind”, “mind”, “intention”, “belief”, “emotion”, 
“imagination”, etc. Partly the problem is that researchers 
invent new scientific words that can have an unclear, 
reductive or too generalising meaning. This is, for instance, 
the case with words like “altruism”, “empathy” and 
“theory of mind”.  
The problem is also that words we use in ordinary life 
are given a different meaning in the philosophical and 
psychological discussions without the researchers noticing 
it themselves. This is, for instance, often the case with the 
words “belief”, “intention”, “knowledge” and “human 
body”. Within theory-of-mind theories these words are 
often used in a highly specialised or reductive sense 
though the theorists might not acknowledge it themselves. 
The field of theory-of-mind theory contains many such 
uses of expressions that are largely accepted even though 
the meaning of the expressions actually may be unclear. In 
this sense we are by no means safe from “extra-scientific 
pretensions” even if we look at real life. And, as Hertzberg 
notes, even if we use “ordinary words” we may still have 
lost the sense for how these words actually are used in 
ordinary life.  
I already noted that theory-of-mind theorists often 
assume that they describe underlying or general cognitive 
functions of understanding. One can then get the 
impression that a reductive, or in other ways specialised 
use of vocabulary, as well as restricted empirical research, 
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should be all right. My criticism of theory-of-mind theories 
often takes the form of suggesting that the use of certain 
concepts is unclear, as well as suggesting other ways of 
interpreting experimental results, or describing broader 
patterns of interpersonal relationships and interpersonal 
responsiveness than theory-of-mind theorists describe. 
One can get the impression that my descriptions of human 
social life are on a “social surface level” while the theory-
of-mind theorists’ descriptions are on a “deep cognitive 
level”. However, my aim is not to contrast a “deep 
cognitive level” with a “social surface level” of human life 
but to provide alternative descriptions of interpersonal 
responsiveness, and thereby also to point to certain 
conceptual confusions within theory-of-mind theories that 
are reflected in the empirical research. The aim is thereby 
to dissolve the impression that theory-of-mind theories 
describe a basic underlying cognitive level of interpersonal 
understanding. 
To conclude then, a central aim of the thesis is to discuss 
the relation between theory-of-mind theories and their 
relation to empirical research as well as their relation to 
real life observations. I will claim that certain 
presuppositions often shape the research as well as the real 
life observations so that certain results are reached or so 
that the real life situations seem to fit well with a 
theoretical perspective, without the researchers 
acknowledging it themselves. Although I will critically 
discuss empirical research my aim is not to contribute with 
new empirical research. My aim is to point at certain 
conceptual confusions in theory-of-mind theories and also 
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then conceptual confusions that are reflected in how the 
empirical research is built up and results are interpreted. 
Summaries of the chapters 
Chapter 1: Rationalistic and emotivistic theories 
of altruism  
In this first chapter I contrast emotivistic and rationalistic 
theory-of-mind theories in the context of evolutionary 
psychology and specifically concerning altruism. I begin by 
describing Cosmides and Tooby’s theory of altruism. 
According to them, altruism consists of an algorithmic 
reasoning mechanism by which we calculate how to act in 
order to maximize fitness when dealing with others. I 
contrast their theory with de Waal’s theory on altruism as 
consisting of a mental mechanism of empathic imagination. 
Cosmides and Tooby’s as well as de Waal’s perspectives 
are expressive of two problems. First, the reliance on a 
transactional model of interpersonal relationships. Second, 
the view of interpersonal understanding as consisting of an 
ability for analogical imagination. By reflecting on various 
examples of the natural and social form of our life I 
question the above mentioned perspectives and point to 
alternative ways of understanding human social life and 
the ways we can care for each other. In this context I also 
bring in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on primitive 
reactions and language.  
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Chapter 2: Theory of mind and infants’ 
imitation of facial expressions 
In this second chapter I focus on the conception of the 
human body that can mainly be seen in emotivistic 
theories. This emotivistic conception is also often called 
“simulation theory”. According to simulation theory 
interpersonal understanding is dependent on a capacity for 
analogical imagination which again is dependent on the 
capacity to simulate bodily reactions. The chapter deals 
with certain psychological experiments on imitation that 
have been made with infants. The psychologists Andrew 
Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore have shown that newborn 
infants have a capacity to imitate other people’s facial 
expressions. These findings suggest that children have a 
theory-of-mind function by which they learn to decipher 
other people’s facial expressions and thereby also 
eventually to understand other people’s intentions. One of 
my aims in this chapter is to discuss how these empirical 
observations should be understood. My aim is not to deny 
the empirical findings per se. Rather I argue that certain 
philosophical assumptions shape the research methods so 
that certain results are reached. I also argue that the 
appearance of clarity in the experimental results is due to 
the strongly restricted focus. 
 
Chapter 3: Autism and theory of mind 
The theme of this chapter is the syndrome of autism and 
research suggesting that persons with autism lack a theory-
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of-mind function, i.e. that autism can be described as 
“mindblindness”.  
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder that 
affects a person’s life extensively. The most striking and 
central feature in autism is the lack of social responsiveness. 
A child with autism is largely unresponsive to other people, 
and often has serious deficits in language. Such a child 
generally does not seem to acknowledge the presence of 
other people, does not respond to other people’s talk, and 
generally does not play with other children etc. Such traits 
in autism can appear to point towards an inability to see 
that other people have minds.  
In this chapter I discuss the theory that autism consists 
in “mindblindness”. I reflect on several empirical studies 
that seem to imply that children with autism lack a theory-
of-mind function. Even though the empirical findings are 
important and even though they do seem to point to some 
form of severe social dysfunction, I claim that the findings 
are more ambiguous than the theory-of-mind theorists 
acknowledge. I also claim that the image of autism as 
mindblindness is created by a one-sided conception of 
ordinary forms of interpersonal understanding as well as a 
one-sided and restricted focus when discussing the 
responses of children with autism. By looking at Clara 
Claiborne Park’s (1967) (2001) biographical books about 
her autistic daughter I try to bring in a more varied picture 
of autism. I do not want to deny that persons with autism 
have various severe problems with interpersonal 
understanding. However, I maintain that these problems 
cannot be understood from the point of view that ordinary 
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interpersonal understanding consists in a theory-of-mind 
function.   
My intention in this chapter is twofold. On a specific 
level the aim is to discuss and question the claim that 
persons with autism lack a theory-of-mind function. 
However, on a broader level, which connects it with the 
other chapters in this thesis, my aim is to once again 
discuss the relationship between empirical research and 
theory-of-mind theory.            
 
Chapter 4: The relationship between empathic 
imagination and compassion  
In this last chapter I discuss certain theories suggesting 
that there is a relationship between empathic imagination 
and compassion. I begin by discussing certain 
experimental investigations on empathy that are 
considered to prove that there is a psychological causal 
link between empathic imagination and compassion. I 
discuss the results of the experiments and argue that they 
are more ambiguous than might seem at first glance. I 
question the experiments on two accounts. On the one 
hand, the experimental context is so strongly reduced that 
it becomes unclear in what sense the participants can be 
said to understand that another person is suffering. Further, 
I maintain that the instructions that the experimenters give 
to the test subjects are leading. This creates a further 
ambiguity in how the responses should be understood.  
By discussing some biographical descriptions of 
suffering as well as of compassion I claim that our failures 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
40 
 
to understand another person’s suffering are of a quite 
different character than what is assumed in the cognitively 
oriented theories on empathy. At the same time, however, 
there are some features in our ways of reacting to another 
person’s suffering that can partly explain why a cognitive 
capacity for analogical imagination can be appealing as a 
philosophical theory. Also both mind-body dualistic as 
well as solipsistic forms of thinking gain credibility when 
one reflects on suffering. However, even if there are traits 
in suffering that can give a certain comprehensibility to 
philosophical perspectives such as empathy, body-mind 
dualism or solipsism, this still does not make these 
perspectives unproblematic.  
In the last part of the chapter I discuss the idea that 
empathic imagination can be used for both good and evil 
purposes. I argue that knowledge is not necessarily always 
expressive of understanding. The assumption that there is 
a cognitive method of empathic imagination that we can 
use for good or evil purposes is based on a conception of 
knowledge as something neutral, something that is 
independent of our attitudes and of our responsibility 
towards other people. I argue that this is a confusion 
regarding the concept of knowledge which is also reflected 
in the idea that there is some such thing as a cognitive 
method of empathic imagination. 
 
  
Chapter 1: Rationalistic and emotivistic 
theories of altruism9 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss two perspectives on altruism. I do 
so by looking at some central modern evolutionary 
theorists, connecting these with two traditions of 
philosophical thinking. The modern evolutionary theorists 
I discuss are the psychologist Leda Cosmides, the 
anthropologist John Tooby and the primatologist and 
ethologist Frans de Waal. These represent two different 
theoretical perspectives on altruism. Cosmides and Tooby 
can be said to have a rationalistic perspective on altruism. 
According to them, altruism consists of an algorithmic 
reasoning mechanism by which we calculate how to act in 
order to maximize fitness when dealing with others. 
According to de Waal, on the other hand, altruism is based 
on empathic imagination. These two modern perspectives 
on altruism are linked with two theoretical traditions. 
Cosmides and Tooby’s rationalistic perspective can be 
traced back to Thomas Hobbes, Herbert Spencer, William 
D. Hamilton and John Maynard Smith. De Waal’s 
emotionally oriented “empathic” perspective on altruism 
can, in turn, be traced back to Adam Smith, Charles 
                                                          
9 An earlier version of this chapter has been published in Gustafsson 
(2012). 
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Darwin and Edward Westermarck. Darwin and 
Westermarck can be regarded as important contributors to 
both of these two traditions of thought, although their 
main approaches stand closer to de Waal’s. 
The main problems about the approaches I discuss are 
the reliance on a transactional model of interpersonal 
relationships and the view that interpersonal 
understanding consists in an ability for analogical 
imagination. I will also maintain that the very concept of 
altruism may obscure more than clarify the meaning of 
care and compassion in human life. Finally I also claim that 
the two perspectives on altruism are, in some important 
ways, not actually opposites but share similar, in part 
questionable, presuppositions about the character of 
human life. 
Even if both the above mentioned perspectives are 
problematic, many observations and descriptions made by 
these researchers on how people (and animals) sometimes 
behave and reason in real life can be made out to support 
their views. However, even though the two perspectives 
on altruism offer interesting and also insightful 
observations of human life, the researchers tend to give 
problematic explanations for their observations. I suggest 
that some of their descriptions are too restricted in focus or 
too one-sided or generalising. The reductive and 
generalising descriptions of human life are expressive of 
how the researchers are influenced by classical, but 
problematic, conceptions of our shared human life and 
interpersonal understanding. By bringing in alternative 
examples and alternative descriptions of the behaviour 
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they cite for support, I try to point to other ways of 
describing human life.  In this context I also bring in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on primitive reactions 
and language. 
Still, even if I question the two perspectives on altruism 
I also think that especially the “theorists of empathy”, i.e. 
Adam Smith, Darwin, Westermarck and de Waal offer 
many sensitive reflections on the natural character of our 
shared human life; reflections that also in many ways 
resemble Wittgenstein’s reflections on the natural form of 
human life.  
1.2 Altruism as transaction 
According to Cosmides and Tooby, the human mind has 
adapted over thousands of years, so that we have become 
the social and moral beings of today. Through evolutionary 
history, we have developed a mental skill of calculating 
how to act optimally in our dealings with others. All such 
dealings are formed so that they on the whole tend to 
enhance fitness i.e. the propagation of copies of the agent’s 
alleles in subsequent generations.10 Cosmides and Tooby 
(2008) describe this view as a social contract theory.  
                                                          
10 In The Adapted Mind (1992) Cosmides and Tooby distinguish between 
two meanings when they talk about “fitness”. They write: “Previously, 
evolutionary biologists spoke of a design’s ‘Darwinian fitness’: its effect 
on the number of offspring produced by an individual who has the 
design. But since Hamilton, one speaks of a design’s ‘inclusive fitness’: 
its effect on the number of offspring produced by an individual who has 
the design plus its effects on the number of offspring produced by others 
who may have the same design—that individual’s relatives—with each 
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Social contract theory is based on the hypothesis that 
the human mind was designed by evolution to reliably 
develop a cognitive adaptation specialized for 
reasoning about social exchange. [...] From an 
evolutionary point of view, the design of programs 
causing social behavior is constrained by the behavior 
of other agents. More precisely, it is constrained by the 
design of the behavior-regulating programs in other 
agents and the fitness consequences that result from the 
social interactions these programs cause. (Cosmides 
and Tooby 2008, pp. 69-70) 
Cosmides and Tooby further describe the fitness enhancing 
systems of reasoning to which our human minds have 
adapted as “evolutionarily stable strategies” or “ESS”. 
According to them, human social engagement has evolved 
because it has proved to be an evolutionarily stable 
strategy. If our social engagement with others did not 
enhance fitness it could not have survived for thousands of 
years.  
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (a 
decision rule) that can persist in a population because it 
produces fitness outcomes greater than or equal to 
alternative strategies. 11  The rules of reasoning and 
decision making that guide social exchange in humans 
would not exist unless they had outcompeted 
                                                                                                                    
effect discounted by the appropriate measures of relatedness […]” 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1992, p. 168) When Cosmides and Tooby talk 
about fitness they mean “inclusive fitness”.  
11 Cosmides and Tooby refer here to J. M. Smith (1982). 
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alternatives, so we should expect that they implement 
an ESS. (Cosmides and Tooby 2008, p. 70) 
In another article Tooby, Cosmides, Aaron Sell, Debra 
Liebermann and Daniel Sznycer (2008) conclude that 
altruism is the outcome of a nonconscious mental 
mechanism whereby we calculate how to cooperate with 
others. They note that human beings tend to be more 
altruistic towards their family than towards other people. 
This they define as “kin selection”. Kin selection is, 
according to them, an evolutionarily stable strategy that 
enhances fitness. Tooby et al. also speak in this context of a 
“welfare trade-off ratio” or “WTR”. By a “welfare trade-off 
ratio” they mean a mental mechanism or a “variable” that 
regulates how much we ought to help others in order to 
gain certain benefits. This variable can be “upregulated” 
when we are dealing with genetic relatives.  
[N]atural selection should have designed the human 
motivational architecture to embody programs 
determining how high one’s welfare trade-off ratio 
toward other individuals should be set. [...] kin 
selection theory tells us that, all else equal, WTR should 
be upregulated for close genetic relatives, motivating 
us to help kin more and harm them less than we 
otherwise would. (Tooby et al. 2008, p. 260) 
The degree to which we make sacrifices for others is 
dependent on a “kinship index” or “kin selection”. 
Important to note here is also that Tooby et al. think of 
these systems of reasoning as occurring nonconsciously. 
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[T]he welfare trade-off ratio, WTR is an internal 
regulatory variable expressing how much you value j’s 
welfare relative to your own. Its value is 
nonconsciously expressed in many decisions you make 
throughout the day—how much chocolate you leave 
for j, how loud you play your music when j is trying to 
work, whether to clean up the mess or leave it for j, 
whether to call home to let j know you will be late. It is 
computed by a system, the welfare trade-off ratio 
estimator, that takes into account a specific array of 
relevant variables [...]. (Tooby et al. 2008, p. 261) 
Tooby et al. follow a pattern of thinking that can be traced 
back to Thomas Hobbes’ idea that human social life can be 
described in terms of a trade-off scenario within the frame 
of a social contract. 12  However, for Hobbes the social 
contract was a theoretical explanation of the origins of 
society. When he described the state of nature as a state of 
war between individuals he did not claim that this is how 
things have actually originally been. Rather he wanted to 
paint a theoretical picture in order to advance his ideas about 
how to achieve a peaceful society.13 When Hobbes talks of 
the natural state of man as well as of the social contract he 
constructs a theoretical image that is not meant to be taken 
as a historical or biological hypothesis. The suggestion that 
what is described is really a biological fact about our 
species and real mental functions comes later, with the 
                                                          
12 See, for instance, Hobbes, ([1651] 1996), Leviathan, chapters 13–15. 
13 Another philosopher who, similarly, paints a theoretical picture of 
human life as originating from a state of nature is Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  
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evolutionary biologists William D. Hamilton (1964) and 
John Maynard Smith (1982). Hamilton argues that an 
organism’s survival ought to be understood according to 
“inclusive fitness”. By inclusive fitness Hamilton means 
that an organism’s genes have higher chances to survive if 
the organism cooperates with relatives or with other 
organisms of the same species. According to Hamilton, this 
explains why some species are altruistic. He writes:  
The social behavior of a species evolves in such a way 
that in each distinct behaviour-evoking situation the 
individual will seem to value his neighbour’s fitness 
against his own according to the coefficients of 
relationship appropriate to that situation. (Hamilton 
1964, p. 19)  
Following Hamilton’s ideas on inclusive fitness, John 
Maynard Smith introduced the idea of “evolutionary stable 
strategies” and argued that “kin selection” and “group 
selection” are such basic evolutionarily stable strategies. J. 
M. Smith (1982) also introduced the economic principles of 
game theory in his reflections on evolution. Cosmides and 
Tooby largely follow this line of thinking.  
1.3 Emotivistic conceptions of altruism 
Frans de Waal’s perspective on social life and on altruism 
differs from Cosmides and Tooby’s perspective. De Waal is 
sceptical of a transactional perspective where we fulfil 
other people’s wishes in order to gain advantages. He sees 
ape and human life as a shared life where we often 
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naturally and spontaneously help each other without 
wanting anything in return. In The Age of Empathy (2009) he 
has, for instance, the following description of chimpanzees 
helping each other. 
There is in fact so much evidence for altruism in apes 
that I will pick just a handful of stories to drive home 
my point [...] At our primate center, we have an old 
female, Peony, who spends her days with other 
chimpanzees in a large outdoor enclosure. On bad days, 
when her arthritis is flaring up, she has great trouble 
walking and climbing. But other females help her out. 
For example, Peony is huffing and puffing to get up 
into the climbing frame in which several apes have 
gathered for a grooming session. An unrelated younger 
female moves behind her, places both hands on her 
ample behind, and pushes her up with quite a bit of 
effort, until Peony has joined the rest. (de Waal 2009, p. 
105) 
De Waal has many descriptions like this one of how 
chimpanzees spontaneously help each other without 
requiring anything in return. He sees altruism as 
spontaneous emotional responsiveness that evolves 
naturally as we grow up with others. In Primates and 
Philosophers, How Morality Evolved (2006) he writes: “Since 
expressions of sympathy emerge at an early age in 
virtually every member of our species, they are as natural 
as the first step” (de Waal 2006, p. 28). The fact that others 
care for us, according to de Waal, is a natural aspect of how 
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we grow up and thus also develop emotional 
responsiveness to each other.  
De Waal’s perspective can be seen as linked with a 
different tradition than Cosmides and Tooby’s. De Waal 
follows a tradition of thought that can be traced back to 
Adam Smith, Charles Darwin and Edward Westermarck. 
According to Adam Smith, human beings have a natural 
inclination to form social bonds and relationships and to 
feel compassion for others. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments ([1759] 2002) Smith writes: 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest 
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or 
compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery 
of others, when we either see it, or are made to 
conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often 
derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of 
fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for 
this sentiment, like all the other original passions of 
human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous 
and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the 
most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most 
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not 
altogether without it. (Smith [1759] 2002, pp. 11-12) 
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According to Smith, we spontaneously care for others 
without requiring anything in return. 14  Consider again 
Tooby et al.’s description of such acts as calling home to let 
one’s family know one will be late. Instead of describing 
this as a trade-off response, one could say that calling 
home to let one’s family know one will be late, is an 
expression of spontaneous considerateness and care. It is 
usually not a decision we make on the basis of a calculation, 
nor is it because we expect something in return that we call 
home. Very often it is simply something we do because 
otherwise the family would get worried. In this way we 
often respond spontaneously with care towards our family 
(as we of course also often respond spontaneously with 
irritation or other negative emotions). 
Charles Darwin also maintains that human beings 
naturally have a “social instinct” and an inclination to help 
each other. However, Darwin differs from Adam Smith in 
that Darwin’s perspective is more biologically oriented. 
Thus he draws many comparisons between animal and 
human behaviour. In The Origin of Species and The Descent of 
Man ([1859, 1871] 1872) Darwin writes: 
                                                          
14 Smith does not specifically use the word “altruism”, as there was no 
such word at the time when he was writing. The French term “altruisme” 
was first introduced into philosophical theory by Auguste Comte in his 
Catéchisme Positiviste (1852). This term was translated as “altruism” in 
Richard Congreve’s English rendering of the text The Catechism of 
Positive Religion (1858). Smith’s ideas on compassion are, however, 
similar to Comte’s ideas on altruism, inasmuch as Comte does not think 
of altruism as being based on self-interest. 
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[...] the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure 
in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of 
sympathy with them, and to perform various services 
for them. The services may be of a definite and 
evidently instinctive nature; or there may be only a 
wish and readiness, as with most of the higher social 
animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways. 
(Darwin [1859, 1871] 1872 p. 472) 
He continues:    
The feeling of pleasure from society is probably an 
extension of the parental or filial affections, since the 
social instinct seems to be developed by the young 
remaining for a long time with their parents; and this 
extension may be attributed in part to habit, but chiefly 
to natural selection. (Darwin [1859, 1871] 1872, p. 478) 
Darwin saw it as a central feature of natural selection that 
animals have natural “social instincts”. According to him, 
these instincts originally develop among human beings in 
the child’s relationship with its parents. 
Another philosopher who was influenced by both 
Adam Smith and Darwin, (and who also has influenced de 
Waal) is Edward Westermarck. He writes in Ethical 
Relativity (1932):  
For my own part I maintain that Adam Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments is the most important contribution 
to moral psychology made by any British thinker, and 
that it is so in the first place on account of the emphasis 
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it lays on the retributive character of the moral 
emotions. (Westermarck 1932, p. 71) 
Like Smith, Westermarck emphasises our spontaneous 
responsivity towards each other. And in line with Darwin 
he claims that the origin of our social instincts can be 
traced back to certain biological social patterns such as the 
natural relation between parent and child. Thus, in The 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,Volume II (1917), 
he writes: “There is one form of the altruistic sentiment 
which man shares with all mammals and many other 
animals, namely, maternal affection.” (Westermarck 1917, 
p. 186) He continues:  
When the young are born in a state of utter 
helplessness somebody must take care of them, or the 
species cannot survive, or, rather, such a species could 
never have come into existence. The maternal instinct 
may thus be assumed to owe its origin to the survival 
of the fittest, to the natural selection of useful 
spontaneous variations. (Westermarck 1917, p. 188)  
To sum up the discussion so far, one can say that there are 
two main traditions of ideas with regard to altruism that I 
will discuss. There is the transactional and computational 
perspective beginning with Hobbes and continuing, with 
alterations, in Hamilton, J.M. Smith, Cosmides and Tooby. 
On the other side we have the emotivistic perspective, 
beginning with Adam Smith and continuing with 
variations, in Darwin, Westermarck and de Waal. Here our 
tendency to respond spontaneously and emotionally to other 
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people’s plight is emphasised. This perspective also 
emphasises the fact that we are born into certain forms of 
social relations (mainly families), and that we grow into 
habits of being with and responding to each other.  
These two traditions of ideas might appear to be sharply 
opposed. However, it is not evident that they are so. For 
instance, when de Waal states that our compassionate 
responses are not based on any attempt to gain benefits, 
Cosmides and Tooby might well agree, and reply by 
saying that such responses of course do not appear to 
involve calculation; it is simply the case that these 
calculations occur nonconsciously. I will return to these 
questions later. 
1.4 Sympathy, empathy and retributive emotions 
as consisting of analogical imagination 
One idea that Adam Smith, Darwin, Westermarck and de 
Waal have in common is a conception of emotions as 
reciprocal or (using Westermarck’s term) “retributive”. 
This is again connected with a certain conception of the 
nature of interpersonal understanding. As I already 
mentioned, all four authors would emphasise our 
spontaneous inclination to care for others. However, all 
four also maintain that this inclination can be explained as 
deriving from a certain function embedded in the mind, 
even if it is not a computational function.   
According to Adam Smith, our care for other people is 
connected with our capacity to imagine ourselves in the 
other’s situation. This can be seen in his ideas on sympathy. 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
54 
 
By “sympathy”, Smith does not mean simply compassion, 
but any kind of imaginative experience of another person’s 
feelings that cause us to be emotionally moved by the other. 
This is, in modern terms, called “empathy”. The 
explanation for our spontaneous reactions of compassion 
must be sought in the functioning of our minds and in our 
capacity to imagine how others feel.  
As we have no immediate experience of what other 
men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which 
they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves 
should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is 
upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, 
our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. 
They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our 
own person, and it is by the imagination only that we 
can form any conception of what are his sensations. 
Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, 
than by representing to us what would be our own, if 
we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own 
senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations 
copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his 
situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same 
torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become 
in some measure the same person with him, and thence 
form some idea of his sensations, and even feel 
something which, though weaker in degree, is not 
altogether unlike them. (Smith [1759] 2002, pp. 11-12) 
Smith’s explanation of moral sentiments consists in an 
argument from analogy. Sympathy is the effect of our 
capacity to imagine ourselves in the other’s shoes. This 
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effect can in turn make us feel compassion for the other 
person’s misery.  
Darwin and Westermarck argue along similar lines as 
Smith. Darwin refers to Adam Smith’s ideas of sympathy 
as consisting of analogical imagination. He further 
suggests that natural selection has increased our tendency 
to feel sympathy especially for our loved ones.15  
According to Westermarck, morality is the outcome of 
“retributive emotions”: 
The moral emotions are retributive emotions. A 
retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of mind, either 
hostile or kindly, towards a living being (or something 
taken for a living being), regarded as a cause of pain or 
pleasure. (Westermarck 1932, p. 172) 
However, he recognizes that the individual’s reactions to 
the causes of his or her own pleasure or pain do not yet 
explain why the individual reacts to the pleasure or pain of 
others: 
Our retributive emotions are, of course, always 
reactions against pain or pleasure felt by ourselves; this 
holds good of the moral emotions as well as of anger, 
revenge, and gratitude. The question to be answered, 
then, is, Why should we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain 
calling forth disapproval because our neighbour is hurt, 
and pleasure calling forth approval because he is 
benefited? That a certain act causes pleasure or pain to 
the bystander may be due to the close association that 
                                                          
15 See Darwin ([1859,1871] 1872) pp. 478-479. 
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exists between these feelings and their outward 
expressions. The sight of a happy face tends to produce 
some degree of pleasure in him who sees it; the sight of 
the bodily signs of suffering tends to produce a feeling 
of pain. In either case the feeling of the spectator is due 
to the fact that the perception of the physical 
manifestations of the feeling produces the feeling itself 
on account of the established association between them. 
(Westermarck 1932, p. 96) 
According to Westermarck, when I see another person’s 
bodily expressions this causes me to associate these 
expressions with certain feelings; and thereby I feel these 
feelings myself. This analogical mechanism of imagination 
explains, according to him, why we are inclined to help 
another person when he is in pain. However, Westermarck 
also suggests that this spontaneous emotional 
responsiveness to others develops through habit. In this 
sense he does not merely consider compassion to derive 
from a mental capacity of analogical imagination. Rather 
he claims that our inclination to imagine how other people 
feel grows out of our habits of shared relationships. It is, 
according to him, important that we get used to sharing 
our life with each other, for how our emotional 
responsiveness also develops.  
Frans de Waal’s ideas are largely along similar lines as 
those of Adam Smith, Darwin and Westermarck. As I 
already suggested, according to de Waal, our inclination to 
care for each other is grounded in the fact that we are born 
into social relationships. But he also thinks that it can be 
explained as consisting of a mental mechanism of 
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imagination. According to him, both humans and apes 
have a natural capacity to imagine how others feel; a 
capacity that is enhanced by our habitual ways of living 
together.  
De Waal, who is more biologically oriented than Adam 
Smith and Westermarck, also describes empathy as at first 
originating from a bodily reaction that eventually develops 
into a full fledged capacity to imagine another’s 
perspective. According to de Waal, then, first we simply 
have a tendency for what he calls “emotional linkage” or 
“emotional contagion”. Eventually we also develop the 
capacity to see that others have different perspectives on 
reality. This is, according to him, part of what it means to 
feel empathy.  
When the emotional state of one individual induces a 
matching or closely related state in another, we speak 
of ‘emotional contagion’ [...] With increasing 
differentiation between self and other, and an 
increasing appreciation of the precise circumstances 
underlying the emotional states of others, emotional 
contagion develops into empathy. Empathy 
encompasses—and could not possibly have arisen 
without—emotional contagion, but it goes beyond it in 
that it places filters between the other’s and one’s own 
state. (de Waal 2006, p. 26) 
According to de Waal, this capacity for empathy is not 
something that can be explained as deriving from social 
competition, but derives from a need for cooperation. 
Human beings as well as apes have a natural inclination to 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
58 
 
become emotionally affected by others because we have a 
natural need to cooperate. The natural habit of cooperating 
in turn enhances our inclinations to become emotionally 
affected by each other.  
I am personally convinced that apes take one another’s 
perspective, and that the evolutionary origin of this 
ability is not to be sought in social competition, even if 
it is readily applied in this domain [...], but in the need 
for cooperation. At the core of perspective-taking is 
emotional linkage between individuals—widespread in 
social mammals—upon which evolution (or 
development) builds ever more complex manifestations, 
including appraisal of another’s knowledge and 
intentions. (de Waal 2006, p. 72) 
This “emotional linkage” eventually leads to a more 
advanced capacity to imagine another’s perspective, which 
de Waal calls empathy.  
Even if I think there is much truth in these ideas on how 
our responsiveness to each other, and our care for each 
other, grow out of our habits of sharing each other’s life, I 
also think it is problematic to claim that, at the bottom of 
our responsiveness, there is some such thing as an 
analogical mechanism of imagination. De Waal describes 
the empathic mechanism as follows: 
[...] at the core of the empathic capacity is a relatively 
simple mechanism that provides an observer (the 
‘subject’) with access to the emotional state of another 
(the ‘object’) through the subject’s own neural and 
bodily representations. When the subject attends to the 
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object’s state, the subject’s neural representations of 
similar states are automatically activated. The closer 
and more similar subject and object are, the easier it 
will be for the subject’s perception to activate motor 
and autonomic responses that match the object’s (e.g., 
changes in heart rate, skin conductance, facial 
expression, body posture). This activation allows the 
subject to ‘get under the skin’ of the object, sharing its 
feelings and needs, which embodiment in turn fosters 
sympathy, compassion, and helping. (de Waal 2006, pp. 
37-38) 
I agree with de Waal (and Smith, Darwin and Westermarck) 
that it is a common feature that we are emotionally affected 
by others and that a kind of emotional contagion often 
occurs. But the question is whether this can be understood 
as expressive of an analogical mental mechanism, as Smith, 
Westermarck and de Waal describe it. And the question is 
also whether compassion can be understood in this sense 
as deriving from analogical imagination.  
De Waal also assumes that it is central for our capacity 
to be emotionally moved by other people that we have 
physically similar bodies. There is, I think, something 
partly correct and partly problematic in de Waal’s 
suggestion that the human bodily form is of importance for 
our capacity to care for other people. I shall continue to 
discuss this in the next section.  
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1.5 Criticism of the argument from analogy 
As I have noted above, according to Smith, Darwin, 
Westermarck and de Waal, compassion is based on a 
cognitive capacity for analogical imagination. This idea 
reflects certain problematic assumptions. It reflects the 
assumption that I understand the other person’s emotions 
by first understanding what the emotion means in my own 
case, and by then projecting these feelings onto the other 
person. Such an idea rests on a classical form of 
philosophical scepticism where the idea is that we can only 
really know what we feel ourselves. In other words, the 
idea that compassion is based on the use of an analogical 
method of imagination (i.e. empathy) is expressive of a 
tendency to assume that the second-person perspective (i.e. 
how we respond to other people) is dependent on the first-
person perspective, when we talk about sensations. The 
idea is that the second-person perspective on sensations is 
a kind of copy of the first person perspective. This 
assumption can be seen in the explanations of how 
empathy works.  
However, we do sometimes imagine how we would feel 
in another person’s situation, and these thoughts can 
sometimes be connected with compassion, but this is 
merely one form our care for another person can take. Our 
care for another person can equally well take the form that 
we do not use our imagination. To take an example, you 
see a child hit by a car and you run instantly to help the 
child. The only thing that passes your mind might be 
something like “Oh my God!” That is, often we simply 
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react to suffering and no imagination is needed. But 
sometimes we might also imagine things. For instance, in 
the evening after the accident you cannot stop thinking 
about the child. Your thoughts about the child can also be 
entwined with how you think about your own children. 
Here one could say that a kind of analogical imagination 
occurs. However, this analogical imagination is in itself 
already a kind of moral response, it is one way you are 
shocked and can’t stop worrying. The fact that reactions of 
this kind can occur does not show that this is a basic 
cognitive mechanism that enables us to understand other 
people. We can respond with compassion in many 
different ways to other people’s suffering, but this does not 
mean that one of these ways of responding is the basis for 
all other kinds of responses. It can also be noted that in the 
case above the analogical imagination is a reaction after the 
accident. It is, in this case, not something that precedes, 
and motivates, the helping action.  
The problem with Adam Smith, Darwin, Westermarck 
and de Waal is their conception of how analogical 
imagination works and of its importance. They assume that 
it is a general and basic cognitive method or function that 
enables us to understand other people and that, because 
we imagine ourselves in the suffering person’s place, 
enables us to care for the other. 
Wittgenstein suggests another way to consider what it 
means to understand another person, and thus also what it 
means to care for another person’s suffering. In Zettel 
([1967] 1981) he writes:  
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Only surrounded by certain normal manifestations of 
life, is there such a thing as an expression of pain. Only 
surrounded by an even more far-reaching particular 
manifestation of life, such a thing as the expression of 
sorrow or affection. And so on. (Wittgenstein [1967] 
1981, §534)  
A few paragraphs later he continues:  
It is a help here to remember that it is a primitive 
reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when 
someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneself 
is—and so to pay attention to other people’s pain-
behaviour, as one does not pay attention to one’s own 
pain behaviour. (Wittgenstein [1967] 1981, §540) 
Partly Wittgenstein’s reflections here resemble Adam 
Smith’s, Darwin’s, Westermarck’s and de Waal’s ideas in 
the emphasis on the spontaneous primitive reaction to care 
for other people. An important difference, however, is that 
Wittgenstein does not claim that such a reaction can be 
explained as deriving from a general cognitive capacity for 
analogical imagination. According to Wittgenstein, it is 
against the background of a broad shared pattern of life—a 
life where we naturally share close relationships with 
others and where we then also respond spontaneously to 
each other in various ways, by for instance sorrow or 
affection that the concept of pain has meaning. It is then 
also as part of such a broad shared pattern of life that our 
spontaneous responsiveness to each other sometimes can 
be reflected in how we think of others. Wittgenstein does 
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not deny that we may sometimes imagine in an analogical 
sense. But he does not maintain that such a form of 
imagination is a basic cognitive mechanism that enables us 
to understand others. 
However, as I have already claimed, even if Smith, 
Darwin, Westermarck and de Waal partly explain altruism 
in terms of a mental method or function of analogical 
imagination, they also partly have a perspective that is 
similar to Wittgenstein’s. Wittgenstein says that it is a 
primitive reaction to tend to another’s pain. Smith, Darwin, 
Westermarck and de Waal say that we spontaneously 
respond to other people’s suffering. Darwin, Westermarck 
and de Waal also emphasise the importance of habit for 
how we grow into being responsive to each other. 
According to Wittgenstein, the expression of pain has its 
meaning because it is part of a broader pattern of a shared 
human life.  
Does this mean that Smith, Darwin, Westermarck and 
de Waal actually think along similar lines as Wittgenstein? 
Even if there are similarities, there are also important 
differences. As was already suggested, one important 
difference lies in the cognitive and also essentialistic role 
that Smith, Darwin, Westermarck and de Waal give to such 
concepts as imagination and understanding (treating them 
as epistemic elements that so to speak give compassion a 
justification in facts). When Wittgenstein says that we can 
only understand the expression of pain if we see it as part 
of a broader pattern of a shared life, he suggests that it is 
problematic to try to give one perspective (i.e. the first 
person perspective) a basic explanatory role if we want to 
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understand such aspects of human life as pain or 
compassion. It will be equally problematic to give 
analogical imagination such a basic explanatory role. The 
inclination to think that interpersonal understanding rests 
on a cognitive function of analogical imagination, or that it 
rests on analogical bodily responses, is reflective of an 
inclination to ignore that we are involved in each other’s 
life in a multitude of ways. The inclination to use 
generalising expressions for our care for other people, such 
as the expression “altruism”, is linked with the above 
tendencies.  
There also appears to be a similarity between the ways 
de Waal and Wittgenstein talk of the human bodily form. 
According to de Waal, it is an important aspect of empathy 
that we have physically similar bodies. This is connected 
with how he thinks of interpersonal understanding as 
dependent on analogical bodily responses. Again, if one 
looks at some of Wittgenstein’s remarks it can appear as if 
he were saying something similar as de Waal. In 
Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 2001) he writes:  
[…] only of a living human being and what resembles 
(behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has 
sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious 
or unconscious. (Wittgenstein [1953] 2001, §281)  
One can take this passage to mean that in order for us to 
understand other people they must be physically similar. 
However, David Cockburn (1985) suggests another way to 
understand Wittgenstein’s remark. He writes: 
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[…] the possibility of thinking of another as being in 
pain, afraid, angry and so on is tied to the possibility of 
feeling certain things towards them—of responding to 
them in certain ways. And the possibility of responding 
in the relevant ways is tied to their having a certain 
form. (Cockburn 1985, p. 491) 
In another paper (1994) Cockburn writes:   
We turn away in horror from the sight of someone’s 
contorted face, close our ears to his cries of pain, watch 
his face carefully for a sign of an easing of the pain, 
look into his face, into his eyes, in sympathy, put an 
arm around his shoulder, and so on. (Cockburn 1994, p. 
144) 
According to Cockburn, Wittgenstein’s remarks on the 
human form ought to be understood in connection with 
how he talks of our understanding of another person’s 
pain as an attitude towards the other person and then also 
as a response to the other. Our responses of compassion 
often take certain bodily forms. We may look into the eyes 
of the other person or we may put an arm around his 
shoulder. In this sense Wittgenstein’s remarks on the 
importance of the human bodily form differs from de 
Waal’s remarks on the importance of our having physically 
similar bodies. While de Waal claims that physical 
similarity enables us to respond to other people in an 
analogical sense, Wittgenstein suggests that it is against a 
broad background of a shared life that the human bodily 
form is also of importance for the way we respond to 
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another’s suffering, by for instance holding the person’s 
hand or looking into his eyes. Cockburn (1994) further 
notes that we also often ascribe fear or other emotions to 
animals that physically can look and behave very 
differently from human beings. He maintains that our 
ascribing emotion to an animal is reflective of the way we 
can be concerned for the animal in question. That is, it is 
not because we observe certain physical similarities 
between human and animal behaviour that we draw the 
conclusion that the animal is afraid or happy. Cockburn 
suggests it is the other way around: “[…] our concern for 
creatures of a certain kind creates the possibility of our 
ascribing fear, pain and so on to them; and that, in turn, 
creates the possibility of observing a similarity between 
their behaviour and that of human beings (Cockburn 1994, 
p.150).” One can say the same thing about our ability to 
ascribe emotions to human beings. That we do so is in itself 
expressive of our attitude to the person, and expressive of 
how we are involved in each other’s life.  
1.6 Cooperation: emotivistic conceptions of 
human social life as instrumental 
So far I have contrasted two theoretical perspectives on 
altruism; one rationalistic (transactional) and another that 
can be said to be emotivistic (and analogical) in kind. The 
rationalistic and emotivistic theoretical perspectives can 
appear to be quite opposite. However, in what follows I 
will argue that both perspectives suggest that human social 
life can essentially be described in instrumental terms, even 
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though they have somewhat different conceptions of this 
instrumental basis of human social life. I will argue that the 
tendency to consider human social life as having an 
instrumental essence is problematic.  
Consider the following description by Jessica C. Flack 
and de Waal (2000) of food-sharing among chimpanzees: 
Food sharing is known in chimpanzees [...] It is an 
alternative method to social dominance and direct 
competition by which adult members of a social group 
distribute resources among themselves. Most food 
sharing requires fine-tuned communication about 
intentions and desires in order to facilitate inter-
individual food transfers. (Flack and de Waal 2000, p. 4) 
Flack and de Waal further explain this food sharing:  
[T]he reciprocity hypothesis—proposes that food 
sharing is part of a system of mutual obligations that 
can involve material exchange, the exchange of social 
favours such as grooming and agonistic support, or 
some combination of the two. (Flack and de Waal 2000, 
p. 5) 
Flack and de Waal suggest that food-sharing is an example 
of what they call “the reciprocity hypothesis”, i.e. a system 
of exchanges of favours. Even though I do think Flack and 
de Waal’s emphasis on cooperative relationships has much 
truth in it, I think there are still some problems with the 
way they describe our care for each other as an exchange of 
favours. Such a description does not show how our 
practical, and non-practical, ways of living have meaning 
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as an integral part of our close relationships. Consider, 
again, what it means to eat together. For human beings, 
eating together is often a way of spending time together, of 
being together. We do not simply exchange food; we eat 
together. Eating together has a different meaning than 
eating alone. That we eat together often displays the self-
evident way in which our lives are intimately woven 
together in multifarious ways. Sharing meals brings 
meaning to the whole situation. At the same time, the fact 
that we share meals is expressive of our sense of 
responsibility for the other. This is a responsibility that 
cannot be understood without acknowledging the 
importance of our shared presence for each other in eating 
together. This presence shows itself, for instance, in the fact 
that we often spontaneously talk with each other and listen 
to each other while we eat.  
According to Flack and de Waal, communication is used 
in food sharing in order to “facilitate inter-individual food 
transfers”. I agree that talking while eating can be of 
practical importance. However, the fact that we talk at 
meals also often has a non-practical character. We simply 
talk because we are together. We are often spontaneously 
drawn into conversations while we eat with others. This 
may be something neither of us decides to do; and it need 
not have any further purpose. But it reflects how we can be 
there for each other. This spontaneous presence is in itself 
expressive of moral sensitivity towards the other; my 
ability to be drawn into the other person’s life, to become 
interested in his life and to take his life seriously.  
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Of course there can be situations where people do not 
talk with each other while eating. In some families it might 
be even more of a rule that they do not talk while eating. 
There can be various reasons for this. One reason can be 
that the married couple are deeply fed up with each other. 
In such situations a cold manner of talking merely in order 
to “facilitate inter-individual food transfers” might also 
take place. However, even if both animals and human 
beings sometimes share meals in a purely practical manner, 
and even if both animals and human beings sometimes 
communicate simply in order to exchange benefits while 
eating, such ways of eating are not any more basic or more 
natural than are our ways of enjoying eating together. Nor 
do such ways of eating and talking explain the multifarious 
ways we share a life with each other and find meaning in 
being together.  
Wittgenstein writes: “Commanding, questioning, 
storytelling, chatting, are as much a part of our natural 
history as walking, eating, drinking, playing” 
(Wittgenstein 2001, §25). One thing Wittgenstein suggests 
here is that it is problematic to think of human nature as if 
it had an “essentially natural” part consisting of practical 
activities essential for survival, while our non-practical 
activities would not be as essentially natural but “cultural” 
or “psychological” features that enhance our practical 
cooperation. Another thing he suggests is that it is 
problematic to think of language as basically a practical 
tool. Wittgenstein mentions such things as chatting, 
storytelling and playing, that is, ways of talking and doing 
things that do not have a specific goal but are rather forms 
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of being with others. For Wittgenstein, our practical actions 
are not in any sense more basic or more natural than our 
non-practical ones. Nor is a practical use of language, such 
as exchanging information, more basic than a non-practical 
one such as chatting, or joking, or quarrelling or 
storytelling. The meaning of our practical activities can 
often not be separated from the way these are entwined in 
activities and ways of talking that do not have a practical 
character. A further thing Wittgenstein’s remark suggests 
is that a large part of our activities have their meaning 
because these activities are integral to our standing in 
personal relationships. What it means for human beings to 
eat cannot be separated from the fact that we share meals 
and that it is common to talk spontaneously while we eat. 
In this sense our physical needs largely get their form and 
meaning from the fact that we live a shared life with others, 
and a shared life full of talk.  
In The Age of Empathy (2009) de Waal seems, however, to 
acknowledge the fact that sharing a meal cannot basically 
be described as an exchange of favors (i.e. cooperation). He 
notes that apes not only help each other out when trying to 
get food but they also sit down and eat together. He asks: 
[...] could it be that they just love to eat together? If both 
monkeys are rewarded, they will sit side by side 
munching on the same food. Do things taste better 
together than alone, the way we are more at ease 
having dinner with family and friends? (de Waal 2009, 
p. 113) 
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My answer here would be yes: sometimes food does taste 
better with family and friends and sometimes it tastes 
worse. De Waal then draws the following conclusion. 
Perhaps it is time to abandon the idea that individuals 
faced with others in need decide whether to help, or 
not, by mentally tallying up costs and benefits. These 
calculations have likely been made for them by natural 
selection. Weighing the consequences of behavior over 
evolutionary time, it has endowed primates with 
empathy, which ensures that they help others under 
the right circumstances. The fact that empathy is most 
easily aroused by familiar partners guarantees that 
assistance flows chiefly toward those close to the actor. 
(de Waal 2009, p. 115) 
Despite noting that apes (and humans) enjoy eating 
together, de Waal does not pursue the question what it 
implies; for instance, what it means to grow into a close 
personal relationship. De Waal assumes that close personal 
relationships are based on a cognitive and psychological 
phenomenon where our getting used to each other’s 
company makes us more inclined to feel empathy for each 
other. This he sees as having a positive evolutionary effect 
since it enhances our capacity to cooperate.  
Westermarck also emphasises the fact that people as 
well as animals enjoy being together. He claims that 
through evolution human beings and certain animals have 
slowly developed into beings that not only respond 
emotionally to each other and cooperate, but into beings 
that simply enjoy each other’s company. He writes: 
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When gregariousness became an advantage to man, he 
would feel inclined to remain with those with whom he 
was living even after the family had fulfilled its 
object—the preservation of the helpless offspring. And 
he would be induced to do so not only from egoistic 
considerations, but by an instinct which, owing to its 
usefulness, would gradually develop, practically within 
the limits of kinship—the gregarious instinct.  
  By the gregarious instinct I understand an 
animal’s proneness to live together with other members 
of its own species, apart from parental, conjugal, and 
filial attachment. It involves, or leads to, pleasure in the 
consciousness of their presence. The members of a herd 
are at ease in each other’s company, suffer when they 
are separated, and rejoice when they are reunited. By 
actual living together the instinct is individualised, and 
it is strengthened by habit. The pleasure with which 
one individual looks upon another is further increased 
by the solidarity of interests. Not only have they 
enjoyments in common, but they have the same 
enemies to resist, the same dangers to encounter, the 
same difficulties to overcome. Hence acts which are 
beneficial to the agent are at the same time beneficial to 
his companions, and the distinction between ego and 
alter loses much of its importance.  
  But the members of the group do not merely take 
pleasure in each other’s company. Associated animals 
very frequently display a feeling of affection for each 
other—defend each other, help each other in distress 
and danger, perform various services for each other. 
(Westermarck 1917, pp. 196-197) 
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The difference between Westermarck and de Waal is 
perhaps not a very big one but I still think there is a 
difference that is worth reflecting on. In the quote above 
Westermarck gives great importance to the fact that 
animals enjoy each other’s company. He does not say that 
animals live together mainly in order to cooperate. Rather 
he maintains that the concept of cooperation gets meaning 
against the background of a shared life where we find it 
meaningful to live together for reasons that cannot be 
reduced to its being useful for us individually to cooperate. 
Thus cooperation cannot be understood as if it were a case 
of two strangers simply deciding to work together for the 
sake of some individual benefit to each. Nor can the 
concept of cooperation be understood as the basic aspect 
that gives meaning to all social relationships. Westermarck 
suggests it is the other way around. Our social 
relationships give meaning to what we mean by 
cooperation. My impression is that Westermarck touches 
on something important here, and that he also differs from 
de Waal. De Waal suggests that “natural selection” has 
enhanced our cognitive capacity for analogical imagination 
(i.e. empathy) which has enhanced our capacity to 
cooperate. In a similar sense Westermarck suggests that the 
origin of our “gregarious instincts” lies in the usefulness of 
cooperation. However, as I already noted, Westermarck 
also claims that our “gregarious instincts” give further 
meaning to how animals and humans cooperate. In this 
sense Westermarck leans partly towards de Waal’s 
perspective and partly he differs from de Waal in the sense 
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that he does not reduce social relationships to a basically 
instrumental meaning. 
In The Ethical Demand ([1956] 1997) K.E. Løgstrup 
distinguishes between mere cooperative relationships and 
the way helping each other is part of our standing in a 
close relationship, something he calls natural love.  
People are bound to one another, among other things, 
through love, sympathy, and solidarity. By love and 
friendship they are bound together in an immediate 
way, whereas in solidarity they are bound together 
more through cooperative endeavor and common 
circumstances. But whether these ties are formed 
spontaneously or socially, it is these ties which 
constitute a person’s existence. From them the 
individual acquires his or her life and its content. This 
is why every time one cares for another person in love, 
sympathy, or solidarity, he or she is him or herself 
rewarded through the maintenance of those 
relationships in which a person has his or her life and 
which constitute his or her existence. [...] 
  But the works of natural love are not on that 
account to be equated with works done for the sake of 
some favor given in return. On the contrary! It makes 
an indefinitely great difference whether that which 
benefits a person is seen as the maintenance of the 
relationships in which he or she has his or her life or 
whether it consists in the idea that ‘one good turn 
deserves another.’ If I help a person perhaps at every 
conceivable juncture, but always in a loveless manner 
and only because one good turn deserves another, this 
shows that that person does not belong to my life as an 
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indispensable part of it. The two of us are indeed of no 
concern to one another. Whether my favor to him or 
her is of help to him or her or not is in itself of no 
interest to me—so long as I receive his or her favor in 
return. He or she is only somebody who does me this 
favor, nothing more. 
  [...] it is not helpful but confusing to speak of 
reciprocity in connection with natural love, where both 
persons benefit from the deed by one for the other out 
of love. That I should benefit in return is of course not a 
condition or requirement that I attach to my love for 
the other person; it simply follows, so to speak, because 
indirectly the other person is a vital part of my life. 
(Løgstrup [1956] 1997 pp. 126-127)      
Løgstrup’s reflections are partly analogous with what 
Westermarck says about the “gregarious instincts”. 
However, Løgstrup differs from Westermarck in the sense 
that he does not explain our caring for each other as 
dependent on “retributive emotions”, that is, a cognitive 
disposition for analogical emotional responsiveness. 
Løgstrup argues that the practical help and care that we 
give each other is an integral part of a larger pattern 
whereby we acknowledge each other as persons. In this 
sense Løgstrup’s reflections resemble Wittgenstein’s. What 
it means to understand a child’s physical needs cannot be 
separated from our acknowledging this child as someone 
to be with also in other ways, someone to eat together with, 
someone to chat with, quarrel with, and tell stories to, 
someone with whom we share a future life and a history. 
Løgstrup writes: 
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[…] the other person or persons by their mere presence 
function as a touchstone. Voice, tone, and gesture as 
such, however spontaneous, are always an unspoken 
invitation to the other person or persons to respond, to 
help, and to take them seriously. (Løgstrup [1956] 1997, 
p. 202, translation amended)  
For Løgstrup, as for Wittgenstein, it is part of our natural 
life that we speak with each other and that we can stand in 
personal relationships. That we speak is, again, reflective of 
the fact that our relations in themselves contain an 
unquestionable responsibility for the other. Løgstrup 
suggests that this feature is also reflected in how we listen 
to the other’s voice. He suggests that personal relationships, 
including what it means to help another and listen to 
another in such relationships, cannot be reduced to 
something basically instrumental.  
1.7 Transaction: a rationalistic conception of 
human social life as instrumental 
I shall now return once more to reflect on Cosmides’ and 
Tooby’s idea of altruism as transactions. I will maintain 
that both the emotivistic and the rationalistic perspectives 
on altruism are based on an instrumental conception of 
personal relationships. However, the conceptions of the 
instrumental form of human relationships differ.  
Two features are central in Cosmides and Tooby’s 
transactional perspective. First, human interpersonal 
encounters are described as if these were always based on 
calculation. Second, Cosmides and Tooby also describe our 
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transactional reasoning as taking place on a nonconscious 
level. This nonconscious level of reasoning they describe as 
a computational reasoning function that governs all our 
social engagement. They claim that all social engagement 
essentially takes the form of exchanges of benefits.  
Cosmides and Tooby defend their view of a 
nonconscious transactional reasoning mechanism by 
referring to empirical evidence or examples from ordinary 
life. Some such examples were mentioned in the beginning 
of this chapter; “[...] how much chocolate you leave for j, 
how loud you play your music when j is trying to work, 
whether to clean up the mess or leave it for j [...]”. Surely 
we often think along these lines, but does this mean that 
there is an underlying nonconscious mental function of 
fitness reasoning taking place? It seems to me that these 
examples are described in a one-sided manner. One could 
also describe the examples in other, less calculating, ways. 
That is, by describing the examples in a certain manner 
Tooby and Cosmides create the impression that all our 
social engagement follows an underlying pattern of 
transactional reasoning. However, Cosmides and Tooby 
also refer to certain empirical observations of hunter-
gatherer cultures, which they maintain will give us an idea 
of our unadulterated evolutionary past. With the example 
of how a “primitive” !Kung San woman reasons about 
food exchanges they want to point to the natural as well as 
universal forms of transactional reasoning in social 
situations.  
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When Agent X provides a benefit to Agent Y, triggering 
the expectation in both that Y will at some point 
provide a benefit to X in return, a social exchange 
relationship has been initiated. Indeed, within hunter-
gatherer bands, many or most reciprocity interactions 
are implicit. (Cosmides and Tooby 2008, p. 72) 
To illustrate their point, Cosmides and Tooby then offer the 
following quotation from Nisa, a !Kung San gatherer from 
Botswana who was interviewed by Marjorie Shostak16:  
If a person doesn’t give something to me, I won’t give 
anything to that person. If I’m sitting eating, and 
someone like that comes by, I say, ‘Uhn, uhn. I’m not 
going to give any of this to you. When you have food, 
the things you do with it make me unhappy. If you 
even once in a while gave me something nice, I would 
surely give some of this to you.’ (Shostak 1981, p. 89)17 
Commenting on this passage, Cosmides and Tooby then 
add: 
Nisa’s words express her expectations about social 
exchange, which form an implicit social contract: If you 
are to get food in the future from me, then you must share 
food with me. Whether we are San foragers or city 
dwellers, we all realize that the act of accepting a 
benefit from someone triggers an obligation to behave 
                                                          
16 The work by Shostak that Cosmides and Tooby refer to is Nisa: The Life 
and Words of a !Kung Woman (1981). 
17 Shostak is quoted in Cosmides and Tooby (2008) p. 72. 
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in a way that somehow benefits the provider, now or in 
the future. (Cosmides and Tooby, 2008, p. 72) 
I do not want to deny that these ways of reasoning about 
food sharing might be found anywhere among human 
beings, but the question is whether the example proves 
that there is an underlying nonconscious transactional 
pattern of reasoning in all social engagement.  
Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992) argue that 
Shostak’s study on the !Kung people is problematic in 
several ways. One problem is that the image of a whole 
culture is based on a single person’s words. They comment 
on Shostak’s study: “The individual, Nisa, is granted a 
degree of singularity, but she is used principally as the 
token of a type: ‘the !Kung.’”(Gupta and Ferguson 1992, p. 
15) Gupta and Ferguson also question Shostak’s suggestion 
that the !Kung people represent an untouched primordial 
people. They refer to an article by Mary Louise Pratt (1986) 
where she notes that the isolated life of the !Kung people is 
the result of centuries of colonialist violence. Gupta and 
Ferguson quote the following by Pratt: 
What picture of the !Kung would one draw if instead of 
defining them as survivors of the stone age and a 
delicate and complex adaptation to the Kalahari desert, 
one looked at them as survivors of a capitalist 
expansion, and a delicate and complex adaptation to 
three centuries of violence and intimidation? (Pratt 
1986, p. 49) 
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According to Cosmides and Tooby, anything that is done 
among hunter gatherers exemplifies the basic natural 
features of all human reasoning. Pratt’s criticism of 
Shostak’s study suggests, however, that the portrayal of 
“primitive” tribes can be misleading partly because it is 
taken for granted that such tribes have no history, that they 
have always lived like this. Gupta and Ferguson in turn 
argue that the image of the “primitive” tribe is problematic 
because its basis is too narrow (only one person in 
Shostak’s case). 
Not only is it problematic to take a single person’s 
words to illustrate a whole culture’s attitude. My 
impression is also that the !Kung woman’s words can be 
understood in several ways. It is not self-evident that she is 
neutrally describing a general pattern of exchanges of 
benefits. To me it seems that the !Kung woman is 
embittered, as anyone can sometimes be. She seems to be 
fed up with sharing her food with others who sometimes 
apparently have taken advantage of her generosity. But the 
fact that people sometimes grow bitter and cynical does 
not prove that this is how we all nonconsciously “function” 
socially. The mere fact that she lives a life as a hunter-
gatherer does not imply that her thinking is more natural 
and immediate than ours. Nor is the fact that all people 
around the world sometimes become bitter proof of the 
absolute basically transactional function of social life. There 
are also a lot of people in the world that are not bitter, and 
probably there are also !Kung San people who are not 
bitter all the time.  
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However, I might of course be wrong in my 
interpretation that the !Kung woman is embittered. Further, 
even if only one person is studied it might still be that she 
does mirror the general attitude among the !Kung people. 
Perhaps she is giving a neutral description of how she and 
others in her culture think about food exchanges. However, 
this does still not mean that the !Kung woman’s words can 
be taken to show a general underlying natural pattern of 
human life. Even if researchers were to find a tribe that 
somehow was proven to have lived in a certain kind of 
completely “transactional” manner for thousands of years, 
it would still be problematic to maintain that it is therefore 
a pattern that explains the origin of all our social 
engagement. On the contrary, a people whose 
interpersonal encounters only took a transactional form 
would be a people very different from most other human 
beings in the world. It would be a people for whom much 
of how we approach each other would not have any 
meaning. So the problem is not only that it can be hard to 
find empirical evidence of an original “primitive” natural 
state of transactional life. I am suggesting that if such a 
form of life was found somewhere, it would no longer look 
like human life. By this I do not mean to say that 
transactions are not of central importance in human life in 
a multitude of ways. The problem arises when it is claimed 
that such ways of engaging with others are the essence of 
all social life. 
Cosmides and Tooby’s nonconscious transactional 
perspective is also connected with a predilection for 
economic jargon when describing human relationships. 
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They talk about “kin selection”, “welfare trade-off ratio” 
etc., when describing our care for family members. These 
expressions are expected to describe general underlying 
behavioural patterns. Our ordinary relational words such 
as “child” or “parent” are supposed to gain their meaning 
from these underlying strategic concepts. These 
expressions reflect, as I mentioned earlier, a conception of 
human relationships as based on calculation. They are 
supposedly relations that we choose to engage in (even if 
the choice may be on a nonconscious level). The idea is that 
we can choose to take any kind of attitude towards another 
person’s life, provided it enhances the chances of survival 
for the genetic information stored in us.  
Løgstrup writes: “The other person is in such a real 
sense a part of our world that it is in fact awkward to refer 
to him or her as ‘the second person’ rather than as one’s 
child or spouse.” (Løgstrup [1956] 1997, p. 125, translation 
amended) According to Løgstrup, there is an ethical and 
relational meaning in the ordinary words we use when we 
talk about personal relationships. This meaning cannot be 
reduced to transactional relationships. The word “child” 
implies a human relationship where the child is involved 
in a certain way of living with others, sharing days and 
years in close relationships, and where there are people 
who talk with and care for this child. In this sense the 
meaning of the word “child” is integral to the self-evident 
form that our responsibility for the child takes. When 
Tooby and Cosmides use words such as “kin selection” 
they also reduce the meaning of personal relationships. 
From a perspective where all interpersonal relationships 
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are described as based on personal preferences it will not 
be possible to understand what it means to grow into a 
close relationship with another. Nor can our responsibility 
for one another be understood from such a perspective. 
The words with which we, in everyday life, refer to 
“biological” relations and functions, such as eating, sex, 
fights, begetting children and caring for them, are imbued 
with meanings that go beyond both biology and strategic 
transaction. Consider a final example, what it means to say 
that a person is dying. This is not simply a neutral 
description of the person’s physical state. It is a moral 
description; when we say that a person is dying we also 
usually say that there is nothing more we can do to help 
him survive. At the same time, the fact that a person is 
dying and that we cannot help him to survive usually does 
not mean that we abandon him. The awareness of another 
person’s coming death often makes us attend to him in a 
special way. In particular it usually makes the dying 
person’s close ones attend to him. We try to make his last 
days as bearable as possible; we try to ease possible pain, 
we help practically, but we also talk, we share meals 
together, and we often share thoughts and memories about 
life and about loved ones. By this I do not mean that we 
necessarily always help our close ones or other people that 
are dying. Family relationships can sometimes be deeply 
damaged, filled with years of conflict that tear people apart. 
People can also wish for the death of another and yet kill 
others. However, these attitudes are not in any sense more 
basic for understanding human life than are the ways in 
which we often do care for others.  
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1.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I shall reflect a little on the similarities and 
differences between the two perspectives on altruism that I 
have discussed. In one sense, there are clear differences 
between the rationalistic explanation of altruism that is 
given by Cosmides and Tooby, and on the other hand the 
emotivistic explanations that are given by Adam Smith, 
Darwin, Westermarck and de Waal. According to the 
emotivistic explanations human social life rests on a 
capacity for analogical imagination. According to the 
rationalistic explanation human social life rests on a 
capacity to reason in a calculating manner and make 
transactions. The emotivistic theorists are critical towards a 
conception of human beings as essentially calculating 
individuals. In this sense one can say that the emotivistic 
theorists, i.e. Smith, Darwin, Westermarck and de Waal 
distance themselves from the rationalistic perspective on 
altruism that is suggested by Cosmides and Tooby.  
However, in another sense I have argued that the 
rationalistic and the emotivistic perspectives both rest on 
certain similar kinds of theoretical assumptions. I have 
claimed that the theories about empathy as a mental 
mechanism of analogical imagination do not actually 
contradict the view of altruism as a nonconscious, 
computational transactional mechanism. Rather one can 
think of these two explanations as existing on different 
levels. Cosmides and Tooby’s perspective of human social 
life as based on a nonconscious algorithmic reasoning 
mechanism, does not necessarily contradict the theories of 
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empathy. To take an example, in one of the quotes earlier 
in this text de Waal states that we are not constantly 
“mentally tallying up costs and benefits [since these] 
calculations have likely been made for [us] by natural 
selection” (de Waal 2009, p. 115) This quite agrees with 
Cosmides and Tooby’s contention that the cost-benefit 
calculations appear nonconsciously.  
Further, even though Adam Smith, Darwin, 
Westermarck and de Waal are critical of a transactional 
perspective in the sense that they are critical of the 
assumption that man is basically an egoistic being who 
only helps others in order to gain certain benefits; they do 
think that human social life originates from a need for 
cooperation. In this sense the rationalistic theorists as well 
as the emotivistic theorists maintain that human social 
relationships basically have an instrumental purpose. The 
emotivistic theorists are not actually opposed to a 
transactional perspective on the origins of human social life; 
they are merely opposed to one kind of transactional 
perspective. The theory about empathy can be seen as one 
form such a transactional explanation of human social life 
can take. It is an explanation that portrays transactions in a 
certain light, as involving cooperation between equals, and 
also as something that depends on a cognitive capacity for 
analogical imagination or analogical bodily responsiveness. 
However the emotivistic theorists also emphasise the social 
relationships that the individuals are born into, rather than 
a competition between antagonists. Cosmides and Tooby 
tend, on the other hand, to portray transactions as basically 
(nonconsciously) a competition between antagonists. I 
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have suggested that both these perspectives are 
problematic.  
From my discussion above one might get the impression 
that I claim that human social life cannot be described from 
an evolutionary perspective. This has not been my 
intention to claim. I do agree with the above discussed 
evolutionary theorists that there are many social patterns 
of human life that enhance the survival of the species. 
However, that certain aspects of human social life are of 
evolutionary (and genetic) importance does not necessarily 
mean that these patterns can be explained by referring to a 
nonconscious algorithmic mechanism of social contract 
reasoning. By referring to a nonconscious algorithmic 
mechanism Cosmides and Tooby create a certain kind of 
reductive image of what they consider to be the natural 
form of human social interaction and also a certain 
reductive image of human understanding. They tend to 
describe human social interaction as if it always basically 
took a transactional form. I have argued that this 
impression is created by a one-sided use of examples of 
human interaction in combination with a one-dimensional 
use of expressions, in combination with a cognitive theory 
about human understanding. 
I do also think it can, in certain contexts, be all right to 
say that human beings are cooperative animals. However, I 
have suggested that such a description can also have its 
limitations. A too general use of concepts like “cooperation” 
or “transaction” easily leaves out important aspects of 
what it means for human beings to share a life and thus 
also what it means to care for another. Further, I have 
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suggested that it is problematic to assume that our 
emotional responsiveness to each other has evolved as a 
useful cognitive tool that enhances cooperation. I have 
argued, by the help of Wittgenstein and Løgstrup that the 
meaning of the natural, biological, aspects of human life, 
including our practical ways of helping each other, in 
important ways is integral to how we stand in personal 
relationships.  
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2: Theory of mind and infants’ 
imitation of facial expressions 
2.1 Introduction 
As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, theory-of-
mind theories can be divided into two more specific 
theoretical outlooks, one that is emotivistic in kind, and 
another that is rationalistic in kind. In this second chapter I 
shall focus on the conception of the human body that is 
mainly present in emotivistic theories. As I have 
mentioned earlier, the emotivistic outlook is also often 
called “simulation theory” while the rationalist outlook is 
called “theory theory”. I do not generally use these 
expressions but in this chapter the distinction can be 
appropriate. According to simulation theorists, our 
capacity to understand other people rests on our ability to 
simulate other people’s expressions and behaviour. 
Simulation theorists also maintain that this ability to 
simulate is largely innate. According to theory theorists on 
the other hand, our capacity to understand other people 
consists in a cognitive theorising function. Their suggestion 
is that this cognitive function enables us to actively 
construct a theory about other people’s mental life on the 
basis of their behaviour. Theory theorists (or the rationalist 
strand) are then not as interested in the human body as are 
simulation theorists. However, despite a lesser interest in 
the human body among theory theorists, they are, I think, 
as entwined as simulation theorists in a problematic 
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conception of the human body, which is reflective of a 
problematic conception of interpersonal understanding. 
The following chapter is therefore not merely intended as a 
critique of simulation theory. Rather it is a general critique 
of the theoretical umbrella conception of theory of mind. 
As I already noted, according to simulation theory, 
interpersonal understanding is largely considered to 
depend on a capacity for analogical imagination which 
again is considered to depend on the capacity to simulate 
bodily behaviour. These aspects have, among other things, 
been studied empirically in research on infants’ capacity to 
imitate facial expressions. It is suggested that the infant’s 
capacity to imitate other people’s facial expressions is one 
of the primary routes for the child’s development of 
interpersonal understanding. One of the central 
researchers in this field is the psychologist Andrew 
Meltzoff.  
2.2 Empirical research on infants’ imitation of 
facial expressions 
Andrew Meltzoff’s research on the infant’s capacity to 
imitate facial expressions originates as a critical stance 
against the assumption that children are originally 
unaware of other people as well as unaware of the world. 
This has, in various forms, been suggested by among 
others Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget and B. F. Skinner. 
Despite their great theoretical differences all these theorists 
assume that infants are originally unaware of other people. 
Meltzoff (2002) writes:  
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On classical views of human development, the 
newborn is cut off from others. Freud and his followers 
proposed a distinction between a physical and 
psychological birth. When the baby is born there is a 
physical birth but not yet a birth of the mind.18 The 
baby is like an unhatched chick within an eggshell, 
incapable of interacting as a social being because a 
‘barrier’ leaves the newborn cut off from external 
reality. [...] Piaget’s newborn is similar [...] Piaget 19 
claimed the baby is ‘solipsistic.’ The neonate has only a 
few reflexes to work with (e.g. sucking, grasping) and 
other people are registered only to the extent that they 
can be assimilated to these action schemes. The baby 
only knows his or her own actions. [...] Skinner20 an 
animal behaviorist, gave his blank-slate infant even less 
to work with. One cannot really quote from Skinner 
about how children crack the puzzle of social cognition, 
because, in a sense, he does not think they ever do. 
Even adults are conceptualized as reacting to behaviors 
but not knowing the minds of their interactive partners. 
(Meltzoff 2002, pp. 7-8)  
Though the three theorists mentioned in this passage are 
very different, they all suggest that children are originally 
unaware of the world and of other people. It is this general 
assumption of which Meltzoff is critical in his research. 21 
                                                          
18 Meltzoff refers here to Freud (1911) and Mahler, Pine & Bergman 
(1975). 
19 Meltzoff refers here to Piaget (1952c) and Piaget (1954). 
20 Meltzoff refers here to Skinner (1953). 
21 I will not discuss the different theoretical positions between Freud, 
Piaget and Skinner in this thesis since their difference is not Meltzoff’s 
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main focus. However, to illustrate the differences between especially 
Freud and Piaget I shall describe their theories briefly. Both Freud and 
Piaget suggested that children primarily live in a solipsistic state where 
they are unaware of the world as well as unaware of other people. 
Freud’s theory on the development of understanding is empiricist in 
kind. According to him, the child is born into a chaotic world of sense 
impressions. The young child lives in a dream world that is formed 
through her own desires. Freud describes this state of infants living 
according to the pleasure principle as the infant being in an autistic state 
comparable with a bird’s egg. Freud’s conception of the child’s sense 
impressions resembles the Cartesian idea that we essentially are caught 
inside our own sense impressions, where we cannot have certain 
knowledge about the outer world.  
In contrast to Freud, Piaget ([1954] 1971) argued for the logical 
character of the child’s development of interpersonal understanding and 
for the logical character of the child’s development of understanding of 
the world. What it means to understand something, according to him, is 
dependent on our being able to see certain logical connections in the 
world, and what it means to understand another person shows in our 
being able to reason with other people in a logical manner. However, 
Piaget also considered it to be an important feature that the child’s 
understanding develops through experience. Children’s minds first put 
things together in ways that do not have to do with logic but with other 
factors, by association etc. Piaget calls this state “syncretic”. Then slowly, 
through experience and practice, the child’s understanding develops to 
a more logical way of functioning. David Hamlyn (1978) points out that 
Piaget takes a middle position between an empiricist perspective on 
understanding and a logical and rational perspective reminiscent of 
Immanuel Kant’s conception. He considers an empiricist perspective as 
a primary level that precedes true logical understanding. The syncretic 
state of the child’s mind means, according to Piaget, that the child is not 
truly aware of reality, or of other people, nor able to reason. Piaget 
writes: “During the earliest stages the child perceives things like a 
solipsist who is unaware of himself as subject and is familiar only with 
his own actions.” (Piaget [1954] 1971, p. 397) Since interpersonal 
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Meltzoff has made a large amount of empirical research on 
the social responsiveness of infants. He claims that infants 
very soon after birth have a capacity to respond to other 
people’s expressions by imitation. In this sense Meltzoff 
argues that infants are social from birth. However, even 
though I do think Meltzoff’s critical stance against the 
assumption that children are solipsistic is important, I will 
argue that his research is based on a problematic 
conception of interpersonal understanding.  
Since 1977 up till 2013 Meltzoff has conducted extensive 
empirical research on infant imitation. Meltzoff frequently 
refers to two of his own studies. In 1977 Meltzoff and M. 
Keith Moore studied infants’ capacity to imitate facial 
expressions. In this experiment 12- to 21-day old infants 
were tested for whether they could imitate facial 
expressions such as tongue protrusion, lip protrusion and 
mouth opening. Meltzoff and Moore describe the test in 
the following way: 
                                                                                                                    
understanding, according to Piaget, consists in a capacity to reason in a 
logical manner, he concludes that infants originally live in a solipsistic 
state. 
Piaget conducted a large amount of careful empirical research on 
infants. However, his conception of understanding as a matter of logical 
reasoning formed his ways of making empirical studies. It is striking 
that, even though his research is carefully made, he pays very little 
attention to how children are involved with other people socially from 
birth. This tendency to ignore infant’s social responsiveness to others 
reflects his conviction that interpersonal understanding consists in a 
capacity to reason. Because of this, Piaget would probably not have 
considered Meltzoff’s empirical research on infant imitation as proving 
that infants are not solipsistic.  
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Testing began with a 90-second period in which the 
experimenter presented an unreactive, ‘passive face’ 
(lips closed, neutral facial expression) to the infant. 
Each infant was then shown the following four 
gestures in a different random order: lip protrusion, 
mouth opening, tongue protrusion, and sequential 
finger movement (opening and closing the hand by 
serially moving the fingers). Each gesture was 
demonstrated four times in a 15-second stimulus-
presentation period. This period was immediately 
followed by a 20-second response period for which the 
experimenter stopped performing the gesture and 
resumed a passive face. (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, p. 
76)   
The result of this test was that the infants generally did 
imitate the facial expressions. On the following page is a 
picture of Meltzoff and Moore’s imitation test that was 
made in 1977. 
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Sample photographs from videotape recordings of 2- to 
3-week-old infants imitating (a) tongue protrusion, (b) 
mouth opening, and (c) lip protrusion demonstrated by 
an adult experimenter. (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, p. 
75)22 
Since the infants were capable of imitating several different 
facial expressions, Meltzoff and Moore suggest that these 
responses are not merely innate releasing mechanisms but 
“active matching processes”.  
The hypothesis we favour is that this imitation is based 
on the neonate’s capacity to represent visually and 
proprioceptively perceived information in a form 
                                                          
22 The picture is taken from Meltzoff and Moore (1977). Reprinted with 
permission from AAAS: The American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. 
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common to both modalities. The infant could thus 
compare the sensory information from his own unseen 
motor behaviour to a ‘supramodal’ representation of 
the visually perceived gesture and construct the match 
required. In brief, we hypothesize that the imitative 
responses observed are not innately organized and 
‘released,’ but are accomplished through an active 
matching process and mediated by an abstract 
representational system. (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, p. 
78) 
In 1983 Meltzoff and Moore23 tested even younger infants, 
who were approximately 32 hours old (the youngest infant 
was only 42 minutes old). The result of this second 
experiment was that the infants tended to imitate the facial 
expressions such as tongue protrusion and mouth opening. 
Meltzoff and Moore claim that the results indicate that 
infants have an innate ability to imitate facial expressions.  
Meltzoff and Moore’s empirical research on infants’ 
capacities to imitate facial expressions can be seen as an 
important criticism of especially Piaget’s tendencies to 
neglect empirical studies on infants’ responsiveness to 
other people. Meltzoff and Moore’s research clearly 
illustrates that infants do respond to other people’s 
expressions already at a very young age. In later studies 
Meltzoff and Moore have also tested whether infants can 
imitate after a delay of one day.  
                                                          
23 See Meltzoff and Moore (1983). 
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Other research documents imitation after the memory 
delay is as long as one day. Six-week-old infants came 
in on one day, observed the gestures, and went home. 
They then returned the next day and were presented 
with the experimenter sitting motionless with a passive 
face. Infants successfully imitate based on their 
remembrance of things past.24 If yesterday’s adult had 
shown mouth opening, the infants initiated that 
gesture; if the adult had shown tongue protrusion, 
infants greeted him with that gesture. (Meltzoff 2002, p. 
10)   
Meltzoff also claims that the imitation research reveal that 
infants correct their efforts to imitate. “Research also 
reveals that the response is not rigidly fixed or stereotypic. 
Infants correct their imitative attempts so that they more 
and more closely converge on the model demonstrated.” 
(Meltzoff 2002, p. 10) According to Meltzoff ans Moore, 
these results indicate that the imitative responses are not 
merely spontaneous reflexes but can be considered as 
active efforts to match the other person’s facial expressions. 
In this sense they suggest that the imitative responses 
display a cognitive capacity. A large amount of similar 
experiments have been conducted since the first studies on 
imitation, indicating that the results are robust. Meltzoff 
(2002) writes: 
[…] the effect has now been replicated and extended in 
more than 25 different studies from 13 independent 
labs, including those from the US, England, Canada, 
                                                          
24 Meltzoff refers here to Meltzoff and Moore (1994). 
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France, Switzerland, Sweden, Israel, Greece, Japan, and 
even in the rural Nepal.25 (Meltzoff 2002, p. 11) 
2.3 The influence from natural science on 
empirical research methods 
From the empirical research described above it is clear that 
infants tend to imitate other people’s facial expressions. 
However, even if the experimental results are interesting, 
there are some aspects that are ambiguous.  
To begin with, there seems to be a discrepancy between 
on the one hand the empirical studies of facial imitation 
and, on the other hand, how children ordinarily encounter 
other people facially. An important aspect of the test is that 
it has a very simple form. The researchers make strong 
grimaces so that the infants are able to see these grimaces 
clearly and so that the infants are also able to respond to 
them without too much difficulty. Such procedures to 
simplify a test situation so that an infant is able to respond 
are in one sense all right. However, despite good intentions, 
it is not evident that the strong grimaces actually simplify 
the situation for the infants. One could ask whether this 
reflects an infant’s normal way of being confronted with 
other people? Is it a normal situation that grown-ups show 
such strong grimaces to new-born infants or is it perhaps 
an unusual situation and thus perhaps a complicated and 
unnatural situation for the infant? Indeed parents may 
sometimes show strong grimaces to their child, but often it 
                                                          
25 Meltzoff refers here to Meltzoff and Moore (1994) and (1997). 
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is also the case that parents do not show strong grimaces. 
However, even if we do not ordinarily constantly display 
such strong facial grimaces, this does not have to mean that 
the test is problematic. Something that indicates that the 
strong grimaces are all right is the fact that the infants do 
respond by imitating the facial expressions. Nevertheless 
there is an ambiguity regarding whether these tests 
actually simplify the situation or make it more complicated 
than an ordinary situation. One could also say that perhaps 
the children’s capacity to respond despite the fact that the 
situation has little to do with how people would confront 
them in ordinary life suggests how very sensitive and alert 
children are to other people even in strange and 
complicated situations.  
As I have suggested, there is a discrepancy between the 
empirical studies of facial imitation and how children 
ordinarily encounter other people facially, because 
ordinarily parents do not necessarily show strong facial 
grimaces to their new-born infants. How should this 
discrepancy be understood? One way to explain it could be 
to say that the infants’ imitative reactions in the test 
situation points at a basic cognitive capacity that we can 
see most clearly, and most explicitly, in a limited 
experimental surrounding. The basic imitative capacity is, 
so to say, brought to the surface by reducing the normal 
life situation as much as possible and by giving “stronger” 
facial stimuli than normally. But is that actually what the 
tests reveal?  
If we consider the character of the tests a little closer we 
can see certain further features that are problematic. One 
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such feature is that the studies of the infants’ facial 
responsiveness tend to have a one-directional character, 
the researcher makes grimaces and the infant responds. 
The one-directional form of the tests appears to be 
reflective of a certain research practice deriving from 
natural science. According to Urie Bronfenbrenner (1978), 
there is a deep-rooted tendency in psychological research 
to construct test situations in such a way that only the 
single individual’s responses are studied. What is left out 
then is often the fact that an individual’s responses are 
entwined in a pattern where two persons both respond to 
each other. In The Ecology of Human Development (1978) 
Bronfenbrenner writes:  
The thesis that behavior in dyads is generally reciprocal 
is widely accepted in theory, but it is often disregarded 
in research practice. The failure to take two-way 
processes into account reflects the inertia of the 
traditional laboratory model with its classical 
participants—an experimenter, identified cryptically as 
E, and another person equally informatively described 
as S, the subject. The term subject is apt, for with few 
exceptions the process operating between E and S is 
viewed as unidirectional; the experimenter presents the 
stimulus, and the subject gives the response. Of course 
in theory the influence can occur in both directions, but 
once the researcher puts on the white coat of scientific 
invisibility, she tends to focus solely on the behavior of 
the experimental subject […] (Bronfenbrenner 1978, p. 
61) 
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Bronfenbrenner’s suggestion is that a certain kind of 
traditional research practice tends to lead researchers to 
focus on the individual even if in theory they might 
acknowledge that human behaviour must often be seen as 
interactive responses between two or more individuals. 
Bronfenbrenner does not discuss the above-described tests 
on imitation, but I think his thoughts also point at a 
problematic one-directional form in these tests. Even if the 
original research interest is to find out how children learn 
to communicate, this research on “communication” leans 
towards a one-sided focus on only the child’s responses. It 
is unclear then in what sense such a focus can reveal 
patterns in the development of communication. 
However, Meltzoff and Moore’s tendency to construct a 
one-directional experimental situation has not merely to do 
with their being influenced by certain research methods 
that one finds in natural science. There is also another 
reason why they have built up the experimental situation 
in a one-directional manner, which I shall discuss below.  
2.4 The influence from theory-of-mind theory on 
empirical research methods 
Meltzoff (2002) suggests that the infant’s capacity to imitate 
is connected with the development of a theory of mind. He 
writes: 
Imitative experience with other people serves as a 
‘discovery mechanism’ for social cognition, 
engendering interpersonal understanding that 
outstrips the innate givens and leads to empathy, 
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perspective-taking, and theory of mind. (Meltzoff 2002, 
p. 7)26 
Meltzoff continues: 
[...] imitation is based on [the] infant’s capacity to 
register equivalences between the body 
transformations they see performed by other people 
and the body transformations they only feel themselves 
make. On this account, facial imitation involves 
crossmodal matching. Infants can, at some primitive 
level, recognize an equivalence between the acts they 
see others do and the acts they do themselves. There 
appears to be a very primitive and foundational ‘body 
scheme’ that allows the infant to unify the seen acts of 
others and their own felt acts into one common 
framework. (Meltzoff 2002, pp. 12-13) 
A bit later Meltzoff continues:  
[...] intentions underlie and cause bodily movements, 
and reciprocally, one can read intentions from body 
movements. But the intentions themselves are not 
directly seen, heard, tasted, or smelled. The 
developmental problem is clear and irresistible: Is there 
any evidence that infants read below the surface 
                                                          
26 It appears that Meltzoff has gradually adopted the idea that infant 
imitation is a theory of mind function. In Meltzoff and Moore’s articles 
from 1977 and 1983 this is not yet explicitly suggested. The gradual 
theoretical development towards an explicit theory-of-mind theory, 
including simulation theory, in Meltzoff’s research might be connected 
with the fact that theory-of-mind theories have gradually gained in 
popularity. 
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behavior and understand the intentions that lie behind 
them? How do they come to this interpretation of 
bodily acts? (Meltzoff 2002, p. 17) 
In another article Meltzoff (2010) writes:  
Although we directly observe other people’s behavior, 
we interpret people to be more than their biological 
movements. We think of them as having internal 
mental states just like us. We think that human beings 
want, think, and feel, and that these states lead to their 
actions. Our ideas about these mental states play a 
crucial role in our interactions with others and the 
regulation of our own behavior. (Meltzoff 2010, p. 15) 
Meltzoff (2013) describes the essence of his theoretical 
question in the following way: “We know ourselves from 
the inside and others from the outside: How do we 
understand what it is like to be another person, to feel 
what the other person feels?” (Meltzoff 2013, p. 140) 
According to Meltzoff, interpersonal understanding 
consists in the capacity to “interpret” people’s bodily 
behaviour, i.e. to see that people are “more than their 
biological movements”, to see that people have “mental 
states”. Briefly one can describe this conception of 
interpersonal understanding as epistemological in kind, 
and also body-mind dualistic in kind. In order for a child 
to learn to understand others, the child must learn to see 
that other people are intentional beings. It is, according to 
Meltzoff, through imitation that infants learn to interpret 
other people’s bodily behaviour, so that they eventually 
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gain knowledge about other people’s intentions. Meltzoff 
further suggests that by imitating others, the infant comes 
to recognize that other people are “like me”. This 
experience of similarity, according to him, is a central 
aspect of the infant’s primary social encounters. He writes: 
The child, even the newborn, processes the movements 
of other people and recognizes: ‘that looks the way this 
feels’ or ‘those acts are like these acts.’ the fact that 
others are seen as ‘like me’ provides an interpretive 
lens for infants’ first social encounters. (Meltzoff 2011, 
p. 52) 
My suggestion so far is that one can discern two reasons 
for the one-directional character of Meltzoff and Moore’s 
empirical tests on infants. Partly the one-directional 
character of the tests reflect what Bronfenbrenner describes 
as the “traditional laboratory model” where the researcher 
observes the subject’s responses. However, partly the one-
directional form of the test also grows out of the dualistic 
philosophical supposition that a child originally perceives 
other people as physical bodies. Further, the strict focus on 
imitation in the test arises from the assumption that the 
only way a child learns to understand others is through the 
use of an analogical method of behaviour which eventually 
enables the child to decipher other people’s intentions. In 
this sense there seems to be a double influence from on the 
one hand a certain kind of classical (natural scientific) 
research practice and on the other hand a philosophical 
theory. It is hard to say which of these influences is 
stronger, but both influences support each other.  
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As I already suggested, one central feature with the 
imitation experiments is the idea that facial expressions 
have a very rigid, stable and also a very marked character. 
The expressions are rigid and motionless; a tongue sticks 
out, or a mouth is wide open. In his paper “What’s in a 
Smile?” (2009) Lars Hertzberg claims that our facial 
expressions actually do not have a rigid form. Facial 
expressions have a changing and fleeting character. And 
they are usually not very marked.  
[...] smiles [...] do not constitute disparate units, smiles 
form part of a continuum of human expressions. Part of 
what is involved in smiles being [...] a form of bodily 
openness, is that they are a living, organic feature of the 
human face. (Hertzberg 2009, pp. 120) 
Hertzberg also quotes Wittgenstein who talks of it being 
difficult to understand such a rigid motionless facial 
expression as a smile: 
[...] a facial expression not susceptible of gradual and 
subtle alterations; but which had, say, just five 
positions; when it changed it would snap straight from 
one to another. Would this fixed smile really be a smile? 
And why not? (Wittgenstein 1980, §614) 
Commenting on this passage, Hertzberg then adds: 
A face which switched from neutral to a broad grin and 
then back again without transitions would not really 
come across as smiling or indeed as expressive in any 
way, rather it would strike us as undergoing some 
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strange contortions. The face would not be alive with 
the smile. (Hertzberg 2009, pp. 120-121)  
If facial expressions do not have this kind of rigid form in 
real life, then it is questionable whether the imitation 
experiments reveal how a child grows into responding to 
others and understanding others.  
The conception of facial expressions as consisting of 
rigid movements is connected with a certain way of talking 
about the human body in the test, as if the body was a 
mere surface. Meltzoff talks about children imitating 
“surface behaviour”. This use of the word “surface 
behaviour” could of course merely reflect a kind of 
professionalised way of speaking in a scientific research 
context. However, it is not merely a manner of speaking 
but reflective of the dualistic assumptions that form the 
tests. The problem here lies in the assumption that people 
essentially consist of a physical “outer” body and an inner 
mind. Thus we basically see bodies per se as outer objects. 
The use of the words “surface behaviour” or “imitation” 
are also reflective of the before-mentioned tendency merely 
to focus on the single individual’s reaction. The researchers 
have built up the test so that only the children are studied. 
What is not studied is the interaction between child and 
parent.  
 A somewhat similar approach as in the above described 
research on children can be seen in Paul Ekman’s research 
on facial expression. Ekman’s studies on facial expressions 
began in the 1970’s. Since then he has made extensive 
empirical studies. I will not discuss Ekman here at length 
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but I want to point out that he has a similar one-directional 
approach in his research as Meltzoff has in his research. 
This is connected with the fact that he has a similar 
conception of interpersonal understanding.  
Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen (1971) studied so-called 
“primitive” tribes in Papua New Guinea. Their aim was to 
study whether facial expressions have a similar meaning 
across cultures. Ekman and Friesen conducted their study 
by showing photographs of facial expressions to the people 
in the tribes. The result of the study was that the people in 
the Papua New Guinean tribes generally attributed similar 
emotions to the pictures as Western people had attributed 
to the pictures. Since this empirical research in 1971 Ekman 
has conducted an extensive amount of further empirical 
research on facial expressions, which has made him very 
influential. 
However, even if the focus of Ekman and Friensen’s 
study differs from Meltzoff and Moore’s studies, one can 
say that the studies are built up in a similar one-directional 
manner. As I already noted, Ekman and Friesen showed 
the people in Papua New Guinea pictures of facial 
expressions that the people were then requested to define. 
They did not consider how facial expressions can have 
meaning for people who are involved in some sort of 
interaction. Ekman and Friesen’s study of facial expressions 
also rests on epistemological and body-mind dualistic 
conceptions of interpersonal understanding. In an article 
from 1993 Ekman writes: 
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It is the morphology, the momentary configuration 
produced by the contraction of a particular set of facial 
muscles, that provide the information about whether it 
is anger, fear, disgust, sadness surprise, or enjoyment. 
The dynamics of the movement also contains 
additional information about the strength of the 
emotion and whether it is genuine, although that 
information is also signalled morphologically. (Ekman 
1993, p. 389) 
Ekman describes bodily expressions as “providing 
information” in the form of physical signs. 27  His 
description suggests a dualistic conception of human 
beings, it suggests that facial expressions reveal something 
invisible inner. This epistemological and body-mind 
dualistic conception of interpersonal understanding forms 
Ekman and Friesen’s empirical research in a similar one-
directional way as Meltzoff and Moore’s research on infant 
imitation. 
In a similar sense as Meltzoff and Moore who study 
infants’ responses to faces, Ekman assumes that facial 
expressions are something we primarily observe rather than 
something we respond to in our daily life. And he also 
assumes that bodily expressions have a rigid on/off form 
that we can label. It is also assumed that it is easier to see 
the human body as a physical surface than it is to see 
                                                          
27  Ekman was inspired by Charles Darwin’s research on facial 
expressions. To a large degree Ekman’s studies also resemble Darwin’s 
studies. See Darwin (1872), The Expression of Emotions in Man and 
Animals.  
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meaningful expressions. Frank Ebersole (2001) describes 
this tendency to consider the body as a kind of physical 
shell: 
[…] bodily movements are to be simple, easy to see. 
They are common and can be pointed out, anytime and 
anywhere. They are conspicuous items in any 
inventory of the physical world. (Ebersole 2001, p. 371)   
The whole idea of facial expressions as outer signs that we 
observe in others, distorts the role of expressions in human 
life. Hertzberg (2009) writes: 
The concept of a smile and what it may signify does not 
enter our life through a discovery. Neither have smiles 
been introduced as a social convention. The word 
‘smile’ is learnt in a setting in which smiles already 
have a place, in which people smile and respond to 
smiles without giving the matter much thought. Both 
the view of smiles as natural phenomena and the view 
of them as applied conventions, then, are expressive of 
the same misconception: the idea that smiles can be 
studied as physical configurations without regard to 
their significance. (Hertzberg 2009, p. 123) 
Cockburn (2009) writes:  
Bodily expression, and in particular facial expression, 
has a central place in our interactions with each other: 
is a central form of our contact with others. I respond to 
the other’s smile of pleasure or amusement with a 
smile. I turn away from the other’s angry gaze, or 
return her friendly or loving gaze. I shrink in the face of 
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the other’s manifest hostility or anger, and the other 
may respond to my shrinking, perhaps with a softening 
of her expression; as, more generally, she may respond 
to my timidity with an encouraging smile. In many 
cases this contact involves an acknowledgement of a 
world that we share with the other. We exchange a 
smile at the remark just made, a look of surprise when 
the guests arrive on time, or a fearful glance when we 
recognize the danger. (Cockburn 2009, p. 129) 
Both Hertzberg and Cockburn suggest that it is 
problematic to consider the meaning of facial expressions 
as if they basically consisted of certain physical movements 
that we observe and learn to interpret. They argue that 
facial expressions have their meaning as part of our mutual 
responsiveness and then also as part of what it can mean to 
stand in a personal relationship.  
My aim so far has not been to say that imitation has no 
importance at all for how infants learn to understand 
others. Neither have I wanted to suggest that it has no 
importance at all what kinds of physical movements may 
occur in a person’s face when he or she smiles or is sad or 
angry etc. Clearly infants do sometimes imitate facial 
expressions, and clearly one can also discern certain 
general physical patterns of facial expressions when people 
look happy, sad, angry etc. What I have wanted to 
question is the idea that the infant’s capacity to imitate 
facial expressions would be the basic cognitive capacity that 
enables the infant to interpret other minds. That is, I have 
wanted to question a tendency to consider imitation as the 
sole (or most important) “method” that enables us to 
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understand others. I have also questioned the idea that the 
meaning of our facial expressions can, in some essential 
sense, be reduced to the mere physical movements of the 
face. These ideas are based on epistemological and body-
mind dualistic conceptions of interpersonal understanding. 
They are based on the idea that other people have outer 
bodies with inner invisible minds about which we need to 
gain knowledge.  
2.5 What do we mean by imitation  
I shall now return to reflect a bit further on what Meltzoff 
means by imitation. According to Meltzoff, the infant’s 
tendencies to imitate other people’s facial expressions will 
eventually enable the infant to figure out the intentions of 
other people. As I have already argued, Meltzoff and 
Moore’s empirical research is more unclear than it can 
seem at a first instance. I have claimed that the empirical 
research has a one-directional character. Partly this is 
reflective of the influence from natural scientific research 
practice. Partly it reflects an epistemological and body-
mind dualistic conception of interpersonal understanding. 
There is, however, a further unclarity concerning what 
Meltzoff means by “imitation”. The unclarity is connected 
with his supposition that there are some such general inner 
mental things as “intentions”, and that there is one method, 
i.e. imitation of “bodily movements”, for understanding 
these “intentions”.  
I noted earlier that according to Meltzoff the results of 
the experiments indicate that infants’ imitation of facial 
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expressions is not merely a reflex but an active effort. This 
further indicates, according to Meltzoff, that infants have a 
cognitive capacity for mindreading. Meltzoff, Rebecca A. 
Williamson and Peter J. Marshall (2013) further connect the 
infant’s capacity to imitate facial expressions with the 
capacity to learn to imitate other people’s actions and 
thereby to learn to do things. 
Before language becomes available to the child, 
imitation is a chief mechanism by which they learn 
about tool use and acquire causal knowledge about 
how novel objects and machines work. This 
‘instrumental imitation’ continues to play such a role in 
adults: how to tie a knot, build a fire, or use a lever is 
more efficiently learned through studying other’s 
behavior than via an instruction manual or a linguistic 
narrative. (Meltzoff, Williamson and Marshall 2013, p. 
287)  
Indeed learning to do things often involves a great deal of 
imitation. But such imitation often presupposes that we are 
already acquainted with a way of living where certain ways 
of doing things are seen as meaningful intentional actions, 
not merely as physical movements. Think for instance of 
how to learn to skateboard. In order to be able to imitate 
specific skateboarding moves you need to understand 
what is being done and who is doing something and who is 
not doing something. Without knowing the difference 
between a person walking his dog and a person 
skateboarding you will not be able to see whom you 
should imitate. If you merely see moving physical bodies 
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any bodily movement becomes relevant or irrelevant. 
Should you hold a leash and pull the furry animal? Or 
should you do something with that flat thing on wheels? 
Perhaps the skateboarding girl takes a little pause to catch 
her breath, drinks a bit of water from a bottle, scratches her 
head, picks her nose. Are these the bodily movements you 
should imitate? The point here is that usually when we talk 
about one person imitating another person’s bodily 
movements this already presupposes that the person who 
imitates sees a meaning in what is being done. We do not 
see the skateboarding girl’s bodily movements as first 
“purely bodily” and then “intentional”, but from the first 
jump we see them as meaningful and intentional, and that 
is why we can focus on what she is doing and also try to 
learn to do the same thing. Our ability to focus on another 
person’s bodily movements entails that we conceive her or 
his actions as having a meaning.  
What one can see from this example is that it is 
important to distinguish between the sort of imitative 
action that requires that we already see a meaning in what 
another person does, and the kind of spontaneous 
imitative response that an infant will sometimes display. 
The spontaneous imitative response that infants exhibit 
have little to do with the kind of imitation I have described 
above. The kind of imitation described above is an 
advanced capacity for action requiring a conception of 
various human contexts, and requiring a capacity to 
control and focus on one’s own bodily movements. It is not 
a matter of merely imitating physical movements in 
general. This does not mean that the child’s spontaneous 
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responsiveness is unimportant or that we could not say 
that it is a kind of imitative response, but it means that the 
child’s response cannot be described as some general 
cognitive capacity that enables the child to interpret other 
people’s “intentions” by imitating their “bodily 
movements”. Even if I do agree with Meltzoff that learning 
has much to do with imitation, I have argued that his 
conception of learning is still based on a problematically 
general and inner conception of intentions, which is 
connected with a problematic conception of imitation as 
well as with a problematically physical conception of 
bodily movements. He suggests that there is some such 
general thing as bodily movements that we first perceive as 
mere physical movements, which then enables us to 
interpret the person’s intentions. I have argued that our 
capacity to see a meaning in what people do, that is, our 
capacity to see that someone is, for instance, skateboarding, 
does not rest on a primary capacity to observe other 
people’s mere physical movements, which we then imitate 
and then interpret as having a certain meaning. Learning 
to observe other people’s bodily movements is something 
we do when we are older, it is not a basic form our 
learning to understand each other takes. And learning to 
observe other people’s physical movements is an even more 
specialised capacity; something that you may learn to do as 
a doctor.  
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2.6 A dialogical perspective 
Another way to think of a child’s development of 
interpersonal understanding can be found among 
proponents of so called attachment theory. A central idea in 
attachment theory is that a child’s development of 
interpersonal understanding grows out of a close reciprocal 
relationship with the caretaker. In his book Attachment and 
Loss ([1969] 1997), the psychologist John Bowlby writes:  
The patterns of interaction that gradually develops 
between an infant and his mother can be understood 
only as a resultant of the contributions of each, and 
especially of the way in which each in turn influences 
the behaviour of the other. (Bowlby [1969] 1997, p. 204) 
A bit later Bowlby continues: 
Very frequently, it is found, babies behave in such a 
way that they maximize the kinds of stimuli that 
emanate from humans. Examples already given include 
a tendency to look at pattern, or at least contour, 
especially when it resembles a human face, and a 
tendency to listen to a human voice, especially a female 
one, and to cry when it ceases. Another bias, present 
from very early days, is a tendency to look at anything 
that moves in preference to something static. 
  Not only are babies biased to behave in special 
ways towards humans but mothers are also biased to 
behave in special ways towards babies. By bringing her 
baby into a face-to-face orientation to herself a mother 
gives him opportunity to look at her. By cradling him 
to herself in a ventro-ventral position she is likely to 
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elicit reflex responses that not only orient him more 
precisely to her but also give him the chance to use 
mouth, hands, and feet to grasp parts of her. And the 
more each experiences the other in these interactions 
the stronger do the relevant responses of each tend to 
become. In this reciprocal way early interaction 
between mother and baby is begun. [...] Whilst being 
breast-fed, a newborn who happens to be alert and to 
have his eyes open will often fixate his mother’s face 
[...]. (Bowlby [1969] 1997, pp. 271-272)    
Bowlby’s perspective differs from the perspective put 
forward in imitation research. He does not deny that 
children can have certain natural tendencies to imitate, but 
he does not maintain that this is the fundamental aspect 
leading to interpersonal understanding. On the contrary, 
Bowlby emphasises the mutual interaction between parent 
and child. It is not only the child that looks at the parent’s 
face and reacts, but also the parent actively engages the 
child and enables the child to look at him or her.28 Bowlby’s 
                                                          
28 It is important to note that attachment theory has been criticized. In 
her book Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture and Mother’s Bodies (2005) 
Rebecca Kukla discusses tendencies in attachment theory to glorify and 
essentialise the relation between mother and child. One form this takes 
is through making it look as if the mother-child relation, and especially 
breastfeeding, is the essential basis for all social relations. Kukla 
questions tendencies to talk about breastfeeding as if it were the 
absolutely most essential and most natural form of interpersonal and 
bodily contact with a child, and a contact that is fundamental to all other 
forms of interpersonal contact. According to Kukla, the emphasis on the 
mother-child relation and breastfeeding that can be seen in attachment 
theory has old roots deriving from Rousseau and the period of the 
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perspective on what it means to simplify a situation differs 
in an important way from the conception of how to 
simplify a situation that is discernable in the imitation test. 
While the imitation test is built on the presupposition that 
                                                                                                                    
European Enlightenment. Rousseau argued that the natural order of 
social life derives from the natural relation between child and mother. 
However, Rousseau does not simply try to explain the origins of social 
life, but his reflections have political aims. He connects the mother-child 
relationship with a natural sense for “the fatherland”. In this sense his 
thoughts are not merely meant as a social theory of interpersonal 
development but also play a political role during a time when, among 
other things, the concept of the nuclear family was gaining importance. 
According to Kukla, this trend can also be seen in attachment theory. I 
find Kukla’s critical reflections to be important. It is important to be 
aware of the risk of constructing pictures that through the invocation to 
human nature may be used politically. However, this does not mean 
that the dialogical perspective in attachment theory is essentially flawed. 
Nor does it mean that we should instead stick to theory of mind. It is 
also important to see that the supporters of attachment theory comprises 
a broad range of theorists of whom some are clearly propounding a 
certain political agenda according to which mothers should stay at home 
with their children. Bowlby is not, as far as I can see, doing so. Bowlby 
notes the following about his use of the word “mother”. “Although 
throughout this book the text refers usually to ‘mother’ […] it is to be 
understood that in every case reference is to the person who mothers a 
child and to whom he becomes attached. For most children, of course, 
that person is also his natural mother.” (Bowlby [1969] 1997, p. 29) 
Bowlby’s thinking derives from a time when mothers were the primary 
caretakers of infants. Therefore he generally talks of mother instead of 
for instance “caretaker” or some other more neutral concept. But he 
does not argue that mothers are the only ones who can have a genuine 
relation with a child. Nor does he maintain that mothers should stay at 
home. 
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strong grimaces will make it easier for the child to respond, 
Bowlby emphasises that the parent actively puts the child 
in such a position that both can look at each other during 
such pleasant situations as for instance feeding. In this 
sense there is a form of care involved in how the parent 
tries to make things easier for the child, a care that does not 
consist in showing exaggerated meaningless grimaces, but 
a care that shows in how the parent enables the child to 
sense a certain kind of meaning in the presence of the 
parent. This can take both positive and negative forms. 
Positively it can be a way of enabling the child to relax, 
where the relaxing can take the form that both look into 
each other’s eyes. Negatively a tired and fed up parent can, 
for instance, handle a child harshly when changing diapers 
in the middle of the night.  
Instead of studying a child’s responses towards facial 
expressions made by a stranger for a brief moment, 
Bowlby studies the child’s growth into a close and 
meaningful long-term relationship and interaction. These 
are relationships that largely take the form of bodily 
closeness, and that consist in an everyday way of being 
together, and these are relationships that develop and 
deepen through patterns of interaction (patterns that 
change and develop) that span over many years.  
The presence to each other is also something that 
concerns the voice. Bowlby writes:  
Not only is mother an interesting and rewarding object 
to watch but she is an interesting and rewarding object 
to listen to. [...] it seems probable, too, that, just as in 
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the case of visual attention and tracking, a baby’s 
auditory attention and pursuit are encouraged and 
augmented by processes of feedback and learning. On 
the one hand, her infant’s interest in her voice is likely 
to lead a mother to talk to him more; on the other, the 
very fact that his attention to her has the effect of 
increasing mother’s vocalisations and other baby-
oriented behaviour is likely to lead the baby to pay 
even more attention to the sounds she makes. (Bowlby 
[1969] 1997, p. 274)    
Again Bowlby emphasizes the interactive pattern of how 
the voice comes to have meaning for the child. It is not 
merely that the parent tries to make the child respond 
correctly to the voice. Rather it is as if the attention that 
both pay to each other’s presence also enhances the 
spontaneous responsiveness of both, it enhances the 
parent’s tendency to talk to the child as well as the child’s 
tendency to listen to the parent’s voice. Parents talk to their 
child long before it can understand any words. This is not 
generally a matter of the parent trying to make the child 
imitate words so that it eventually recognizes the meaning 
of these words. Rather the talking is often simply a way of 
being together, it is a form of presence in the various 
practical things that are done.  
Bowlby brings forth dimensions of how a child comes to 
respond to facial expressions (or to the voice) that cannot 
be discerned from the perspective represented in imitation 
research. In imitation research the adult does not adapt his 
behaviour to the child’s responses. It is just the child that 
should learn to imitate the adult. And even if the 
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experiment in some sense is simplified, the simplification 
has very little to do with trying to communicate with the 
child and trying to make a situation more meaningful and 
comprehensible to the child. The researchers are merely 
trying to produce certain responses to facial images or to 
facial movements. They have, so to say, from the start 
decided that infants are not possible to communicate with, 
because it is taken for granted that infants can only see 
physical surface images and imitate them. Clearly parents 
often address children in a kind of simplified manner, but 
this is done so that the child can by and by come to sense a 
meaning in the situation.  
That we respond to another person is so deeply part of 
what it means to acknowledge another that it can feel very 
awkward not to do so, even to an infant. In How Infants 
Know Minds (2008) the psychologist Vasudevi Reddy 
describes a test where adults were requested to display a 
completely still and unresponsive face to an infant. 
Researchers then studied the reactions of the infant. The 
result was that after a little while the child became 
unhappy. But also the adults found this situation of 
unresponsiveness as emotionally difficult. 
Confirmation or recognition of the other can happen—
or not happen—in many ordinary ways. In all the 
perturbation experiments, the adult (whether the 
parent under instruction to hold a still face or the 
experimenter manipulating the video play) is explicitly 
not confirming the infant—not acknowledging or 
recognising the infant’s previous acts or the infant 
herself. Mothers and other adults asked to engage in 
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still-face experiments sometimes report finding them 
emotionally difficult. And this is why: they are being 
asked to act as if the infant isn’t there—to not 
acknowledge the infant. (Reddy 2008, p. 84) 
Something similar is going on in the imitation tests. The 
adult is not actually responding to the child but merely 
trying to produce a certain response from the child. D. W. 
Hamlyn writes in Perception, Learning and the Self ([1983] 
1994). 
[..] early learning is very much a function of personal 
relationships that exist between the child and other 
human beings; without this or something like it, it is 
difficult to see how learning could go on at all, let alone 
make much progress. (Hamlyn [1983] 1994, p. 144) 
How should one then explain the occasional imitative 
responses that infants can exhibit? Instead of considering a 
child’s imitative responses as displaying a primary 
mindreading function, the child’s tendency to imitate facial 
expressions can be seen as part of a spontaneous dialogical 
engagement with others. Children are intensely awake to 
other people. Certainly this might well to a large degree be 
something innate but it is also something that deepens and 
changes as the child’s interaction with others deepen. It is a 
responsiveness that is entwined in how parents are 
responsive to the child. Imitation is merely one occasional 
pattern that their dialogical presence to each other can take. 
It is one aspect of how the child can be engaged with 
another. These ways of responding do not have to do with 
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learning to read minds, though they are one aspect of how 
we grow into a close relationship with others and into an 
everyday way of being with others.  
Admittedly, Meltzoff (2013) does acknowledge the fact 
that imitation can be part of a dialogical relationship. He 
notes that imitation can often be a way of playing with a 
child.  
[...] mutual imitation games deepen a sense of 
relationship. Mutual imitation indicates ‘communing’ 
or ‘being with’ someone else, even prior to the time 
that linguistic exchanges are possible. [...] caretaker’s 
mirroring serves the functions as a physical mirror. 
Infants can use imitative interactions to learn what the 
self looks like. [...] Through such social mirroring, 
infants gain a better sense of what their own felt acts 
look like. (Meltzoff 2013, p. 141) 
Here Meltzoff acknowledges the dialogical and relational 
character of imitation games. In this sense Meltzoff here 
appears not to have a purely epistemological or a purely 
dualistic conception of interpersonal understanding. That 
is, he does not describe the purpose of imitation as if it 
merely had the function of enabling the child to gain 
knowledge about the other person’s inner intentions. 
However, Meltzoff still seems to consider the “deepened 
sense of relationship” as a secondary feature. He suggests 
that the mirroring enables the child to gain an 
understanding of what its own acts look like. In this sense 
Meltzoff still considers interpersonal understanding, 
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including self-awareness, as dependent on a cognitive 
analogical mechanism.   
There is also a further problem with Meltzoff’s 
emphasis on imitation. Even though he notes that imitation 
games can deepen the relationship between parent and 
child, he does not note that there are a lot of other things 
that children and parents do together, where imitation is 
not the central feature. Meltzoff’s emphasis on imitation as 
the basic source of interpersonal understanding suggests 
that he regards interpersonal understanding as consisting 
of one basic mental function of analogical imagination. 
However, even though I agree that infants sometimes 
imitate others I think it is important to acknowledge that 
there are a lot of other things that parents and infants also 
do together. Meltzoff appears to suggest that imitation 
could be considered meaningful in itself, regardless of the 
larger life-context that the child is part of, and regardless of 
other kinds of responses displayed by the child or by the 
parent. Göran Torrkulla (2009) writes: “[…] the child, from 
its very birth, is met with the full range of expressive 
possibilities of the community into which it is born.” 
(Torrkulla 2009, p. 144) It is only against a background of 
daily mutual engagement in all sorts of different ways that 
the idea of an infant occasionally imitating another is 
comprehensible. A child’s imitative response to another 
person gets its meaning from the way the responses are 
entwined in a broad web of daily responses that do not 
take the form of imitation. The point is that surely a child 
might occasionally imitate other people, but this response 
cannot be understood if we isolate it from the rest of her 
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life, or if we isolate this feature from how adults respond to 
the child in many different ways.  
2.7 Mirror neurons 
As I have suggested, it is not self-evident that Meltzoff’s 
perspective contradicts Bowlby’s perspective. Both can be 
taken to support a perspective on children where the 
child’s growth of interpersonal understanding is 
dependent on its entering into social relations with others. 
Meltzoff does also, in his later works, occasionally note 
that imitation is part of how parent and child can play 
together. In this sense his theory of imitation can also seem 
to resemble Bowlby’s dialogical perspective. However, 
Meltzoff mainly discusses this feature on another, 
allegedly more fundamental and more technical level than 
Bowlby does.  
Research has also been done on so-called “mirror 
neurons”, and this research could also be taken to be 
compatible with, though moving on a “deeper” level than, 
Bowlby’s more socially oriented dialogical perspective. The 
theory about mirror neurons consists in the idea that our 
capacity to respond emotionally and physically to other 
people’s actions and emotions is based on a certain kind of 
neural system that “mirrors” other people’s emotional or 
behavioural reactions. The “mirror neuron” phenomenon 
has also been studied empirically in monkeys. In their 
paper “Grasping the Intentions of Others with One’s Own 
Mirror Neuron System” (2005) the neuroscientists Marco 
Iacoboni, Istvan Molnar-Szakacs, Vittorio Gallese, 
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Giovanni Buccino, John C. Mazziotta and Giacomo 
Rizzolatti write:  
Mirror neurons are premotor neurons that fire when 
the monkey performs object-directed actions such as 
grasping, tearing, manipulating, holding, but also 
when the animal observes somebody else, either a 
conspecific or a human experimenter, performing the 
same class of actions. (Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, 
Gallese, Buccino, Mazziotta and Rizzolatti 2005, p. 0529) 
In another article Rizzolatti reflects on the possible 
importance of mirror neurons.  
What is the functional role of the mirror neurons? 
Various hypotheses have been advanced: action 
understanding, imitation, intention understanding, and 
empathy. 29   In addition, it has been suggested that 
mirror-neuron system is the basic neural mechanism 
from which language developed.30 (Rizzolatti 2005, p. 
419) 
Rizolatti suggests that the “mirror neuron system” in our 
brains is the root of all our social engagement, including 
our capacity to talk. In their article “Language within our 
Grasp” (1998) Rizzolatti and Michael A. Arbib write: “It is 
likely that the human capacity to communicate beyond 
that of other primates depended on the progressive 
                                                          
29 Rizzolatti refers here to Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) and to Gallese, 
Keysers and Rizzolatti (2004). 
30 Rizzolatti refers here to Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998). 
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evolution of the mirror system in its globality.” (Rizzolatti 
and Arbib 1998, p. 192)31 Meltzoff (2010) argues that the 
research on mirror neurons has important features in 
common with his research on imitation.  
The idea of a supramodal representation of action that 
we used to explain early imitation fits well with 
modern neuroscience discoveries about shared neural 
circuits for perception and action and so-called neural 
mirroring systems. (Meltzoff 2010, p. 19) 
There have been a lot of research on brain reactions that 
seem to show that human beings’ and monkeys’ brains 
react in similar ways when the human being or monkey 
observe other people or other monkeys doing things as 
well as when they do these things themselves. My 
intention is not to deny these brain activities. Nor do I 
want to deny that we may often react spontaneously in a 
kind of imitative way to others. Still, there are some 
problems both with how some of the experimental 
research on mirror neurons is designed as well as with 
how some researchers interpret the results of the 
experiments.  
One presupposition that appears to shape the empirical 
studies on mirror neurons is the idea that we generally 
understand other people’s actions by observing them. 
Generally the experimental studies in mirror neurons are 
constructed as situations where one person (or a monkey) 
observes another person (or monkey) who does something. 
                                                          
31 Rizzolatti and Arbib refer here to Donald (1991). 
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Then it is noted that certain similar events occur in both 
monkey’s brains. (The whole concept of mirror neurons 
also metaphorically rests on something we mainly observe 
but do not engage with, i.e. mirrors.) Even when it comes 
to studies on communication these studies have the form 
of one person passively listening to another person 
uttering certain words, rather than the two persons 
engaging in a conversation together.32 The mirror neuron 
studies are generally not constructed as situations where 
two persons (or apes) are entwined in some form of 
reciprocal engagement like playing football, or two persons 
chatting or quarrelling with each other or two apes 
scratching each other’s back. There seem again to be 
several reasons for why the empirical studies are built up 
in such a one-directional manner. One reason may be the 
earlier discussed influence from classical natural scientific 
research methods. Another reason may be that the studies 
suffer from similar problematic assumptions about 
interpersonal understanding as Meltzoff’s studies on 
infants’ imitative responses. This also means that Rizzolatti 
et al.’s theory on mirror neurons cannot be taken to merely 
lie on a deeper cognitive level than Bowlby’s interactive 
dialogical conception of understanding. Rather it is based 
on a quite different conception of interpersonal 
understanding which is reflected in different kinds of 
examples of situations of interpersonal understanding as 
                                                          
32 This can for instance be seen in Rizzolatti and Craighero’s article “The 
Mirror-Neuron System” (2004). 
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well as reflected in differences in the empirical research 
methods.  
Would the theory on mirror neurons then become more 
tenable if a more interactive approach was taken in the 
empirical studies? It might become more tenable, but it is 
not certain. This depends on what the researchers claim 
that the brain activities in question mean. The theory on 
mirror neurons is influenced by a conception of 
understanding as private inner events. In such cases it is 
not evident that the theory would become more tenable 
even if a more interactive approach was taken in the 
empirical research. Even if one person “mirrors” another in 
some sort of interactive sense it is still not clear in what 
sense such a response would be expressive of 
understanding. Though I might have a similar brain 
reaction as you have, this does not in itself mean that I 
understand you. The concept of understanding is integral 
to the fact that we can also respond to each other in 
different ways, and it is integral to the meaning of the 
situation. It is integral to that we can consider a person’s 
understanding as correct or incorrect, that we can criticize, 
console, help or quarrel with the person etc. In this sense 
my understanding of another person cannot be thought of 
as mere similar brain states that occur in two person’s 
brains. By this I do not mean to say that it would be 
unimportant to study brain activities in connection with 
human understanding. Nor do I mean that it necessarily 
would be unimportant to study how one person’s (or 
monkey’s) brain reacts when the person (or monkey) 
observes another person (or monkey) doing something. 
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Clearly it can be an important thing to study. However, I 
am claiming that some of the mirror neuron theorists draw 
too far reaching conclusions about the meaning of such 
brain reactions. These conclusions are expressive of certain 
misconceptions of interpersonal understanding. I am also 
claiming that the empirical studies on mirror neurons tend 
to be constructed in a manner that appears to be influenced 
by a classical natural scientific research practice. This 
construction of the empirical research fits well with an 
epistemological, and analogical, conception of 
interpersonal understanding.  
2.8 Sharing experiences  
There is also a further problem with Rizzolatti et al.’s 
theory on mirror neurons as well as with Meltzoff’s theory 
of imitation. Both rest on the idea that in order for us to 
understand another person we need to have the same inner 
impression or the same sensation as the other. Both 
theories also suggest that it is important that we can share 
another person’s experiences. I shall reflect some more on 
what we mean when we talk of two people sharing an 
experience.  
As I have noted earlier, Meltzoff suggests that imitation 
games can “deepen a sense of relationship”. But then he 
explains this as being important because it makes the 
infant able to mirror its own behaviour with other people’s 
behaviour. Thereby infants “gain a better sense of what 
their own felt acts look like”. Surely infants can sometimes 
mirror their own behaviour with other people’s behaviour, 
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and surely infants can sometimes gain a sense of their own 
behaviour through such mirroring. But is this the essential 
meaning of shared play? There are, I think, several aspects 
with what it means to share an experience that Meltzoff 
does not acknowledge. Consider the following description 
by Rudolph Schaffer (1977) of how a parent and child play 
together: 
Watch a mother with her one-year-old sitting on her 
knee in front of a collection of toys: a large part of her 
time is devoted to such quietly facilitative and scene-
setting activities as holding a toy that seems to be 
pushed out of range, clearing away those things that 
are not at present being used in order to provide the 
child with a sharper focus for this main activity, 
putting things next to each other that she knows the 
child will enjoy combining (such as nesting beakers), 
turning toys so that they become more easily grasped, 
demonstrating their less obvious properties, and all 
along molding her body in such a way as to provide 
maximal physical support and access to the play 
material. (Schaffer 1977, p. 73)  
Schaffer describes here a situation where a parent and 
child play together. However, even if they share a moment 
together they do not do the same thing, nor is it evident 
that they feel the same thing. It might, for instance, well be 
the case that the parent is bored while the child is having 
fun. The child is not imitating its parent, nor is the parent 
imitating the child. Rather the shared play consists in that 
the parent helps the child along in doing things. But while 
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doing so they are also spending time together. The parent’s 
helping creates room for the possibility to share a moment. 
Consider also the following description by Olli Lagerspetz 
(2008): 
In what sense does a train ride from Sorrento to 
Pompeii constitute a shared experience? —If my 
daughter is riding the local train with me, we will 
receive almost the same visual and auditory input. 
Only she is shorter and seated a bit away. An unknown 
tourist next to me, being the same length, will receive 
stimuli that correspond to mine even more closely. But 
when I speak of the experience as something I share 
with my daughter, I do not think of it as something just 
accidentally shared, as it will be with the adjacent 
stranger. My experience is that of a trip together with my 
daughter, just as hers is a trip with me. (Lagerspetz 2008, 
p. 15) 
Lagerspetz suggests, that when we talk about two people 
sharing an experience we say something about how the 
experience cannot be understood from an individual point 
of view. It is what the two do together that is the experience. 
This does, however, not have to mean that they feel the 
same thing. Lagerspetz suggests, by his example, that often 
what we mean by two persons sharing an experience 
cannot be understood by simply looking at the moment 
itself but is something that gets its meaning through the 
way the two persons also have shared a life history 
together. In this sense the sharing cannot be understood 
merely as two persons having similar feelings that are 
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“contagious”. Consider the following poetic reminiscence 
by P.F. Thomése of how he learned to see birds as a child. 
In his book Shadow Child (2005) Thomése writes: 
One sees best through the eyes of another. ‘Look’, my 
father would say, and if I looked carefully I could see it 
too. We were outside, and what he pointed to in the 
bushes became birds. And the birds became different: 
chiffchaff, grosbeak, flycatcher. With my father’s eyes I 
saw them, each and every one. 
  Until he died. Suddenly they were gone, the trees 
were still, everything had lost its tongue.  
  Right after my father was gone, when he was, as it 
were, almost still alive, I had the feeling I had to act as 
his observer, in case his death proved a passing thing 
and he would have to be brought up to date afterwards. 
 Those were the days of an extreme keenness, 
because I was looking for two. It was as though I had to 
keep the world from falling apart, on my father’s behalf. 
(Thomése, 2005, p. 53) 
Thomése talks about the way his father took him along to 
look at birds, and how the world became alive for him 
through this. He does not here describe two people 
imitating each other, and then somehow being affected by 
each other and feeling their similar feelings of joy. 
Thomése describes how their looking at birds together gave 
meaning to the whole situation. And it is also because this 
is a close relationship with a long history of a daily shared 
life that their looking at birds comes to have a special 
meaning as a part of this shared everyday life.  
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Thomése also talks about seeing in a way that is 
markedly different from the way philosophers usually talk 
about seeing. Usually seeing is considered to be an 
individual matter of observing the world of objects, where 
other people are merely a more complicated kind of object. 
But Thomése describes how he came to see the birds in the 
bushes through his father’s eyes. The birds became alive, 
got form, got distinction for him through the way his 
father took him along to look at birds. This also suggests 
how the theory about mirror neurons as well as the theory 
on imitation are problematic. They are problematic because 
they presuppose that shared experiences mean that two 
persons have similar momentary inner states. Such a 
perspective does not allow for the way close personal 
relationships, with a long shared life history, give meaning 
to our ways of experiencing and doing things. 
From the perspective of theory of mind (including 
simulation theory) there is also a tendency to emphasize a 
careful attentive attitude towards other people. 
Understanding is assumed to be an activity connected with 
such words as “attention”, “reflection” and 
“concentration”. However, in his book The Absent Body 
(1990) Drew Leder argues that the emphasis on attention 
reflects an old rationalistic Cartesian perspective on human 
understanding. But it also has to do with the idea that 
other people’s intentions are difficult to discern. However, 
Leder suggests that our ability to relax and to be unaware 
of things are as essential expressions of understanding as 
our ability to be aware of things. The way children grow 
into various ways of being with others largely consists in 
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their growing into a non-reflective and relaxed attitude to 
others. This is not a matter of the child becoming 
inattentive. Rather it is a central and normal part of how 
we grow into close relationships that we can relax in each 
other’s company. For instance, young children will 
commonly tend to fall asleep in the arms of others. A child’s 
whole ability to fall asleep and her sense of becoming 
sleepy is usually shaped through the comforting presence 
of another. Tiredness can of course be a physical state and 
if you are exhausted you fall asleep anywhere. But being 
tired generally makes a child hysterical or angry or 
irritated. When it comes to children; relaxing and falling 
asleep is thus often dependent on others. As a child grows 
up she has to learn to sleep alone. A child’s ability to sleep 
is in this sense often dependent on, and formed by, other 
people acknowledging her need to sleep. This kind of ability 
to relax in the bodily presence of another is not discussed 
from the perspective of theory-of-mind theory, because it is 
not seen as anything that enhances our ability to “read 
minds”. But very much of how a child grows into a life 
with others takes this form, including how the child learns 
to talk. By this I do not mean that children never fall asleep 
by themselves, nor do I mean that a child always feels 
comforted by the bodily presence of others. Children’s 
ways of relaxing as well as their way of responding to 
others vary, and parents behave in various ways towards 
their children. Someone might therefore criticize me here 
by saying that my example is merely one empirical 
observation among others. My suggestion is, however, that 
this example is reflective of a broader pattern of how 
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human beings can come to have meaning for each other 
and respond to each other. That we can relax in each 
other’s company is largely part of how we grow into a 
close relationship and it can be an expression of 
understanding.  
Leder (1990) has the following example where a 
conversation grows out of a shared walk in the woods:  
I am walking in the forest with a friend. As we stroll 
we point out various things to one another. The colour 
of the leaves, a passing bird, the changing of the 
seasons. I adjust to my friend’s pace and she to mine. I 
find myself enjoying things more and in a different 
way than when I had come alone. We speak of other 
topics beside the scenery. Of politics, mutual friends, 
movies each has seen. But then we lapse into silent 
enjoyment of our surroundings. [...] As discussed, 
when I walk with my friend through the forest I am not 
self-conscious about my movements and gestures nor 
focused on hers. Our bodies stand in cotransparency, 
ecstatically involved with a shared world. The 
structure of bodily disappearance is modified but 
fundamentally preserved in this being-with-another.  
  However, I can easily imagine a situation that 
would give rise to explicit body thematization. For 
example:  
  While walking with my friend in the forest I 
notice her surreptitiously sneaking glances at me. I 
become aware that she thinks that something is wrong 
with me: that my words, gestures and comportment are 
those of a seriously unbalanced man. As I describe a 
movie, she seems not to be imagining it along with me 
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but focusing upon the strange way in which I talk. She 
apparently is looking for signs of my derangement. As 
I point out something in the forest, she seems struck by 
the outlandishness of my gestures, not by what I am 
gesturing towards. (Leder 1990, pp. 94-95) 
In the first part of the example Leder describes how two 
persons relax in each other’s company. He also describes 
how this makes the two experience their surroundings in 
new ways. Their walking together makes them take an 
interest in new things, enjoying the sound of birds etc. In 
the example one can also see how a sense for the other’s 
expression changes depending on the character of the 
situation. We are not all the time looking attentively for 
certain changes in the other’s voice or searching for 
patterns in the other’s facial expressions. And that we are 
not doing so can be expressive of how we experience a 
meaning in each other’s presence. However, as Leder 
suggests, we do also sometimes look carefully at others; 
this can be expressive of a negative attitude towards the 
other, or expressive of uncertainty in the relation or 
expressive of worry about the other. Even if we may often 
look at each other while talking we do not usually 
concentrate on each other’s face or search for certain traits 
or gestures, but our listening and talking to each other may 
still have a character of sensitivity. Looking another in the 
eyes is often a part of emphasising one’s words or sharing 
a thought with the other. When I listen to what you tell me 
I might rest my eyes in your eyes. This can be part of my 
concentrating on what you are saying. I might also look 
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you in the eyes as an expression of being sincere in my 
words. In this way sensitiveness to the other’s expression is 
a constant part in how we talk, but this does not 
necessarily consist in our being intensely aware of the 
other’s behaviour and expressions. 
Leder’s example also suggests that there is often a 
spontaneous and floating openness in conversation. We 
often change subjects depending on what the other person 
wants to talk about and depending on what she comes to 
think about. In Totality and Infinity (1969) Emmanuel 
Levinas writes: “Language is not enacted within a 
consciousness; it comes to me from the Other [...]” (Levinas 
1969, p. 204) Sometimes this floating openness can grow 
into a quarrell that suddenly arises from nothing. This is a 
feature that often can be seen with siblings. Their way of 
quarrelling is often expressive both of how they can relax 
in each other’s company as well as expressive of the open 
character of their conversations. But often the openness 
also takes the form of spontaneous considerateness that is 
reflected in how our speaking about different topics is not 
decided by either one of us but we move into other topics 
in an indeterminate way, letting the discussion flow from 
one thing to another depending on what the other person 
wants to talk about. This floating character of 
conversations is also often one form of how we can relax in 
each other’s company. Talking is in that sense often 
connected with considerateness towards the other, a 
readiness to follow her, to respond to her words rather 
than necessarily only to get one’s own thoughts through. 
But the considerateness need not take the form of constant 
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careful attention to what the other person is saying. It can, 
so to say, be integral to the conversation being relaxed, but 
it can also be integral to conversations sometimes being 
tense or strictly focused. And, of course, we are not always 
considerate in our conversations. 
My reason for bringing up these examples of sharing 
experiences has been to suggest that the research on 
imitation and on mirror neurons rest on a problematically 
subjective and private conception of what it means to 
experience something. This is why there is the idea that 
two persons can only understand each other if they 
experience similar feelings, or if they imitate each other’s 
behaviour. By the examples above I have suggested that 
what it means to experience something often cannot be 
understood without seeing how these experiences get their 
form and meaning through what the persons do together 
and then also through the life history the two persons 
share. In Lagerspetz’, Schaffer’s and Thomése’s examples, 
mentioned earlier, one can also see that the way these 
parents share an experience with their child is expressive 
of a form of acknowledgement of the child. It is not 
because parent and child are necessarily very much alike 
or because they happen to have the same interests that 
they come to share each other’s company. Rather, there is 
an acknowledgment of the child in the way the parent 
brings the child along to do things. However, our ways of 
doing things with our parents or with our children are not 
always experienced as positive moments of sharing. Often 
when parent and child go out to share experiences 
everything quickly goes to pieces and the shared moment 
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ends in quarrels and screaming, because the child does not 
put on her clothes fast enough or she does not want to 
walk the wonderful walk in the forest because it is boring 
and she is tired and she wants to play computer games, 
and the parent’s plans of sharing a moment with her child 
goes to pieces and she starts to scream. “Bloody hell! I took 
you along so that we would do something fun together 
and all you do is whine about going home!” There are 
often efforts to acknowledge another person that for some 
reason or other fail. Perhaps these efforts fail because we 
have too big expectations, or perhaps we fail because our 
child simply is in a bad mood and she does not want to do 
anything at all today except scream that everything is 
boring and in between hit her brother. Or then these efforts 
fail because the parent slept badly at night and he is not 
able to keep up a good mood and he loses his temper even 
though he tries to do something fun with the children. 
These kinds of failures to share moments are an integral 
part of a shared life. They are not cognitive-epistemological 
failures to understand, but have meaning in a relational 
and moral sense.  
2.9 Conclusion 
There are two central aspects to the idea that infants learn 
to understand other people through imitation of facial 
expressions. On the one hand this idea rests on the 
conviction that human beings have a natural inclination to 
be social, to respond to other people. It is claimed that our 
sociality originates in a bodily responsiveness to others 
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rather than in a capacity for logical reasoning, as was 
argued by Jean Piaget. This emphasis on our natural bodily 
responsiveness to others is, I think, an important aspect of 
the research on imitation. The research on imitation and 
mirror neurons can be seen as taking a critical stance 
towards tendencies to consider the development of 
interpersonal understanding from a strictly rationalistic 
and then also non-bodily angle.  
However, I have also suggested that the research on 
infant’s imitation of facial expressions is reflective of a 
problematic conception of interpersonal understanding. 
The emphasis on imitation as the basic cognitive method or 
mechanism that enables the infant to understand others 
rests on the idea that we understand each other through 
analogical imagination. This idea is also reflected in 
Rizzolatti’s theory on the function of mirror neurons. The 
idea that interpersonal understanding rests on a capacity 
for analogical imagination is reflective of the idea that the 
second-person perspective is dependent on a first-person 
perspective when it comes to interpersonal understanding. 
Further, Meltzoff’s theory on imitation reflects a body-
mind dualistic perspective on human beings. I have also 
suggested that this assumption also partly shapes the 
empirical research in problematic ways. These are 
assumptions that also partly shape the research on mirror 
neurons.  
The assumption that interpersonal understanding 
consists in one kind of cognitive function makes the 
researchers focus too much on imitation while they ignore 
all other kinds of interpersonal responsiveness that can 
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take place between parent and child. The cognitive 
conception of interpersonal understanding also makes the 
researchers construct a kind of one-directional test 
situations. Further, I argued, with a reference to 
Wittgenstein, Hertzberg and Cockburn, that the focus on 
infants’ imitation of facial expressions portrays facial 
expressions as having a problematically rigid character. I 
also argued that Meltzoff’s conception of interpersonal 
understanding rests on body-mind dualistic assumptions. 
These assumptions also shape the empirical research.  
I then discussed John Bowlby’s examples of the mutual 
responsiveness between a parent and child, a 
responsiveness that takes many forms (both positive and 
negative) which often do not consist in imitation. I also 
suggested that one cannot understand what it means to be 
present to a young child if one considers only the face. The 
ways we are present to a young child take a reciprocal 
form, and involves our bodily way of being in various 
ways. But our presence also gains meaning through the 
fact that we come to share a long life history where 
conversations will be an essential part of this shared life. I 
have also suggested that what it means for a child to grow 
into an understanding of others must be seen as dependent 
on the fact that we acknowledge the child. The concept of 
imitation will not reveal what it means to acknowledge 
another human being. 
 
  
Chapter 3: Autism and theory of mind 
3.1 Introduction 
The theme of this chapter is the syndrome of autism and 
research suggesting that persons with autism lack a theory-
of-mind function. According to proponents of theory of 
mind, people have a mental function that enable them to 
interpret other people’s behaviour and thus eventually to 
see other people as minded, as having intentions and 
beliefs. It is, however, suggested by theory-of-mind 
proponents that persons with autism lack such a mental 
function to see other people as mental beings.  
In core cases autism is a pervasive developmental 
disorder that affects a person’s life extensively. The most 
striking and central feature in autism is the lack of social 
responsiveness. Children with autism are largely 
unresponsive to other people, and often have serious 
deficits in language. They generally do not seem to 
acknowledge the presence of other people, do not respond 
to other people’s talk, and generally do not play with other 
children etc. Autism is, however, not a unitary 
phenomenon but rather a large spectrum of patterns. 
Because of this it is defined as “autism spectrum disorder” 
or ASD. Often autism is connected with intellectual 
disability but sometimes it is not. Children with autism can 
also have various physical problems. It is, however, the 
social unresponsiveness that is the most striking feature in 
autism, and it is this that researchers in theory of mind are 
interested in explaining. 
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My intention in this chapter is twofold. One aim is to 
discuss the claim that persons with autism lack a theory-of-
mind function or that they are “mindblind”. A broader aim, 
which connects with the other chapters in this thesis, is to 
discuss the relation between empirical research and 
theory-of-mind theory. 33  
                                                          
33 In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fifth Edition 
(DSM-5), diagnostic criteria of autism spectrum disorder are described 
in the following way: 
”A. Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction 
across multiple contexts, as manifested by the following, currently or by 
history (examples are illustrative, not exhaustive […]):  
1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from 
abnormal social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth 
conversation; to reduced sharing of interests, emotions, or affect; to 
failure to initiate or respond to social interactions.  
2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social 
interaction, ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and 
nonverbal communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body 
language or deficits in understanding and use of gestures; to a total lack 
of facial expressions and nonverbal communication.  
3. Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships, 
ranging, for example, from difficulties adjusting behavior to suit various 
social contexts; to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making 
friends; to absence of interest in peers. […]  
B. Restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, as 
manifested by at least two of the following, currently or by history 
(examples are illustrative, not exhaustive […]):  
1. Stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or speech 
(e.g. simple motor stereotypies, lining up of toys or flipping objects, 
echolalia, idiosyncratic phrases).  
2. Insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized 
patterns of verbal or nonverbal behavior (e.g. extreme distress at small 
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3.2 Autism as “mindblindness” 
The psychiatrist Leo Kanner was one of the first to describe 
case studies of autism. In the article “Autistic disturbances 
of affective contact” (1943) he gives the following 
description of a five-year old boy with autism: 
He paid no attention to persons around him. When 
taken into a room, he completely disregarded the 
people and instantly went for objects, preferably those 
that could be spun. Commands or actions that could 
not possibly be disregarded were resented as 
                                                                                                                    
changes, difficulties with transitions, rigid thinking patterns, greeting 
rituals, need to take same route or eat same food every day).  
3. Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or 
focus (e.g., strong attachment to or preoccupation with unusual objects, 
excessively circumscribed or perseverative interests).  
4. Hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input or unusual interest in 
sensory aspects of the environment (e.g., apparent indifference to 
pain/temperature, adverse response to specific sounds or textures, 
excessive smelling or touching of objects, visual fascination with lights 
or movement). […]  
C. Symptoms must be present in the early developmental period (but 
may not become fully manifest until social demands exceed limited 
capacities, or may be masked by learned strategies in later life).  
D. Symptoms cause clinically significant impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of current functioning.  
E. These disturbances are not better explained by intellectual disability 
(intellectual developmental disorder) or global developmental delay. 
Intellectual disability and autism spectrum disorder frequently co-occur; 
to make comorbid diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder and 
intellectual disability, social communication should be below that 
expected for general developmental level. (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013, pp. 50-51) 
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unwelcome intrusions. But he was never angry at the 
interfering person. He angrily shoved away the hand 
that was in his way or the foot that stepped on one of 
his blocks [...] Once the obstacle was removed, he 
forgot the whole affair. He gave no heed to the 
presence of other children [...] (Kanner 1943, p. 220)  
A bit further Kanner gives another description of a six-year 
old boy with autism: 
He was led into the psychiatrist’s office by a nurse, 
who left the room immediately afterward. His facial 
expression was tense, somewhat apprehensive, and 
gave the impression of intelligence. He wandered 
aimlessly about for a few moments, showing no sign of 
awareness of the three adults present. He then sat 
down on the couch, ejaculating unintelligible sounds, 
and then abruptly lay down, wearing throughout a 
dreamy-like smile. When he responded to questions or 
commands at all, he did so by repeating them echolalia 
fashion. The most striking feature in his behavior was 
the difference in his reactions to objects and to people. 
Objects absorbed him easily and he showed good 
attention and perseverance in playing with them. He 
seemed to regard people as unwelcome intruders to 
whom he paid as little attention as they would permit. 
When forced to respond, he did so briefly and returned 
to his absorption in things. When a hand was held out 
before him so that he could not possibly ignore it, he 
played with it briefly as if it were a detached object. 
(Kanner 1943, p. 224) 
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Kanner has many similar, detailed descriptions of children 
with autism. The descriptions are striking in the way the 
children seem to be largely unaware of other people. It is 
claimed by theory-of-mind theorists that these problems all 
derive from the lack of a theory-of-mind function.  
Among the first to suggest that autism is due to a 
theory-of-mind deficit were the psychologists Simon 
Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie and Uta Frith, in their paper 
“Does the Autistic Child have a ‘Theory of Mind’?” (1985). 
According to them, the social and linguistic deficits that 
persons with autism suffer from cannot be explained as the 
result of mental retardation since there are persons with 
autism who are not mentally retarded. They also point out 
that mental retardation often does not lead to any social 
impairment. For instance, persons with Down’s syndrome 
are generally highly social. Because of this they argue that 
the social impairments in autism must be due to an 
“underlying cognitive mechanism independent of IQ” 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985, p. 38) This cognitive 
mechanism they describe as:  
[...] a mechanism which underlies a crucial aspect of 
social skills, namely being able to conceive of mental 
states: that is, knowing that other people know, want, 
feel, or believe things; in short, having what Premack 
and Woodruff (1978) termed a ‘theory of mind’. (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985, p. 38)   
In Mindblindness, an Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind 
(1997) Baron-Cohen writes: 
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Imagine what your world would be like if you were 
aware of physical things but were blind to the existence 
of mental things. I mean, of course, blind to things like 
thoughts, beliefs, knowledge, desires, and intentions, 
which for most of us self-evidently underlie behavior. 
(Baron-Cohen 1997, p. 1) 
Baron-Cohen continues: 
It is probably impossible to imagine what it is like to be 
mindblind, in the same way as it is impossible to 
imagine what it is like to be a bat34. To live in a bat’s 
world, in which objects are known by echo location, 
must impart a notion of objects so radically different 
from the notion that we obtain through vision that it 
may be beyond our imagination. Conversely, it is 
probably impossible for a mindblind person to imagine 
what it is like to be a mindreader. In the words of 
Sperber (1993), ‘attribution of mental states is to 
humans as echolocation is to the bat.’ It is our natural 
way of understanding the social environment.  
 The gulf between mindreaders and the mindblind 
must be vast. (Baron-Cohen 1997, p. 4) 
A few pages later Baron-Cohen continues:  
Tragically, mindblindness is not an idle thought 
experiment or a piece of science fiction. For some 
people, it is very real. [...] In this book I will discuss the 
idea that children and adults with the biological 
                                                          
34 Baron-Cohen refers here to Nagel (1974). 
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condition of autism suffer, to varying degrees, from 
mindblindness. (Baron-Cohen 1997, p. 5)  
Baron-Cohen maintains that the syndrome of autism can 
be defined as mindblindness, or more precisely as a 
dysfunction of a theory-of-mind mechanism. Baron-Cohen 
and John Swettenham (1997) write:  
[...] the theory-of-mind deficit in the majority of cases 
with autism is very severe. It has the potential to 
explain the social, communicative, and imaginative 
abnormalities that are diagnostic of the condition [...] 
(Baron-Cohen and Swettenham 1997, p. 884) 
If one looks at real life descriptions of autism, such as those 
of Leo Kanner, Baron-Cohen’s characterisation of autism as 
mindblindness can seem fitting. However, there are also 
other kinds of descriptions of autism that give a somewhat 
different picture of the condition. 
In her book The Siege (1967) Clara Claiborne Park writes 
about her daughter who was born with autism. She begins 
the book with the following description: 
WE START with an image—a tiny, golden child on 
hands and knees, circling round a spot on the floor in 
mysterious, self-absorbed delight. She does not look up, 
though she is smiling and laughing; she does not call 
our attention to the mysterious object of her pleasure. 
She does not see us at all. She and the spot are all there 
is, and though she is eighteen months old, an age for 
touching tasting, pointing, pushing, exploring, she is 
doing none of these. She does not walk, or crawl up 
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stairs, or pull herself to her feet to reach for objects. She 
doesn’t want any objects. Instead she circles her spot. 
Or she sits, a long chain in her hand, snaking it up and 
down, up and down, watching it coil and uncoil, for 
twenty minutes, half an hour—until someone comes, 
moves her or feeds her or gives her another toy, or 
perhaps a book.  
  We are a bookish family. She too likes books. 
Rapidly, expertly, decisively, she flips the pages, one 
by one by one. Bright pictures or text are the same to 
her; one could not say that she doesn’t see them, or that 
she does. Rapidly, with uninterrupted rhythm, the 
pages turn.  
  One speaks to her loudly or softly. There is no 
response. She is deaf perhaps. That would explain a lot 
of things—her total inattention to simple commands 
and requests, which we thought stubbornness; the fact 
that as month follows month she speaks no more than 
one word or two, and these only once or twice in a 
week; even, perhaps, her self-absorption. But we do not 
really think she is deaf. She turns when you least 
expect it, at a sudden noise. The soft whirr as the water 
enters the washing machine makes her wheel round. 
And there are the words. If she were deaf there would 
be no words. But out of nowhere they appear. And into 
nowhere they disappear; each new word displaces its 
predecessor. (Park 1967, pp. 3-4) 
This was the state of Clara Park’s daughter Elly35 when she 
was a baby and to various degrees up to the age of four. 
                                                          
35 Elly’s real name is Jessica, but in order to make the discussion easier 
in this text I will use the name Elly as it is used in Park’s book. In Exiting 
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Her daughter was a happy child, often in a good mood, 
but she was not active in the way normal children are. She 
did not try to explore her surroundings. She did not try to 
climb up stairs, did not try to get things. She was basically 
sitting or circling a spot. Nor did she generally seem to 
notice the presence of others. It was as if she did not see or 
hear, nor did she respond to others. A bit further in the 
book Park writes:  
Elly did not point. Nor did she try to get objects that 
were not within her reach; she seemed unconscious 
they were there. Content in crib or pen, when removed 
from them she crawled freely from room to room. But 
it was motion, not exploration. She did not push or 
poke, open drawers, pull at lamps or tables. At twelve 
months, when she began to crawl, I got ready the gates 
that we had used to keep the other three children from 
falling downstairs. I never used them. Elly did not try 
to go down, and there was never a question of her 
falling. Unconscious of so much, she was conscious of 
the location of every edge or limit; she could be left 
safely on any bed. (Park 1967, p. 7) 
Park describes how her daughter did not engage in doing 
things; she was to a large degree inactive. But at the same 
time her inactivity did not have to do with any kind of 
physical inability to move or clumsiness or complete 
                                                                                                                    
Nirvana: a Daughter’s Life with Autism (2001), a later book by Park about 
her daughter, Park uses her daughter’s real name, Jessica. I will use the 
name Jessica when I quote passages from this later book.  
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unawareness of her surroundings. She was on a certain 
level aware of physical limits.  
Park also tells of there being occasions when Elly did 
react both to sounds and objects and also to people. Elly 
was also occasionally fast at picking up how to do things. 
But even though she for a moment seemed fully to know 
how to do something, these newly learned skills often 
evaporated into the air.  
She made no move to climb the stairs, but one day, in 
play, her sister taught her to crawl up. She learned 
easily enough, and I thought the new skill would mean 
the usual extension of a baby’s possibilities. She 
learned on a Friday. We went away that weekend to a 
stairless household, and when we came back the 
Sunday it did not occur to us to review her new skill. It 
was six months before she crawled up again. (Park 
1967, p. 7)   
There are a large number of such descriptions of Elly 
learning something and then not doing it again for months 
or even for years. She learned certain words but suddenly 
completely stopped using these words. She learned certain 
simple games but suddenly did not play them at all 
anymore.  
From the earlier quote by Kanner one can get the 
impression that autistic children have no trouble in 
understanding or seeing objects while they are unaware of 
other people. However, from Park’s description it appears 
as if her daughter was unaware of almost anything, i.e. 
both objects and people. How should this difference in 
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description be understood? One way to explain the 
difference is that children with autism are not all alike. 
Another explanation may be that the children Kanner 
describes are several years older than Park’s daughter Elly. 
It might well be that the children in Kanner’s description 
had been in a similar state as Elly was, when they were 
younger. Perhaps they had developed and become more 
active and aware of objects. Another aspect to note is that 
Kanner’s description of how the children play is quite 
short. He says in one of the quotes that the boy “showed 
good attention and perseverance in playing”. It is, however, 
common that children with autism are interested in objects 
in abnormal ways and then also “play” in abnormal ways. 
For instance, children with autism often like to spin things 
endlessly. Kanner also notes in the first quote that the boy 
preferred to play with objects that could be spun. In Park’s 
description Elly flips pages in books endlessly. Such 
behaviour is not expressive of a normal sense for objects.  
Park describes several traits in Elly’s behaviour, traits 
that involve both her failure to take an interest in objects 
and also her failure to acknowledge or respond to people. 
Park also describes a changing character in Elly’s sense for 
her surrounding; she does not always appear unresponsive 
to people or to her physical surroundings. There is a 
general lack of spontaneous engagement in, or 
responsiveness to her surroundings, but at the same time 
Park also tells about Elly being sensitive when moving 
around in the house and sensitive to certain sounds. There 
is also the general pattern of Elly not responding to other 
people, while on the other hand every morning when 
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waking up Elly happily greets her mother. She also loves 
to be tickled by her father. Jenny Lexhed (2008) also writes 
of how her autistic son loved to be tickled and how during 
these tickling sessions he used to laugh and look intensely 
into his mother’s eyes. There are also the sudden displays 
of new skills such as when Elly’s sister one day taught Elly 
to climb up the stairs, a skill that also then equally 
suddenly disappeared. Thus there are various patterns of 
apparent incapacity or lack of engagement but also evident 
displays of sudden capacity and development and learning 
combined with an equally sudden incapacity or lack of 
interest in continuing doing things. And there are various 
patterns of unresponsiveness to others combined with 
certain patterns of evident responsiveness and presence to 
others.  
My suggestion so far is that theory-of-mind theory is 
influenced by certain careful and very striking real life 
descriptions of autism, such as Leo Kanner’s. Even if 
Kanner’s descriptions are carefully made one can be struck 
by the apparent difference in how autistic children seem to 
be unaware of people while they seem to be aware of 
objects. From this one can get the impression that autism 
essentially consists in “mindblindness”. 36 However, I have 
                                                          
36 I do not mean to imply that Kanner’s descriptions of children with 
autism are not good descriptions.  However, there are certain 
differences in the character of these descriptions. Kanner describes 
children that are several years old. His descriptions are also to a large 
extent focused on the child’s behaviour during the child’s visit at the 
clinic, though he does also describe the children’s life history briefly as 
well as their further development. Park’s description of her daughter 
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also suggested that there are other descriptions of autism 
that do not fit as well into the theory of “mindblindness”. 
In Park’s description of Elly as an infant there is not a stark 
difference between Elly’s sense for objects and her sense 
for people. Since Elly, as a young child, appears to be 
largely unaware of both objects and people it is not clear 
that Elly’s state could be defined as “mindblindness”. But 
also the fact that Elly occasionally does respond to other 
people, for instance that she loves to be tickled, goes 
against the theory of mindblindness. The claim that autism 
can be defined as “mindblindness” rests on the idea that 
we understand other people by the use of a mindreading 
mechanism. Even though there are many features in 
autism that can seem to support the theory of 
mindblindness I will argue that autism cannot be 
understood from such a perspective on interpersonal 
understanding.37  
                                                                                                                    
stretches over a longer period of time. She describes her daughter’s 
behaviour from infancy to adulthood. She also describes her daughter’s 
behaviour in ordinary life situations. Because of this difference in focus, 
I think Park’s description of her daughter reveals aspects that are not as 
clearly discernible in Kanner’s descriptions.  
37 The temptation to describe autism as a kind of body-mind dualism, 
where the person with autism only can see outer bodies but not minds, 
is also reflected in the following imaginary description of autism, by 
Alison Gopnik: “This is what it’s like to sit around the dinner table. At 
the top of my field of vision is a blurry edge of nose, in front are waving 
hands.... Around me bags of skin are draped over chairs, and stuffed 
into pieces of cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected ways.... Two 
dark spots near the top of them swivel restlessly back and forth. A hole 
beneath the spots fills with food and from it comes a stream of noises. 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
154 
 
3.3 Autism, pretend play and mindreading 
In discussions concerning autism as mindblindness, it is 
often concluded that pretend play is an important practice 
whereby a child learns to imagine that other people have 
minds. The philosopher A.I. Goldman writes in Simulating 
Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of 
Mindreading (2006):  
[...] creative role play constitutes a kind of simulation 
[...] such practice at simulation makes a positive 
contribution to children’s mindreading. […] Normal 
children engage in role play from the age of 2, acting 
out the role of a person or creature. Role play […] is a 
species of pretend play in which a child impersonates a 
character, such as a mother, a bus driver, or a soldier. 
One can also project a role onto an object like a doll or 
toy, which serves as a prop for the role. I shall interpret 
role play as extended imitation. [...] role play is 
                                                                                                                    
Imagine that the noisy skin-bags suddenly moved toward you, and their 
noises grew loud, and you had no idea why, no way of explaining them 
or predicting what they would do next.” (Gopnik 1993, taken from 
Baron-Cohen 1997, pp. 4-5) Gopnik’s description of autism is an 
imagined case. It is not a description of a real case of a person with 
autism. One can, however, see in the quote how the theoretical idea of 
“mindblindness” is reflected in a tendency to give a strongly 
dramatized body-mind dualistic description of the autistic person’s 
impression of people. Baron-Cohen suggests that Gopnik’s description 
is an accurate description of autism. I think Gopnik’s description is 
dramatised in a problematic sense. Such dramatised imaginative 
descriptions will not help people to understand persons with autism. It 
will, on the contrary, make people estranged to persons with autism. 
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‘extended’ imitation insofar as it involves more than 
mere behavioral copying. It involves imitation as well, 
that is, attempts to enact in one’s own mind a target’s 
mental states or processes. Evidently children’s role 
play involves such mental simulation, as manifested by 
verbal and nonverbal behavior. (Goldman 2006, p. 196)  
According to Goldman, children’s capacity for role playing 
and playing with dolls is central for the development of 
interpersonal understanding because it enhances a form of 
analogical imagination whereby the child learns to 
understand other minds. Autistic children’s inability to use 
such an analogical form of imagination is, according to 
Goldman, one reason why they do not develop an 
understanding of others. Baron-Cohen writes: 
If children with autism really have some impairment in 
the development or functioning of ToMM [Theory of 
Mind Mechanism], they should also have difficulty 
understanding the mental state of pretending. [...] A 
range of studies now show that in children with autism 
spontaneous pretend play is severely impoverished or 
altogether absent. (Baron-Cohen 1997, pp. 76-77)  
The philosopher Gregory Currie also concludes about 
autistic persons: “We have seen that autistic individuals 
show coincident deficits on pretend play and on the 
comprehension of the mental states of others.” (Currie 1995, 
p. 159) These deficits in pretend play are considered to 
reflect the fact that children with autism lack a capacity for 
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analogical imagination which in turn is considered 
important for the theory-of-mind mechanism to work. 
Children who play with dolls often imitate various 
situations in real life. In this sense children’s play often 
takes on a kind of analogical character. The question is, 
how should this analogical character of playing be 
understood? Does the abundance of forms of playing that 
involve a kind of analogical imagination, such as for 
instance doll play, show that the social importance of 
playing with dolls lies in the ability to use a method of 
analogical imagination that enhances the child’s capacity to 
imagine the mental states of other people? Is children’s 
pretend play expressive of a training for mindreading? 
Does the lack of pretend play among children with autism 
point towards a theory-of-mind deficit?  
There are several problems here in how pretend play is 
taken to enhance the child’s capacity to read minds. One 
problem is that pretend play is portrayed as if it were 
basically a lonely child playing with her doll. However, 
playing is centrally something children do with others; it 
largely has meaning as a social way of being with others. If 
a child were only interested in pretend playing by herself 
and not at all interested in playing with others, there would 
be something seriously wrong with this child. Indeed 
children often want to play by themselves, but equally 
often they want to play with others. The emphasis on 
pretend play in theory-of-mind theory is connected with a 
consistent tendency to ignore the fact that children play 
with others. This is reflective of the way the proponents of 
theory of mind think that to understand another person 
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means to learn to read the person’s intentions rather than 
to learn to do various things together with the other person. 
Another problem with the idea that pretend play 
enhances the child’s development of a theory-of-mind 
function is that only one form of playing is emphasised 
while a lot of other forms of playing are totally ignored. 
Pretend play is merely one form of playing that is part of a 
whole lot of other ways of playing, and also part of a lot of 
other ways of being together, that have nothing to do with 
analogical imagination or with imitation. Children play 
hide and seek together, they fight with each other, parents 
and children eat together, they go along shopping, they 
chat about various things almost constantly, they quarrel 
etc. I do not mean to say that pretend play is unimportant 
for how a child grows up and develops an understanding 
of various things, but it is problematic to suggest that 
pretend play is a basic tool by which the child learns to 
read minds. In playing, as much as in our other forms of 
being together, we are confronted with each other in ways 
where we learn to be considerate as well as mean, we learn 
to accept the wishes of others, we learn to help each other, 
and we learn to control our temper. But we also learn mean 
tricks of ostracising someone, not taking the other kid 
along to play etc. We get used to people having their 
various good and problematic attitudes, and we get used 
to quarrelling and getting irritated with each other and 
expressing our opinion or keeping quiet. However, from 
the perspective that pretend play and imagination is 
connected with learning to read other minds, none of these 
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social and moral aspects are considered as expressions of 
how a child learns to understand others. 
My argument so far has been that theory-of-mind 
theory portrays playing in a problematic one-sided and 
restricted light, as if it were a tool by which the child learns 
to read other minds. If one thinks of playing as a tool for 
mindreading one will miss how crucial it can be for a child 
with autism to learn to play. I shall now again return to 
take a look at Park’s description of how she tried to get 
contact with her daughter Elly: 
Elly is prone on the floor, legs frogged out on either 
side of her. She is under a blanket and so invisible, but I 
know the position and the steady rhythm that goes 
with it. She is rapt, removed, she needs me not at all. I 
crouch beside her, ready to enter her world in a way 
she can appreciate if she will and ignore if she wants to. 
My finger goes under the blanket, then my hand. No 
response. My head follows. Elly knows I am there. 
There are two of us now, withdrawn from the world 
but near each other. It is very inward, warm and 
dark—a physical expression for undemanding 
intimacy. There is nothing difficult here—nothing to do, 
nothing to say. The only thing you need is time and the 
willingness to spend a lot of it with your head under a 
blanket.  
  It became possible to make a game out of raising 
the edge of the blanket. By the time she was two we 
could get her to play the peek-a-boo game whose 
absence we had noticed at ten months, and she even 
made a little ‘there-she-is’ noise to go with it. As time 
went on we moved forward, but not far. She began to 
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welcome me into her enclosures. At three and a half 
she even developed on her own a new discovery 
game—herself closed in a closet, I to open the door. 
Better yet, both of us sit quiet in the dark closet, door 
pulled to, she and I, close together, everything else shut 
out. We still do that sometimes, even today. (Park 1967, 
pp. 92-93)  
Here Park gains contact with her daughter by simply lying 
beside her under a blanket for long times. Slowly out of 
this they develop a peek-a-boo game. And then Elly herself 
develops the game further. No examples like these are 
discussed by Baron-Cohen. From the perspective of theory-
of-mind theory, bodily closeness plays no role, even 
though bodily closeness is one of the most fundamentally 
important ways of having contact with a young child. 
Another such attempt to get Elly to respond has to do with 
playing with toes.  
How could we give Elly’s shapes a human meaning? 
Elly was three years old, and I was still trying to find 
out whether she recognized that a doll had a human 
shape. Sculpture, which reaches touch as well as sight, 
is one degree less abstract than painting. We sit on the 
floor with a small girl doll. It belongs to Elly’s sisters; it 
has many outfits. I dress it. Elly pulls the clothes off, 
chooses another costume, we begin again. The game 
holds her interest over several weeks. Can I assume 
that it shows she knows the doll represents a human 
body? Testing, testing. In the absence of other evidence 
I cannot be sure. I try to put the doll into interesting 
situations, but of course they are not interesting to Elly. 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
160 
 
One day, however, an idea floats into my mind which 
most of the time is vacant; I play ‘this little piggy,’ 
which Elly knows, not on Elly’s toes but on the doll’s. 
Elly shows no interest, but in her bath that night I 
surprise her counting over the doll’s toes, ending with 
the delighted squeal that for her signals the climax of a 
tickling game. It seems unmistakable that she is tickling 
the doll, that it is safe to conclude at last that she sees 
the doll has toes like her own.  
  I can make explicit now, the principle that I then 
perceived so dimly that I made use of it only by 
accident: in reaching the eyes and ears of such children, 
and later on their minds, one must begin with 
sensations their bodies can recognize. From Elly’s toes 
to the doll’s. It is not for three full months that it occurs 
to me, as mechanically we turn the pages of A Treasury 
of Art Masterpieces (so much more interesting for 
mother than Little Golden Books), to play ‘this little 
piggy’ on the bare toes of those Renaissance Christ-
babies. Which I do. And Elly laughs. (Park 1967, p. 61)   
This case can appear to resemble Baron-Cohen’s and 
Goldman’s claim that doll play and pretend play are 
essential in order for a child to learn to understand other 
minds. However, Goldman does not at all talk about 
pretend play as something we do with others. Neither does 
he say anything about how children can enjoy a kind of 
bodily playfulness, such as tickling. For Goldman doll play 
is important through enhancing an analogical form of 
imagination. However, for Elly the picture of the Christ-
baby became meaningful through the way Elly had 
enjoyed it when her mother played this-little-piggy with 
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Elly’s toes. This resembles the situation of their both lying 
together under the blanket and it slowly developing into 
the peek-a-boo game.  
In his book Autism and the Development of Mind (1993), 
the psychiatrist Peter Hobson writes: 
If personal relatedness involves intersubjective 
exchanges that are co-ordinated between the infant and 
others [...] then we shall need to think in terms of the 
structure of interpersonal events. Even if one wishes to 
maintain a focus on the individual infant, it is still 
necessary to consider how specifically interpersonal 
patternings of behaviour and experience are generated 
and registered. [...] More specifically, the argument 
goes, a child’s experience of affectively patterned 
personal relatedness is constitutive of the child’s 
understanding of the nature of persons with minds. 
(Hobson 1993, p. 186) 
Hobson’s conception of interpersonal understanding 
differs from the conception put forward by theory-of-mind 
theorists. According to Hobson, autism ought to be seen as 
involving various difficulties of engaging with others. A 
child’s ability to grow into an understanding of other 
people is largely dependent on the way the child is 
entwined in affectionate relationships with others where 
the child responds to these others spontaneously and these 
others respond to the child.  
[...] there is no radical developmental disjunction 
between the perception of ‘bodies’ or ‘behaviour’, and 
the apprehension of ‘mind’. A fortiori, it is not a matter 
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of the infant beginning with the cool perception of 
thing-like bodies, and only subsequently interpreting 
or theorising that behind bodily behaviour there might 
be ‘mind’. On the contrary, aspects of mind are 
perceived in aspects of expressive behaviour. [...] To 
perceive personal meanings is also to have the 
propensity to react to such meanings in appropriate 
ways. Perception is relational; in the early stages of 
personal relatedness, perceiving has intrinsic 
connections with feeling and acting. (Hobson 1993, p. 
187) 
Hobson emphasises how the child grows into interpersonal 
understanding through being part of affectionate 
relationships. Baron-Cohen’s conviction that interpersonal 
understanding is fundamentally a matter of seeing that 
other people have an inner mental life makes him pay no 
attention to the meaning of close relationships. 
Consequently he pays no attention to descriptions of how 
parents of children with autism try to get contact with their 
child, and how these repeated efforts largely take an 
affectionate form. Hobson also emphasises the importance 
of sharing:  
[...] it is partly from early experiences of ‘sharing’ [...] 
that a child’s concept of person is derived. It is to 
bodily expressed attitudes that a young child responds, 
often with (sharing) attitudes of her own. (Hobson 1993, 
p. 188)  
In his article “The Roots of Mindblindness” (2004) the 
philosopher Stuart Shanker writes:  
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[...] an infant’s emotions develop in the context of co-
regulated and shared emotional experiences (i.e. 
interactions in which partners are continuously active, 
continually adjusting their behaviours to each other), 
including the capacity to recognize the significance of 
or respond automatically to facial expressions of 
emotion [...] Far from being predetermined phenomena, 
the emotions that a child experiences and the capacity 
to understand the emotions that another person is 
experiencing are two aspects of one and the same 
phenomenon, both shaped by the nurturing 
relationships that a child experiences with her primary 
caregivers. (Shanker 2004, p. 692) 
It is, according to Hobson and Shanker, largely difficulties 
on this level that a child with autism struggles with. 
However, it is also important to note that parents try in 
various ways to create forms of contact, as one can see in 
the quotes by Park above. There is so to say no absolute 
wall surrounding a child who has autism, even if it might 
be very difficult to establish contact, to arouse the child’s 
interest in things and to figure out ways to engage the 
child in interpersonal relationships. Most importantly, the 
situations of playing described by Park above are not proof 
of the pretend play theory put forward in theory of mind, 
because according to the pretend play theory no shared 
relationships are of relevance at all for the meaning of 
playing. That is, children with autism do indeed often tend 
not to be good at pretend play, but this does not mean that 
pretend play enables a child to read minds. What a child 
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lacks when it is not good at pretend play is something 
other than a tool to learn to read minds. 
However, there is also another side to the way Elly 
comes to recognize the picture of the baby through the 
playing with toes. It is something that can be seen in the 
following quote: 
Elly becomes interested in her brother’s kindergarten 
workbook. She turns the pages as always, looking with 
attention but without recognition. But now I have an 
inkling of how to proceed. As we pass a large, realistic 
picture of an ice cream cone, I take her hand and make 
her pat it. Next time she looks at the book there is a 
pause in the mechanical turning; that picture, at any 
rate, she sees.  
  This book was full of usable sights; for the picture 
of a school playground I made her fingers walk up the 
slide and go ‘whee’ down, I made them ride the seesaw 
and the swings. I no longer wondered about her 
comprehension; her delight left no doubt of it. (Park 
1967, p. 62) 
There is a difference between an ordinary child and Elly in 
that it was to such a large extent difficult for Elly to engage 
in doing things. For an ordinary child doing things, 
touching, pulling, pushing, etc., is central for her coming to 
see a meaning in things. This is entwined with parents and 
others also constantly showing, helping, taking along, 
forbidding, etc. But even though Elly’s parents tried to 
engage her, Elly still largely lacked that capacity to become 
interested in doing things. At many instances Elly used her 
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mother’s hands to do things. It was not merely as if she 
used her mother as a tool but rather as if she was unable to 
engage in doing things by herself; as if she needed another 
for this. She largely did not respond to invitations to take 
an interest in things by herself or by doing things herself. 
But when Elly reacted to the “this little piggy” game her 
mother realized that her daughter still, despite her general 
inactivity, sensed a meaning in things through touch. This 
was a very important insight since, contrary to ordinary 
children, Elly did not as easily seem to become aware of 
things through her sight or hearing. Therefore touch 
became a very important source for contact and 
understanding. It was through meaningful touch in the 
form of doing things as a kind of imaginary bodily playing 
or bodily presence (such as in lying together under the 
blanket) that Elly also came to see things with her eyes.38 
                                                          
38 Park also describes how Elly could communicate by singing even 
though Elly was to a large degree unable to utter specific words. There 
is, I think, something similar here with how she came to sense a 
meaning in pictures through bodily “acting” the picture. Park writes: 
“Tunes became words for Elly. ’Ring around a rosy’ was the first. She 
was three and three quarters that spring, and she had been playing the 
game for many months. Now her new musical alertness picked up the 
tune.  As soon as it did, she extended it spontaneously to a picture of 
children in a ring, then to a garland of flowers, and finally to the 
unadorned figure of a circle. The song—shortened to its first few 
notes—for more than a year remained her word for ‘circle’ and the 
cluster of ideas around it, functioning far more reliably than any of her 
actual words. 
 Other leitmotifs followed. ‘Happy birthday’ equalled cake and, by 
extension, candles and fire. […] ‘London Bridge’ became a bridge motif; 
the dwarfs’ song from Snow White did duty for ‘dig.’ We noticed that 
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Through this her mother saw a way to establish contact 
with her child, which would eventually enable them to 
communicate with each other by the use of pictures. Often 
the tendency among children with autism to use their 
parent’s hands as if they were mere “tools” is taken to 
imply that the child is not aware of other people, treating 
them merely as objects. Surely this can be the case, but 
perhaps at least for some autistic children this behaviour 
might partly have to do with an inability to take an 
initiative on their own and partly with a difficulty of seeing 
things without touching the thing in a meaningful way? At 
least Elly’s case seems to imply some such a reaction. Park 
describes several instances where it is as if Elly is unable to 
take initiative on her own even though she wants to do 
something. In the following description Elly is about three 
years old: 
Though she is fascinated with water, activating a faucet 
is harder. […] she learns of herself to use the kitchen 
faucet, which requires only a simple push. But an 
ordinary faucet requires both pressure and twist. I put 
Elly’s hand on it; wrist and fingers go limp. My whole 
hand covers Elly’s; using her as a tool, I turn on the 
faucet. This first time, and again, and again, all the 
force is mine. Elly likes water and she has no objection 
                                                                                                                    
though she now sang many songs freely, she never sang her leitmotifs at 
random or for their own sake as songs. Nor did she sing them musically, 
like the others, but rapidly, schematically, functionally—only just well 
enough for them to do their job of communication. Music was serving as 
her avenue to words […]” (Park 1967, pp. 83-84) 
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to repetition. Imperceptibly—I hope it is 
imperceptibly—I lighten my pressure. The small hand 
beneath mine is no longer quite limp. It seems that 
there are muscles there after all. I move my hand a 
quarter inch up hers as I turn the water on again. 
Another quarter inch. A half. Infinitely gradually I 
withdraw my hand, up her fingers, up her arm. Finally 
all that is left is one finger on her shoulder, to enable 
her to maintain the fiction that it is I, not she, who is 
performing the action. […] next day we must go over 
the process again to re-establish the skill, but we can do 
it more rapidly. Then I remove my finger; my presence 
now is enough. The next day she does it alone, thrilled, 
delighted, over and over. (Park 1967, pp. 51-52) 
Hobson also reflects on the fact that autistic children do not 
play much with things. He notes that autistic children 
often do not show much spontaneous play while they do 
play when being elicited. He argues that the lack of 
spontaneous play often seems to have more to do with a 
lack of motivation than with cognitive deficits.  
[…] there is the specially marked abnormality in 
spontaneously produced as opposed to elicited play. 
Why do so very few autistic children seem to have fun 
in playing? As Sharon Wulff (1985) describes, an 
autistic child who is left to his or her own devices in a 
playroom full of toys is very likely to ignore the toys 
and continue rocking or hand-flapping, or will spin 
moveable parts rather than becoming engaged in a 
meaningful way. (Hobson 1993, p. 164)  
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Hobson argues that the ways we grow up to see a meaning 
in things, to enjoy playing with things, doing things, 
handling things, moving about, is largely entwined with 
how we are responsive to others. Elly’s inability to become 
spontaneously interested in, or to react to, her physical 
surrounding seems to have been part of her inability to 
engage with people.  
In the living whole, nothing comes first. Work done on 
any one of Elly’s inabilities affected the others. Every 
game we played, every exercise we devised to extend 
Elly’s use of her body, her eyes, her ears, her voice, her 
mind, worked in addition to breach that jealously 
guarded isolation which for those who lived with her 
remained the most obvious and the most terrible aspect 
of her condition. (Park 1967, p. 88) 
Park again: 
But all this—head under the blanket, doll play, practice 
in imitation—was for one purpose: to bring her into 
contact with people. The evidences of progress were 
small, but they were beginning to accumulate. In the 
weeks before her third birthday, all these things 
happened. In the course of a tickling game, she poked 
me with her finger, to her great amusement. (It did not 
happen again for six months.) She fed me a candy, as 
she did a little later at Dr. Blank’s, putting it into my 
mouth herself, not merely pushing my hand to do the 
work. When an elderly gentleman had held her hand 
and tickled it, she held out her hand to invite him to 
begin again. She even clowned a little for him, as a 
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normal baby would. One memorable afternoon she 
spontaneously hugged her sister. Three or four times 
she pushed the children, not with the detached don’t-
bother-me attitude we were used to, but with the first 
anger and hostility she had ever shown. [...] there was a 
general forward motion that helped us bear setbacks. 
As Elly approached four she abandoned doll play 
altogether and resisted all attempts to lure her back to 
it. But other things took its place. The new ability to 
joke and tease did not disappear. She spilled water on 
me on purpose, and laughed. She turned the light off 
while we sat at supper. Teasing is not an autistic 
activity.  
  We were able to establish a few reciprocal 
games—ones in which Elly too must play her part. Elly, 
who six months before would lackadaisically roll a ball 
back to you from twelve inches away, would now 
retrieve it with enthusiasm if you threw it several yards. 
Out on the wide college lawns, I could now do as I had 
delighted to do with the other children—crouch down 
and hold out my arms while a small, laughing creature 
came running from fifty feet away to end in my 
embrace. (Park 1967, pp. 102-103)   
These responses are not preliminary steps of seeing an 
outer physical human shape towards a “real” 
understanding of other people as “mental”, they are 
genuine responses to another. It is an essential feature in 
human life that we grow into such various forms of 
spontaneous affectionate responsiveness to each other. 
And it is also through this that we grow into slowly having 
a more advanced sense of others, which for instance shows 
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in how we get used to respond to our close ones’ attitudes 
of irritation or jokes or anger or pain or forgetfulness. 
However, no such descriptions of expressions of 
interpersonal responsiveness are mentioned when theory 
of mind is emphasized as the basic problem in autism.  
3.4 Autism and the false belief task 
Now someone could object that so far I have discussed 
autistic children that are on a much lower level of 
understanding than the cases that are generally discussed 
by theory-of-mind theorists, and that I hereby sidestep 
their question. Partly this critique is correct and partly not. 
It is not correct in the sense that by discussing the case of 
Elly as a young child I have not wanted to sidestep their 
question but I have wanted to argue that it is important to 
acknowledge the life history of children with autism, and 
then also important to acknowledge that children with 
autism develop. By discussing the case of Elly I have also 
wanted to question a certain kind of one-sided attention, 
among theory-of-mind proponents, to certain features in 
autism. This one-sided attention is reflective of the body-
mind dualistic, rationalistic and epistemological 
conception of interpersonal understanding that theory-of-
mind theory consists of. 
However, there are features in older and more able 
children with autism that seem not as stark in younger or 
less developed children. Such features can concern how 
children with autism often fail to consider other people’s 
perspective on a situation, or in other words fail to see that 
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other people have intentions. These features can appear to 
support the theory that children with autism specifically 
have a theory-of-mind deficit. Other features also show in 
the autistic person’s use of speech. In what follows I shall 
therefore first discuss some studies concerning autistic 
children’s incapacity to understand that other people have 
intentions or beliefs. After this I discuss some studies 
indicating that the language deficits that children with 
autism can have indicate a lack of theory of mind. 
There is a well-known psychological test that concerns 
the ability to consider other people’s perspective, or in 
other words the ability to see that other people have beliefs 
and intentions. This test is called “the false belief task”. 
Originally the theory about false beliefs was put forth by 
Daniel Dennett (1978). In his article “Beliefs about Beliefs” 
Dennett reflects on whether chimpanzees might have a 
theory-of-mind function or not. He proposes that one 
might try to find out whether this is the case by making a 
false belief experiment. A few years later Heinz Wimmer 
and Josef Perner (1983) put Dennett’s thoughts into action 
by constructing a real test situation. They conducted the 
false belief task with ordinary non-autistic children 
between the age of three and four. Since then the false 
belief task has been repeated a large number of times and 
in varying forms, with ordinary children at the age of three 
to four, as well as with autistic children. The idea has been 
that the children’s capacity or incapacity to accomplish the 
test indicate that children gradually develop an 
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understanding of other people as minded. Here is a 
description of Wimmer and Perner’s false belief task39: 
In order to test the subjects’ comprehension of the other 
person’s wrong belief, stories like the following were 
constructed: A story character, Maxi, puts chocolate 
into a cupboard x. In his absence his mother displaces 
the chocolate from x into cupboard y. Subjects have to 
indicate the box where Maxi will look for the chocolate 
when he returns. Only when they are able to represent 
Maxi’s wrong belief (‘Chocolate is in x’) apart from 
what they themselves know to be the case (‘Chocolate 
is in y’) will they be able to point correctly to box x. 
This procedure tests whether subjects have an explicit 
and definite representation of the other’s wrong belief. 
(Wimmer and Perner 1983, p. 106)  
The result of this test was that a four year old child 
generally understood that the story character Maxi will 
have a false belief while a child of three generally did not 
realise this. The test seems to indicate that it is difficult for 
children under the age of four to complete the task because 
they have an undeveloped mental capacity to see that 
other people have intentions and beliefs.  
A few years later (in 1985) Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. 
Leslie and Uta Frith built a similar kind of test that they 
conducted with autistic children. Their task was named the 
                                                          
39 Wimmer and Perner made many variations on this false belief task. I 
have only quoted one of these. See Wimmer and Perner (1983). 
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Sally-Anne task. They describe the task in the following 
way: 
There were two doll protagonists, Sally and Anne. First, 
we checked that the children knew which doll was 
which (Naming Question). Sally first placed a marble 
into her basket. Then she left the scene, and the marble 
was transferred by Anne and hidden in her box. Then, 
when Sally returned, the experimenter asked the 
critical Belief Question: ‘Where will Sally look for her 
marble?’. If the children point to the previous location 
of the marble, then they pass the Belief Question by 
appreciating the doll’s now false belief. If however, 
they point to the marble’s current location, then they 
fail the question by not taking into account the doll’s 
belief. These conclusions are warranted if two control 
questions are answered correctly: ‘Where is the marble 
really?’ (Reality Question); ‘Where was the marble in 
the beginning?’ (Memory Question). (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie and Frith 1985, p. 41) 
The result of their false belief task was the following:  
23 out of 27 normal children, and 12 out of 14 Down’s 
Syndrome children passed the Belief Question on both 
trials (85% and 86% respectively). By contrast, 16 of the 
20 autistic children (80%) failed the Belief Question on 
both trials. [...] All 16 autistic children who failed 
pointed to where the marble really was, rather than to 
any of the other possible locations [...] (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie and Frith 1985, p. 42) 
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As one can see from the results of the false belief task there 
was a striking difference in ordinary children and children 
with Down’s Syndrome answering correctly while children 
with autism generally failed. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
conclude:  
Our results strongly support the hypothesis that 
autistic children as a group fail to employ a theory of 
mind. We wish to explain this failure as an inability to 
represent mental states. As a result of this the autistic 
subjects are unable to impute beliefs to others and are 
thus at a great disadvantage when having to predict 
the behaviour of other people. (Baron-Cohen, Leslie 
and Frith 1985, p. 42)  
The results of the false belief task indicate that children 
with autism have fundamental problems with 
understanding how other people might think in certain 
situations, problems that ordinary children over the age of 
four, and children with Downs’ syndrome, generally do 
not have. According to Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, the 
result of the test indicates that autism has to do with a 
specific inability to see other minds. In a similar sense, 
Wimmer and Perner’s test with ordinary three- and four-
year-old children, seems to indicate that ordinary non-
autistic three-year-old children are unable to see other 
people as minded.  
However, the false belief task has received some 
criticism. In their article “Two Reasons to Abandon the 
False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind” (2000) the 
psychologists Paul Bloom and Tim P. German argue that 
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the results of the false belief task cannot be taken for 
granted. They suggest that there is a problem in the way 
the false belief task is supposed to point at a general 
mental mechanism of mindreading or the lack of such a 
mechanism. This problem is connected with the fact that 
researchers often conclude that children under three as 
well as persons with autism fail the false belief task and 
that they therefore lack a theory-of-mind function. 
According to Bloom and German, such a comparison of the 
results are problematic because it suggests that a normal 
three year-old who fails the task is similar to an autistic 
child who fails the task. 
Normal 3-year-olds and older children with autism 
both fail the false belief task, but, in all interesting 
regards, normal 3-year-olds are nothing like older children 
with autism [...]. Normal 3-year-olds are far superior 
with regard to communicative and linguistic skills, the 
ability to pretend and understand the pretence of 
others, and the ability to engage in, understand and 
manipulate the actions of others. This is a severe 
problem for any theory that lumps the two groups 
together as individuals who lack theory of mind. 
(Bloom and German 2000, p. B29) 
Bloom and German argue that it is problematic to compare 
a normal three-year-old with an autistic child simply by 
measuring their failure or success in the false belief task. 
Such a comparison creates the impression that an ordinary 
three-year old child who fails the false belief task and an 
autistic child who fails the task have similar problems. 
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However, as Bloom and German note, a normal three-year 
old child is highly social even if the child might not pass 
the false belief task, while a child with autism has severe 
social problems. The question is then how the results 
should be explained. 
One reason why both ordinary three-year-old children 
and children with autism fail the false belief task may have 
to do with it being constructed in a rigid and 
intellectualistic manner. Bloom and German point out that 
the false belief task, despite the appearance of simplicity, 
requires an advanced capacity to concentrate and 
remember story lines.  
To solve it [the false belief task], the child has to follow 
the actions of two characters in a narrative, has to 
appreciate that Sally could not have observed the 
switching of the chocolate, has to remember both 
where the chocolate used to be and where it is at the 
time of the test, and has to appreciate the precise 
meaning of questions (for instance that it means where 
will Sally look, not where she should look). (Bloom and 
German 2000, p. B27) 
As Bloom and German argue, the reason why ordinary 
three-year-old children fail the false belief task may be that 
it requires quite high attentional and linguistic skills. That 
young children fail the task does not necessarily point 
towards a theory-of-mind deficit. It might be difficult for 
the children to remember long story lines, it might be 
difficult for them to remember where a thing was placed 
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and it might also be difficult for them to understand 
certain words.  
Another problem with the task is that it appears to be 
based on the idea that we understand other people’s beliefs 
by observing and reflecting on their behaviour. But it is not 
usually in the form of such passive observation and 
reflection that we come to understand other people’s 
mistakes or thoughts or intentions. Even if we occasionally 
do so this is by no means the major way in which we 
understand mistakes. On the contrary it is usually because 
we are involved in doing something with others that we also 
realise that someone makes a mistake. This indicates 
another reason why the children under three fail the false 
belief tasks even though they might have no problem in 
understanding mistakes in real life. They are placed in a 
situation where they should describe a situation rather 
than themselves take part in the situation. It is not self-
evident that it is as easy for a three year old to describe a 
situation as it is to respond in a situation she is involved in 
herself. If a child is not used to commenting and describing 
a situation this can be a difficult task.  
However, Bloom and German note that not all 
perspective-taking tasks are as rigid in their character as 
the classical false belief task. There have also been 
modified perspective-taking tasks where younger children 
succeed in the task. One such task was built up by the 
psychologist Daniela K. O’Neill (1996). O’Neill built up a 
task where the children are more engaged in doing things 
themselves rather than merely having to watch a scenario. 
The children are also involved with their parents rather 
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than with a researcher (i.e. a stranger). Bloom and German 
describe the task as follows. 
[...] in an elegant study by O’Neill (1996), 2-year-olds 
observed as an attractive toy was put on a high shelf. 
As this happened, the child’s parent was either present 
or absent. When later asking for help in retrieving the 
toy, the children were more likely to name the toy and 
gesture to the location when their parent had not been 
present to witness the placement of the toy than if their 
parent had been present. This suggests that they 
modify their behavior according to the knowledge 
states of other people (i.e. whether or not their parent 
possesses a given belief), and that they have a tacit 
appreciation of the circumstances under which beliefs 
are formed. (Bloom and German 2000, p. B29) 
One can see here that when the test is modified so that it 
largely looks like an ordinary situation where the child is 
actively involved in doing something fun with family 
members, children of a much younger age act in a manner 
that indicate that they can take into account another 
person’s knowledge or lack of knowledge of the situation.  
However, the psychologists Vasudevi Reddy and Paul 
Morris (2009) point out that structural criticism of the false 
belief task can actually work as a defence of the idea that 
interpersonal understanding consists in a theory-of-mind 
function. In this sense O’Neill’s more engaged false belief 
task, where the two-year olds ask for help to get a toy from 
a shelf, can be taken as support for theory-of-mind theory. 
Reddy and Morris write:  
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This early experimental test-passing could be 
interpreted as validating and being validated by the 
naturalistic data, and providing a new watershed for 
the development of false-belief understanding. In other 
words, the naturalistic data and the new experiments 
could be seen as coming together to simply lower the 
critical age for false-belief understanding to just after 12 
months, and as providing new and dramatic evidence 
for the reality of a (now non-verbal) ‘Theory of Mind’. 
(Reddy and Morris 2009, p. 95)  
Reddy and Morris’ point is important. It is not clear that 
structural criticism of the false belief task means that the 
theory-of-mind theory is flawed. Criticism of flaws in an 
empirical test does not necessarily always disqualify the 
theory that the test is supposed to prove. Both O’Neill’s 
criticism and Bloom and German’s criticism of the classical 
false belief task are specifically structural criticisms of the 
task itself. They are not explicitly questioning the idea that 
there is some such thing as a theory-of-mind function, but 
they are questioning the highly intellectualistic character of 
the classical test as well as the assumptions that are drawn 
from the results. Bloom and German also claim that the 
results of O’Neill’s test indicate that normal children do 
have a theory of mind while children with autism do not 
have a theory of mind. They write: 
A more promising analysis is that some individuals 
with autism fail the false belief task because they lack 
the capacity to acquire a theory of mind. In contrast 3-
year-olds might fail the false belief task because of 
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general task demands, because they don’t have a grasp 
of false belief, or both. But they surely have a ‘theory of 
mind’, in the general sense of having sophisticated 
ability to reason about the mental states; this is 
precisely why they differ from autistic individuals in 
the social, communicative, and imaginative domains. 
(Bloom and German 2000, p. B29)  
Even though Bloom and German are critical of the false 
belief task, they are not questioning the idea that 
interpersonal understanding rests on a theory-of-mind 
function. They also claim that persons with autism lack a 
theory-of-mind function.  
However, the problem with the classical false belief task 
is not only that the task is constructed in a too 
intellectualistic fashion, but the task reflects certain 
conceptual assumptions that underlie theory-of-mind 
theory. One such conceptual assumption is the notion that 
our understanding of other people in an essential sense is 
based on a third-person perspective where we observe 
other people instead of being involved in interaction with 
others. 
If we now turn to reflect on children with autism, there 
seem to be other reasons why they fail the task. One aspect 
that may affect an autistic child’s capacity to succeed in the 
task is that these children often have many kinds of 
attentional problems. They may suffer from various kinds 
of syndromes such as over- or under-sensitivity to sounds, 
light, touch, smells etc. Children with autism can also tend 
to get, so to say, stuck in their attention. A child with 
autism might seem to have a normal comprehension of 
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words, but the child might have a tendency to get stuck 
with certain words when listening to story lines. The child 
might also get stuck when looking at certain objects, the 
child may take an interest in things or expressions that are 
not perhaps the central aspect of the story. Further, often 
children with autism do not like to play with dolls. If that 
is the case it is not a very promising start to be placed in 
front of dolls in a test situation. From the descriptions of 
the classical false belief task it appears that no such 
individual syndromes or personal character traits are taken 
into account. My point here is not to say that actually 
children with autism do understand other people’s belief. 
On the contrary, it is clear that it is often difficult for 
children with autism to understand others. I am merely 
claiming that since the false belief task is constructed in a 
manner that does not take into account the autistic child’s 
individual syndromes, it becomes unclear how one should 
interpret the results of the false belief task. 
Another thing I have tried to argue so far is that there 
may be quite different reasons why an ordinary non-
autistic child under the age of three fails the false belief 
task and why a child with autism fails the task. This by 
itself indicates that the results are not as evident as they 
may seem. Still, even if the results of the false belief task 
are obscure, it is clear that it is often difficult for children 
with autism to consider other people’s perspective. Park 
describes many instances where her daughter behaves as if 
she was unable to do so. Park here uses her daughter’s real 
name, Jessy instead of “Elly” as in her first book. 
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Thinking of others, of course, is hard when you don’t 
have a ‘theory of mind’ to allow you to see something 
from another point of view. Even in the unemotional, 
physical world, Jessy can’t do this. She locks the door 
behind her when she leaves for work, even though she 
knows I’m still inside and there’s no need to. She 
scrapes the ice off the windshield on the passenger’s 
side, her side, leaving the driver’s side obscured. She 
thinks I can see what she sees; if she knows something, 
she thinks the person she’s talking to knows it too. 
(Park 2001, p. 148)  
These patterns of behaviour suggest again that Jessy is 
unaware of other people’s perspective. However, can one 
from cases like these draw the conclusion that children as 
well as adults with autism lack a theory-of-mind function?  
Why do ordinary children learn to scrape the whole 
window and not merely the passenger’s side? I am not 
convinced that they learn it by reflecting on other people’s 
minds. For ordinary children it might not even occur to 
them that they could scrape only the passenger’s side. Of 
course ordinary children can behave in selfish ways, as 
anyone can, but it is often as natural for them to do things 
in a way that takes others into account. My suggestion is 
that much of the things children learn to do include other 
people in a self-evident way that does not depend on a 
need to reflect on other people’s minds. Sometimes 
questions about another person’s perspective do come up, 
but there is no general basic question of “learning to see 
other minds” that non-autistic children apply at every 
instance when they take others into account. It is then also 
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problematic to maintain that there is some such general 
mindreading ability that a child with autism lacks when 
the child only scrapes the passenger’s side of the window.  
The false belief task is based on the assumption that 
other people in an essential sense are mental beings whom 
we need to learn to interpret. I have argued that children 
do not grow up to see that there is some such unitary thing 
as “intentions” or “beliefs” or “perspectives”; they grow 
up to comprehend and respond in various sorts of 
meaningful situations when being involved with other 
people. Often there is no question at all of other people 
having separate perspectives. Often we simply do things 
together because that is how things are done. Often we also 
spontaneously take each other into account. Sometimes, 
however, we do think about another person’s perspective, 
but this is no general matter.  
It is an important part of growing up that we learn to 
acknowledge others and to care for others, and it is 
important to learn that human life is a life full of mistakes 
and failures. But while theory-of-mind proponents think of 
this as a cognitive matter of learning to read other minds, I 
argue that we learn to respond to each other in a social and 
moral sense. This is largely something we grow into 
spontaneously as we grow up with others. Learning to take 
other people into account, learning to see that people (both 
others and myself) are not perfect, learning to help others, 
learning to see that they can be mistaken as well as that 
they can behave stupidly and arrogantly etc. is integral to 
how we respond to each other and integral to how we talk. 
It is integral to the fact that we help each other, that we 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
184 
 
show each other where to look for something, it is integral 
to the fact that we accuse each other for things, that we get 
angry in disproportionate ways, that we sometimes later 
on apologize for our own behaviour, that we laugh at our 
own behaviour as well as tease others for their mistakes 
and so on. And it is also entwined with learning that 
sometimes it is irrelevant who is right or who is wrong, 
sometimes you just have to stop quarrelling. Such 
situations are very common for children. It is a very 
common thing for a child to loose things or to realize she 
was wrong about something. And it is quite common that 
parents get angry at their child for messing up and loosing 
stuff etc. It is also common that parents help their children 
and that children help parents. It is an equally everyday 
fact that parents can’t find things and rumble around 
searching for socks or gloves or boots.  
The false belief task creates the impression that children 
learn to apply a general method of reflection when they 
learn to acknowledge others in their actions, as well as the 
impression that it is such a general capacity for 
“mindreading” that a person with autism lacks. I have 
argued that this impression is created by the 
intellectualistic character of the task.  
3.5 Theory of mind and autistic children’s 
language problems 
A further aspect of autism that seems to point towards an 
inability to see that other people have minds is the fact that 
children with autism often have severe language problems. 
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This has also been taken to support the theory-of-mind 
theory. Referring to Leo Kanner’s studies, Hobson gives an 
overview of what kinds of peculiarities can show in the 
way a child with autism speaks.  
Leo Kanner (1943) noted that besides a lack of 
communicative speech that may amount to muteness, 
the autistic child commonly displays echolalia (an 
‘echoing’ of words or phrases the child has heard 
spoken by others, either in the immediate or more 
distant past), confusions in the use of personal 
pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’, idiosyncratic utterances that can 
only be understood with reference to the contexts in 
which the child acquired the words, and a literalness of 
speech that seems to show a restricted grasp of 
connotative meanings. Amongst other features one 
may add to this list are abnormalities in the tone and 
rhythm of speech (which may be flat and monotonous, 
or sing-song) and difficulties in initiating or sustaining 
conversation with someone else, partly through 
insensitivity to the knowledge and interests of the 
listener [...] (Hobson 1993, p. 165)  
Hobson suggests that these features are reflective of the 
child’s great social difficulties.  
Rather than underlying the handicaps of autism, 
language might constitute an especially refined and 
vivid reflection of the children’s limitations in 
interpersonal relatedness and understanding, and more 
specifically in their notions of sharing, referring, and 
communicating. (Hobson 1993, p. 166)  
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One could easily take the tendency for echolalia as well as 
the tendency to mix up the use of the words “I” and “you” 
to indicate that the child with autism is unable to see that 
other people have different perspectives and that the child 
is actually not communicating with others even though he 
or she is talking. However, Hobson points out that this is 
jumping to conclusions. He writes: 
The first lesson to be learnt from this research is that 
we should be wary of supposing that autistic children 
are non-communicative. What might at first appear to 
be failures to use speech and gesture for 
communicative purposes may often turn out to have 
significance for the children’s interpersonal 
transactions. For example, the autistic child’s use of 
idiosyncratic or ‘metaphorical’ expressions may reflect 
an attempt to communicate, but one that is ineffective 
in so far as the message is not adapted to the listener’s 
perspective40 Echolalia may seem (and sometimes be) 
meaningless, but it can also serve a variety of purposes 
such as to curtail a social exchange41, to maintain an 
interaction in the face of a failure to comprehend 
another person42 or to fulfil a variety of other functions 
such as requesting, protesting, affirming and so on43. 
Incessant and repetitive questioning may be intended 
to initiate or to maintain social contact rather than to 
                                                          
40 Hobson refers here to Wetherby (1986). 
41 Hobson refers here to Shapiro (1977). 
42 Hobson refers here to Fay (1973). 
43 Hobson refers here to Prizant & Duchan (1981), and Prizant & Rydell 
(1984). 
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request information 44 . Correspondingly, autistic 
children vary in their wish or ability to communicate 
with different individuals, and may be more 
communicative with teachers than with children or 
with familiar than with unfamiliar adults45. (Hobson 
1993, p. 174)   
According to Hobson, one cannot draw the conclusion that 
an autistic person is unaware of other people, and does not 
communicate with speech, simply because the person has a 
tendency to speak in terms of echolalia or is unable to 
distinguish between the words “I” and “you” or because 
the person’s speech in other ways appears to be non-
communicative. The education and disability researcher 
Douglas Biklen (2005) also notes that echolalia sometimes 
can have to do with the tendency of some people with 
autism to get stuck with certain words and expressions. He 
quotes an autistic person named Sue Rubin who describes 
such situations:  
She describes herself as having ‘obsessive or 
compulsive behavior’ where she gets ‘stuck with 
certain thoughts and actions’. With echolalia, she 
explains, ‘I say a word or sound and am unable to 
switch it off or change to a different sound’. Yet, when 
                                                          
44 Hobson refers here to Hurtig, Ensrud, & Tomblin (1982). 
45 Hobson refers here to McHale, Simeonsson, Marcus & Olley (1980) 
and Bernard-Opitz (1982). 
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attending a class where she is ‘cognitively engaged,’ 
her echolalia disappears. (Biklen 2005, p. 43) 46 
Rubin’s description of how she sometimes can get stuck in 
echolalia suggests that the echolalia need not have to do 
with an inability to understand other people’s words. 
Rather it can be a kind of obsessive behaviour that the 
person gets caught in but that the person also, sometimes, 
can manage to overcome. However, such a tendency to get 
stuck on words can probably also affect a child’s ability to 
learn to speak. 
Hobson’s description above also suggests that there are 
many aspects to what it means to talk with another person. 
Sometimes we try to initiate conversations as a way of 
being together. Sometimes a failure to understand can 
show in a person clinging to certain words or repeating the 
same question several times, in order not to have to show 
the failure to understand. Sometimes also disappointment 
can show in repeated questions. And, importantly, our 
ways of talking, our wish to initiate conversations, our 
wish to ask or explain etc. often differ considerably 
depending on whom we talk with, whether it is a familiar 
person or not. Hobson’s descriptions suggest that one 
should be careful about drawing too definite conclusions 
about what a person with autism can or can’t understand 
about others. In many situations it may be difficult for the 
person with autism to see another’s perspective, but this is 
                                                          
46  Biklen refers here to Rubin, Biklen, Kasa-Hendrickson, Kluth, 
Cardinal & Broderick (2001). 
AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND 
189 
 
not necessarily some all-encompassing feature meaning that 
the person has no sense for other people whatsoever. Nor 
does it prove that the person lives in a solipsistic world 
isolated from others. An autistic child’s inability to 
comprehend how the meaning of situations vary 
depending on whom one talks to might be reflected in a 
confused use of personal pronouns, it might also be a 
feature that makes it difficult for the child with autism to 
understand and respond to more complicated situations as 
when several people talk with each other, or when people 
talk about the future or about situations that are not 
present, but these problems of understanding need not be 
absolute.  
In another book by Clara Park, Exiting Nirvana, A 
Daughter’s Life with Autism (2001) Park reflects on her 
autistic daughter as an adult. Here one can again see traits 
that seem to fit in with the theory about autism being a 
theory-of-mind deficit. She describes, among other things, 
certain kinds of peculiarities in her daughter’s 
development of language.  
She speaks of Miranda, her brother’s daughter, and 
someone asks, ‘Who’s Miranda?’ She hesitates. Then, 
slowly and carefully, she replies: ‘I...am...my niece.’ 
 Be assured, Jessy knows she isn’t her niece. 
Although eager psychoanalysts for years took 
pronominal reversal as evidence of ‘early ego failure,’ 
Jessy has anything but a weak ego. [...] Jessy has even 
more trouble with ‘we’ and ‘our’ and ‘us,’ with ‘they’ 
and ‘their,’ with ‘his’ and ‘hers,’ even with ‘he’ and 
‘she.’ I hear her answering the phone, groping for the 
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words to tell a caller her father’s not home. It’s going 
slowly, so I try to help. ‘Say he’s not home and can you 
take a message.’ Jessy alters the primary pronoun; she’s 
learned that much. But what results is this: ‘she’s not 
home, and can you take a message.’ (Park 2001, pp. 42-
43) 
From Park’s description one can see that confusing 
personal pronouns does not necessarily mean that one does 
not know the difference between persons. Still, the 
tendency to confuse pronouns does point at some kind of 
difficulty to grasp the variable character of how we 
address persons, how we talk about others, how we talk of 
relationships etc. According to Park, Jessy tended to 
understand words referring to “objects” much more easily 
than words referring to persons.  
A giraffe is a giraffe wherever you find it; a rectangle is 
a rectangle. Not so with nouns like ‘teacher,’ ‘friend,’ 
‘sister.’ My teacher may be your sister, or her friend. It 
was not until late in Jessy’s teens that we could teach 
her, with charts and written examples, the simple 
words for generational relationships. (Park 2001, p. 47) 
In The Siege (1967) Park also writes: 
[...] there were no limitations on the number of nouns 
she could acquire. But even among nouns, the easiest 
words to learn, there were limitations on kind. She 
could learn immediately a word like ‘igloo’ and 
remember it, although its relevance to her own 
experience was nonexistent. She could learn and 
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accurately apply the words ‘oak,’ ‘elm,’ and ‘maple.’ 
Yet words which were, one would think, much closer 
to her experience she could not understand or learn. 
Such terms as ‘home,’ ‘sister,’ ‘grandmother,’ ‘teacher,’ 
‘friend,’ or ‘stranger’ were beyond her at five; ‘friend’ 
and ‘stranger’ are beyond her today. Proper names she 
acquired with a slowness that seemed clearly related to 
the weakness of affect. (Park 1967, pp. 200-201)  
A bit further Park continues (here using the name Elly).  
As we observed Elly’s developing speech, it seemed 
divided into words she could learn instantly once they 
were pointed out to her, and words she could not learn 
at all. For a long time there seemed to be no middle 
ground. What she was able to grasp were absolute 
terms, whether concrete or abstract—those that 
reflected concepts that could be defined and 
understood in themselves. ‘Box,’ ‘cat,’ ‘giraffe,’ 
‘rectangle,’ ‘number,’ ‘letter’. What she could not 
understand were relational terms—those that must 
absorb their full meaning from the situations in which 
they occur—situations in which the human element 
plays a part. [...] ‘Teacher’ is a word which, like ‘man’, 
is the product of abstraction, but it is first learned in a 
relational situation: ‘my teacher’. Similarly for ‘sister’, 
‘friend’ or ‘home’. It is characteristic of the average 
child that he learns concepts best in situations in which 
he can find a personal relation. With Elly, the personal 
relation seemed at best irrelevant, at worst a hindrance. 
(Park 1967, p. 204)    
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It is tempting to think that these difficulties to learn words 
that are connected with human relationships point at Elly’s 
(that is, Jessy’s) inability to be aware of other people’s 
minds and that it reflects mindblindness. However, think 
of how a child normally learns to use words like “mom” or 
“dad”. They learn them in connection with doing such 
things as constantly following their parent, requesting 
comfort, with asking or notifying the parent about 
something, they learn it as part of expressing their delight 
as a greeting when “mom” or “dad” comes home etc. 
Children also quickly learn the name of their siblings in 
connection with quarreling or teasing or playing with each 
other. For instance expressions like “Mom! Alexandra took 
my lego car!” is a very common way of using names. 
Children do not ordinarily learn such words because they 
learn to read minds, they learn these words because they 
are in constant interaction with others. If a child for a long 
time while growing up is incapable of such spontaneous 
ways of being with and responding to its family members, 
it will also affect the child’s ability to use words like 
“mom”, “dad” or names of siblings. Again, that Jessy did 
not use these personal words does not point to a theory-of-
mind deficit, it points to how severely unresponsive she 
was as a young child. 
However, Park also describes another pattern in Jessy’s 
behaviour that might explain why it was difficult for Jessy 
to understand personal pronouns. She describes Jessy as if 
it was difficult for her to shift her attention from one thing 
to another. This showed when Jessy was a baby, in the 
sense that she could keep doing one simple thing for hours, 
AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND 
193 
 
like snaking a chain in her hand. The same rigidness shows 
when Jessy is older among other things in that she finds it 
easier to understand words that refer to objects than words 
referring to persons. But it is also reflected in the fact that 
Jessy likes order; she does not like it when plans are 
changed suddenly. Jessy also likes catchy phrases, phrases 
that are often repeated, standing phrases: 
When she watches TV, what is she watching for? Not 
the content, whatever that may be; not even the 
pictures. What she’s listening for, what she hears, is 
what we’ve named  ‘intransition phrases’: ‘Coming up 
next,’ ‘Don’t touch that dial,’ ‘Hold everything,’ ‘Stay 
tuned,’ ‘Be right back.’ She is delighted to write them 
down for me. She has identified twenty-six. (Park 2001, 
pp. 50-51)  
There seems to be a multitude of patterns in how Jessy 
talks and how she takes an interest in things. She does 
seem to have certain kind of problems with taking other 
people’s perspective. But it is important not to define 
certain confused patterns of speech or surprising ways of 
behaving as if they necessarily mean that the autistic 
person completely lacks a comprehension of other people 
or of the situation in question. Baron-Cohen’s way of 
talking about autistic persons as mindblind suggests such a 
complete and all-encompassing inability to understand 
other people. Further, I also think it is good to see that a 
person with autism does not only have problems and 
deficiencies but can also come to enjoy doing things and 
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can come to enjoy life in new and sometimes surprising 
ways.  
3.6 Theory of mind and autistic persons’ 
difficulties to understand irony  
In this last part of the chapter I shall discuss one more 
problem of understanding that, according to proponents of 
theory of mind, is connected with autism, namely the 
inability to understand ironic speech.   
According to the cognitive neuroscientist Francesca 
Happé (1993), people with autism often have problems 
understanding metaphor and irony. This, according to her, 
has to do with the same mindreading deficit that is 
reflected in the autistic child’s inability to manage the false 
belief task. Happé has shown there to be a correlation 
between how well or badly certain autistic people 
accomplish false belief tasks and their ability to understand 
metaphor and irony. From her research one gets the 
impression that there is a connection between a capacity to 
see that other people have inner, invisible intentions 
(which, according to her, shows in the capacity to pass the 
false belief tasks), and a capacity to understand metaphor 
and irony.  
Research into the autistic child’s theory of mind47 has 
found a severe impairment in most autistic subject’s 
ability to comprehend another person’s false belief. [...] 
                                                          
47 Happé refers here to Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985). 
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 This impairment should have serious consequences 
for communication, if, as Sperber and Wilson (1987) 
claim, ‘communication exploits the well-known ability 
of humans to attribute intentions to each other.’ (Happé, 
1993, pp. 101-102)   
Happé continues: 
If most autistic individuals cannot represent a speaker’s 
intention, then communication should break down 
most noticeably where the speaker’s attitude must be 
taken into account in modifying the literal meaning of 
the utterance. [...] It is widely reported48 that even the 
most verbally able autistic people fail to understand 
non-literal speech such as irony, joking and 
metaphorical expressions. (Happé 1993, p. 103) 
Autistic speakers often use language in a rigid manner. 
What is especially difficult for autistic speakers, according 
to Happé, is the intentionality of language and thus how the 
meaning of our words may differ depending on how or 
why we say things. I agree with Happé that people with 
autism can have a rigid or unusual use of language and 
that it can be difficult for them to understand metaphor 
and irony. But the question is if these difficulties can be 
explained as depending on a mindreading deficit. The 
problem here lies in the idea that there exists a certain 
general feature of our language, its “intentionality”. This 
aspect of language is what is thought to be the thing that 
autistic persons cannot grasp. According to Happé it is an 
                                                          
48 Happé refers here to Happé (1991) and Tantam (1991). 
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important feature of language that we can mean different 
things by what we say even though we use the same 
expression. She says that sometimes we mean things 
“literally” but sometimes “the speaker’s attitude must be 
taken into account” in order for us to understand what the 
speaker means. According to her, this shows that we must 
be able to see others as minded, as having intentions, in 
order to understand how the meaning of words can vary. 
Even though I agree with Happé that we can sometimes 
distinguish between “literal” and “non-literal” speech, I do 
not think this is a fundamental distinction of how language 
has meaning. Neither am I convinced that such a 
distinction helps us understand how or why the meanings 
of our words differ. Nor do I think the distinction helps us 
understand how humour and irony have meaning in 
conversations, or why a person with autism may find it 
difficult to understand humour and irony. Let me now 
examine my doubts. 
Happé assumes that understanding irony and humour 
requires a special effort of mindreading. This creates, I 
think, a problematically intellectualistic impression of 
humour and irony. Another way to think of the meaning of 
our words is to look at how our ways of talking are an 
integral part of our daily lives with each other. Children 
grow up and learn to acknowledge others by constantly 
doing things together with others. In this constant 
interaction they also learn to respond to each other; help, 
quarrel, criticize, protest, apologize and so on. This also 
means that there is no fundamental step of realizing that 
words can mean different things depending on the 
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person’s “inner intentions”. Words mean different things 
depending on what we are doing and why we are talking 
with each other and how we are related to each other. And 
our sensing the difference in the meaning of what people 
say is so integral to how we sense a meaning in the specific 
situation that there usually is no question of the person’s 
words perhaps meaning something else than we take them 
to mean. It is also as a part of such daily engagement that 
we learn to play with words, expressions, the tone of voice, 
manners etc. However, if a normal responsiveness and 
spontaneous engagement in various situations is broadly 
lacking in a child’s way of being, it will also affect the 
child’s sensitivity to what people say as it will affect the 
child’s ability to comprehend situations that it is not used 
to.  
Instead of taking an autistic speaker’s difficulty 
understanding irony as pointing towards an inability to 
read minds, I think there is no single answer to this 
problem. However, one answer perhaps has to do with the 
place humour and irony have in our ways of talking with 
each other. As Hobson notes, children with autism seldom 
chatter spontaneously, seldom initiate conversations and 
are not good at sustaining a conversation. (Hobson 1993, p. 
168) Irony and joking are centrally things that take place in 
such kinds of spontaneously elicited conversations and 
chats; it is part of the ways we enjoy conversations, how 
we continue them and go along in them. If it is difficult for 
a child to comprehend such kinds of spontaneous 
conversations, it might also be difficult for the child to 
understand irony. The inability to understand irony can 
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then be seen as a reflection of the person’s large and long 
lasting problems with growing into a normal kind of 
responsiveness to others which includes the person’s ways 
of becoming engaged in spontaneous conversations.  
Hobson mentions a study by Ricks and Wing (1975) that 
illustrates how a child with autism may answer questions:  
One was the following question-answer sequence: 
Question: ‘What did you have for dinner?’ Answer: 
‘Meat and cabbage and potatoes and gravy and salt 
and jam tart and custard and orange juice and cup of 
tea.’ (Hobson 1993, p. 170) 
The child here gives a precise list of absolutely everything 
that he has eaten. His answer reflects his incapacity to 
sense the contextual meaning of the question. Usually 
when we ask another person what he has had for dinner 
we do not ask for a complete list of what has been 
consumed. Our ordinary ways of answering and asking 
things are entwined in a meaningful social context. In 
order to be able to understand what is a relevant answer 
and what is irrelevant, we must be accustomed to various 
ways of talking about dinners and eating; ways of talking 
where certain things are the “dinner” and certain things are 
simply side issues connected with the dinner and not 
relevant to mention. The child’s way of giving a long 
detailed list of everything he ate, including custard and 
orange juice and tea, can be seen as reflecting his larger 
patterns of difficulty in engaging with others, such as for 
instance being involved in daily conversations about 
dinner. Such kinds of long lasting and broad social 
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difficulties can affect a child’s ability to spontaneously 
understand questions in various contexts and to see what 
is a relevant answer in a context. It can affect the child’s 
ability to flow along in discussions, to react to certain tones, 
to see certain relationships between people, and it can 
surely affect a child’s capacity to understand irony.  
From Happé’s argument that autistic people do not 
understand irony it also appears as if we, “ordinary 
people”, always understand irony. But people’s capacity to 
understand irony is much more variable than Happé 
claims. This has to do with understanding irony requiring 
a deep acquaintance with various ways of living and 
talking, as well as often also an acquaintance with the 
person who is talking. Understanding or not 
understanding irony and joking is often connected with 
closeness to others. In some families joking is an almost 
constant part of their manner of conversing. It can also be a 
common pattern in some families that they become ironic 
towards each other when they quarrel. In other families a 
calmer and more serious way of talking forms the days. As 
Gilbert Ryle writes: “For one person to see the jokes that 
another makes, the one thing he must have is a sense of 
humour and even that special brand of sense of humour of 
which those jokes are exercises.” (Ryle 1949, p. 54) 
Understanding irony also has to do with the fact that it 
takes time to learn to see certain patterns in your close ones’ 
speech and manners. Becoming skilled at irony can be 
entwined with getting used to teasing your brother or your 
sister or the kids at school. Slowly many children get more 
and more skilled at this. Our use of irony as well as joking 
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also depends on how we feel at home in talking with 
others. It is difficult to try be fun when you feel at unease 
with the people you talk with. In such situations all your 
words can feel clumsy and out of place. Irony also 
demands a high skill in using words. It is for this reason 
very difficult both to joke and be ironic in a language you 
do not speak as your mother tongue. The point in trying to 
describe these various aspects of irony is, that it is 
problematic to portray irony as if it could be understood 
by a picture of language as consisting of two mental beings 
communicating certain inner intentions. This is as 
problematic as portraying “false beliefs” as something 
unitary and inner in the mind.  
Happé’s claim that autistic persons do not understand 
irony because they have a mindreading deficit is not only 
based on a philosophical misconception of what it means 
to understand other people, but her reflections are also too 
absolute. A skill that even for many ordinary grownups is 
difficult to manage, when lacking in an autistic person, is 
taken as defining the autistic person as mindblind. I think 
it would be better again to see that humour is not an all or 
nothing affair. A person with autism is not necessarily 
without humour in some absolute sense any more than an 
ordinary person has humour in some absolute sense, but it 
can be the case that the autistic person does not manage to 
understand subtle forms of humour, or forms of humour 
that require a high sensitivity for the use of words. In the 
case of Jessy (i.e. Elly) described above, she loved to be 
tickled. This is already, I would say, an expression of a 
sense of playfulness and humour. And it is a kind of 
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playfulness that gets its meaning out of a sense of bodily 
closeness, not an intellectual form of humour. This sense 
for affection Jessy and her mother eventually developed 
into peek-a-boo games, and eventually Jessy also came to 
joke independently and more actively with her family. 
Jessy responded more and more to her parents and siblings 
in various ways; by giving a hug, by enjoying certain 
mutual games, and by joking with her family in turning 
the light off at supper and occasionally by getting angry. It 
was not because she learned to read minds that she began 
to joke; it was as part of a pattern of developing 
responsiveness and ability to communicate and thus more 
advanced enjoyment in being together with her close ones 
that the joking also became a part of her ways of being 
with her family. 
However, even if I have argued that Happé’s idea that 
the inability to understand irony is due to a theory-of-mind 
deficit is problematic, this does not mean that people with 
autism have no problems understanding others or being 
involved in conversations. I am merely claiming that such 
problems cannot be understood from the perspective of 
theory of mind. And I am also maintaining that the 
empirical research that is based on the theory about autism 
being a theory-of-mind deficit is one-sided in its focus. This 
has to do with the whole perspective of theory of mind 
being built on a misconception of what it means to 
understand another person. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
My intention in this chapter has been twofold. One aim has 
been to discuss and probe the idea that persons with 
autism lack a theory-of-mind function. However, another 
aim, which connects with the other chapters in this thesis, 
has been to once again question the relation between 
empirical research and theory-of-mind theory. 
There are many traits in autism that may appear to 
support the theory that autism is due to a theory-of-mind 
deficit. Children with autism can be largely unaware of 
other people, they can have extensive language problems, 
they are often more or less unable to play with others, they 
are not good at pretend play etc. Such problems can seem 
to point towards an inability to see that other people have 
minds. I have, however, questioned the theory that autism 
consists in “mindblindness”. Among other things, I have 
argued that the image of autism as mindblindness is 
created by a one-sided and restricted focus when 
discussing the responses of children with autism. I have 
also argued that theory-of-mind theory is based on an 
intellectualistic conception of normal interpersonal 
understanding.  
  
Chapter 4: The relationship between 
empathic imagination and compassion49 
4.1 Introduction 
In philosophical and psychological contexts empathy is 
often talked about as a general capacity to imagine what 
another person feels or thinks or as a capacity to imagine 
oneself in the other person’s situation. This capacity is 
sometimes described as “putting oneself in the other’s 
shoes”. It is suggested that the capacity to imagine what 
the other person feels is a fundamentally important feature 
that enables us to understand other people. Often this 
imaginative capacity is considered to be a phenomenon 
that can concern any kind of emotional state, regardless of 
whether the other person is happy or sad or angry or 
afraid etc. According to several theorists, there is an 
especially important link between the imaginative-
emotional function of empathy and our willingness to help 
other people. It is claimed that empathic imagination 
makes us emotionally moved by another person’s situation, 
and this is then thought to motivate us to help the other.  
In this sense the concept of empathy, in philosophical 
and psychological theories, often has a cognitive meaning 
that is distinct from compassion, even though it is 
suggested that there is an important link between empathy 
and compassion. The idea that there is an empirically 
observable link between empathic imagination and 
                                                          
49 Parts of this chapter have been published in Gustafsson (2009). 
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compassion also appears to be reflected in our everyday 
experiences. We are often emotionally moved by the sight 
of another person’s suffering. We can find it unbearable to 
look at an injured person. It is as if we feel the other 
person’s suffering. And often we also reflect on other 
people’s suffering, we worry, etc. Imagination and 
emotional reactions are in this sense often a central part of 
compassion. Often it is also the case that if we have 
experienced something similar as another person we also 
feel we understand how the other person feels. A common 
way of talking about compassion is to say that we feel with 
the other person. Sometimes we might also say that we 
identify with the other. These ways of responding 
emotionally to other people’s suffering seem to support the 
suggestion, originally made by David Hume and Adam 
Smith, that compassion is based on an analogical method 
of imagination, a form of explanation that is often invoked  
in theory-of-mind theories. In this chapter I will discuss the 
relation between empathic imagination and compassion. 
I begin the chapter by discussing experimental research 
on empathy that is considered to prove that there is a 
causal link between empathic imagination and compassion. 
I claim that there are certain problems connected with the 
experimental research. Since the experimental context is 
highly reduced it becomes unclear in what sense the 
participants can be said really to understand that another 
person is suffering. It is central for how we understand 
another person’s suffering that we can see that the 
suffering affects the person’s life in some sense. In some of 
the experimental situations, however, the painful 
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experiences have no consequences; they are not related to 
injury or illness. I also claim that the instructions that the 
experimenters give to the test subjects are leading. Thereby 
it also becomes unclear how the responses should be 
understood. I further argue that the fact that the 
researchers construct such restricted research settings is 
reflective of the assumption that compassion depends on a 
cognitive capacity to use our imagination in an analogical 
sense. 
After having discussed experimental research, I discuss 
several biographical descriptions of suffering as well as of 
compassion. These biographical descriptions reveal how 
experiences of suffering affect interpersonal relationships 
in many ways. The descriptions also reveal how our 
difficulties in understanding another person’s suffering are 
of a quite different character than is assumed in the 
psychological and philosophical theories on empathy.  
In the last part of the chapter I discuss the idea that 
empathic imagination can be used for both good and evil 
purposes. This idea rests on a conception of interpersonal 
understanding as a neutral cognitive faculty. I argue that 
such a conception of interpersonal understanding is 
problematic. There is no general neutral way of 
understanding other people’s suffering. The ways we think 
about suffering, the ways we know things, reflects our 
attitude towards the suffering person. In this sense 
knowledge and imagination cannot be separated from the 
fact that we are responsible for each other’s life. 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
206 
 
4.2 The relation between empathy and 
compassion 
The psychologist Ezra Stotland (1969) describes empathy 
in the following way: 
A mother will share the joys and sorrows of her 
children; friends often feel each other’s emotions; the 
sight of a sick or injured person will sometimes upset 
us; and we are sometimes elated at another person’s 
success. Our sharing of the feelings of another does not, 
however, necessarily imply that we will act or even feel 
impelled to act in a supportive or sympathetic way 
when we are reacting to another’s sorrows. [...] 
Nevertheless, on other occasions, a person may be 
moved by another’s pain to help the other, or to help 
another attain and sustain a happy experience. In short, 
sharing another’s feelings should be distinguished 
from acting sympathetically and helpfully towards him. 
[...] The phenomenon referred to [...] can be described 
as ‘empathy,’ [...] It is an observer’s reacting 
emotionally because he perceives that another is 
experiencing or is about to experience an emotion. 
(Stotland 1969, p. 272) 
Indeed there is much that seems correct in Stotland’s 
description above. We do share the joys and sorrows of our 
loved ones, people do often get upset by the sight of an 
injured person etc. We are often emotionally moved by 
other people. It seems also correct to say that such 
emotional movement is not always expressive of 
compassion. According to the social psychologist C. Daniel 
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Batson (1991), there is a connection between empathy and 
altruism (or in other words compassion). Batson maintains 
that empathy is linked with altruistic motivation to help 
the other person.  
Empathy is an other-oriented vicarious emotion 
produced by taking the perspective of a person 
perceived to be in need. It is distinct from personal 
distress. The magnitude of empathic emotion is a 
function of the magnitude of the perceived need and 
the strength of the perceiver’s attachment to the person 
in need. [...] Empathic emotion evokes altruistic 
motivation to have the other’s need reduced. [...] the 
goal of this motivation is to increase the other’s welfare, 
not one’s own. (Batson 1991, pp. 89-90) 
Batson further claims that it is of central importance for 
empathy that we are capable of adopting the other 
person’s perspective: 
[...] perception of the other as in need is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the experience of empathy. 
Also necessary is adoption of the other’s perspective, 
perceiving the situation from the point of view of the 
other’s wants and desires and imagining how the other 
feels about the situation.  
 Adoption of the other’s perspective requires 
considerable cognitive sophistication. It requires the 
ability to view the need situation from a point of view 
other than one’s own and the ability to imagine how 
someone else is feeling or will feel. These inferences 
must often be made using limited information about 
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the situation and limited verbal and nonverbal cues. 
(Batson 1991, p. 226) 
Martha Nussbaum (2001) also defines empathy as an act of 
imagination that is related to compassion.  
[...] compassion is distinct from empathy, which 
involves an imaginative reconstruction of the 
experience of the other. [...] empathy is like the mental 
preparation of a skilled (Method) actor: it involves a 
participatory enactment of the situation of the sufferer, 
but is always combined with the awareness that one is 
not oneself the sufferer. This awareness of one’s 
separate life is quite important if empathy is to be 
closely related to compassion: for if it is to be for 
another, and not for oneself, that one feels compassion, 
one must be aware both of the bad lot of the sufferer 
and of the fact that it is, right now, not one’s own. 
(Nussbaum 2001, p. 327) 
A few pages later Nussbaum continues: 
[Empathy] is a very important tool in the service of 
getting a sense of what is going on with the other 
person, and also establishing concern and connection. 
[...] By reconstructing in my own mind the experience 
of another, I get a sense of what it means for her to 
suffer that way, and this may make me more likely to 
see her prospects as similar to my own, and of concern 
in part for that reason. (Nussbaum 2001, pp. 330-331) 
However, according to Nussbaum, there is no necessary 
connection between empathy and compassion. According 
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to her, empathy is a morally neutral mental ability that, 
even though it can be useful for compassion, can also be 
used for sadistic ends. 
In short, empathy is a mental ability highly relevant to 
compassion, although it is itself both fallible and 
morally neutral.  
 Does empathy contribute anything of ethical 
importance entirely on its own (when it does not lead 
to compassion)? I have suggested that it does not: a 
torturer can use it for hostile and sadistic ends. 
(Nussbaum 2001, p. 333) 
Stotland’s, Batson’s and Nussbaum’s thoughts reflect 
several important aspects of compassion. As Stotland notes, 
we are often emotionally moved by another person’s 
suffering. And, as Batson and Nussbaum point out, it is 
often the case that another person’s suffering affects our 
imagination. However, all three also seem to share certain 
theoretical assumptions concerning empathy and 
compassion. One such assumption is that there is a kind of 
general cognitive capacity to imagine and to become 
emotionally moved by other people, that we can define as 
empathy. Another assumption is that there is a causal 
psychological link between such empathic imagination and 
our inclination to help others (i.e. compassion).  
Both Stotland and Batson have also conducted 
psychological experimental research on the relation 
between empathy and compassion. The experimental 
results seem to indicate that there is a causal connection 
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between empathic imagination and our willingness to help 
other people.  
4.3 Stotland’s experimental research on empathy 
The suggestion that there is a causal psychological link 
between empathy and compassion has been studied 
empirically in several psychological experiments. From the 
results of these experiments it seems that the existence of 
an empathic function is a well confirmed fact. According to 
Stotland, there is a causal relation between altruism (i.e. 
compassion) and our capacity to feel empathy. In order to 
test this hypothesis, Stotland and Stanley Sherman 
designed a psychological experiment. Stotland describes 
the experimental setup in the following way: 
In general, the design of the study [...] involved 
inducing three different mental sets in the subjects as 
they observed another person undergo a painful, 
neutral, or ‘pleasurable’ experience [...] The first set was 
that as they observed the other, they were to imagine 
how they themselves would feel if they were in the 
other’s position (‘imagine-self’ condition.). The second 
set was that they were to imagine how the other person 
felt (‘imagine-him’ condition). The remaining subjects 
were asked to watch the other person’s physical 
movements very closely (‘watch-him’ condition). The 
general hypotheses were, first, that more empathy 
would occur in the imagine-him condition than in the 
watch-him condition; second, that more empathy 
would occur in the imagine-self condition than in the 
watch-him condition; third, that more empathy would 
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occur in the imagine-self condition than in the imagine-
him condition. (Stotland 1969, p. 289)  
The aim of Stotland and Sherman’s experiment was to see 
how differences in perspective affect our capacity to feel 
empathy. The degree of empathic feeling was measured 
both physically and by answering questionnaires. The 
physical effect was measured by a vasoconstriction 
measure and by a palmar sweating measure. I will not now 
discuss all aspects of Stotland’s experimental research but 
will focus on some details. 
The result of these experiments was that the test-
subjects in the two imagining conditions (imagine-self and 
imagine-other) reacted more strongly than the test-subjects 
in the watch-him conditions.  
[...] on none of the physiological measures was there 
any significant differences among the watch-him—pain, 
watch-him—neutral, and watch-him—pleasure 
conditions, while there were differences on the 
physiological measures in the two imagining 
conditions. This indicates empathy is related to the set 
that the person has in viewing the other person. A 
‘superficial’ set of just watching him does not lead to 
empathy. (Stotland 1969, p. 297) 
From Stotland and Sherman’s experiment one gets the 
impression that a certain form of imagination induces 
empathic feeling. Their experiment has also influenced 
further research on empathy. According to Batson (1991), 
the results of experiments carried out by Stotland and 
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Sherman support the claim that there is a link between 
empathy and compassion. Alvin I. Goldman (1995) also 
finds Stotland and Sherman’s experiment convincing. 
According to Goldman, the experiment proves that the 
mechanism of empathic imagination can produce 
compassion. He concludes: “[Empathy] seems to be a 
prime mechanism that disposes us toward altruistic 
behavior” (Goldman 1995, p. 202). However, it is worth 
taking a closer look at Stotland and Sherman’s experiment. 
Let us first look at the instructions that were given to the 
test-subjects in the watch-him condition. 
Watch-Him Condition 
In a few moments you will be watching the actual 
demonstration. While you are doing so, please watch 
exactly what the demonstrator does. You are to watch 
all of his body movements that you can see. Your job 
will be to watch his leg movements, arm movements, 
foot movements, head movements, hand movements. 
You are to notice anything that he does, whatever it is. 
(While you are watching him, don’t try to imagine how 
you would feel in his place or how he is feeling. Don’t 
think about how he feels or how you would feel. Just 
watch him closely.) (Stotland 1969, pp. 292-293)        
There are some points about the experimental design that 
the experimenters seem to have neglected. It is plausible to 
suppose that the fact that the persons who watch carefully 
do not have strong emotional reactions reflects how they 
understand the request in the experimental situation. They 
are asked to put their feelings aside. That is, the questions 
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are leading. Similar problems with the experiment can be 
seen if one looks at the other two groups that were asked 
to use their imagination in the imagine-self condition or in 
the imagine-him condition. These were told the following:  
Imagine-Self Condition 
In a few moments you will be watching the actual 
demonstration. While you are doing so, please imagine 
how you yourself would feel if you were subjected to 
the diathermy treatment, whether it turns out to be 
painful, pleasant or neither. While you are watching 
him, picture to yourself just how you would feel. ([...] 
You are to react as if it were you who will have the 
experience that is pleasant, painful or neither.) While 
you are watching him, you are to concentrate on 
yourself in that experience. You are to concentrate on 
the way you would feel while receiving the treatment. 
Your job will be to think about what your reactions 
would be to the sensations you would receive in your 
hand. (Stotland 1969, p. 292)         
 
Imagine-Him Condition 
In a few moments you will be watching the actual 
demonstration. While you are doing so, please imagine 
how the demonstrator feels as he is subjected to the 
diathermy treatment, whether it turns out to be painful, 
pleasant, or neither. While you are watching him, 
picture to yourself just how he feels. (You are to keep 
clearly in mind that [...] It is he who will have the 
experience that is pleasant, painful, or neither. While 
you are watching him, forget yourself.) While you are 
watching him, you are to concentrate on him in that 
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experience. You are to concentrate on the way he feels 
while receiving the treatment. Your job will be to think 
about his reaction to the sensations he is receiving in 
his hand. In your mind’s eye, you are to visualize how 
it feels to him to be the demonstrator in this experiment. 
(Stotland 1969, p. 292)         
It is not evident that these two groups that were asked to 
use their imagination were merely (as Stotland claims) 
asked to use a certain cognitive technique that was directed 
at the self or at the person being in pain. That is, the 
experimenters thought they exhorted the test persons to 
use a neutral cognitive technique with two kinds of focus; 
one where the focus was directed at oneself, and the other 
where the focus was directed at the person in pain. 
According to Stotland, this difference in focus also reflects 
a difference in the emotional reactions. However, it is still 
possible that the test persons understood the questions in a 
different manner; as exhortations to take an egocentric or 
compassionate attitude. This means that the result 
according to which the test persons who were told to 
imagine, tended to react more strongly than the group that 
was told to watch, is not necessarily a result of their using 
a mental technique. Rather the different reactions might 
well be a result of how they understood the exhortations in 
the experiment in a certain sense, i.e. as an exhortation to 
feel self-centred nausea (or pleasure) or as an exhortation 
to care. The persons were asked to imagine in order to 
fulfil the demands in the experimental situation. This 
means that the exhortations become ambiguous. The test 
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subjects’ strong emotional responses do not necessarily 
reveal how we might react in real life since the test persons 
are trying to fulfil the demands in the experiment. 
However, do we not sometimes also in real life tell people 
to use their imagination? Sometimes I might say to my 
child “Try to imagine how you would feel if you were in 
her situation!” Indeed we do say things like these, but they 
are in themselves moral exhortations, they are not neutral 
advice. 
However, the problem with Stotland and Sherman’s 
experiment is not only that the questions are leading. There 
are also certain theoretical assumptions concerning 
interpersonal understanding that seem to affect how the 
experiment is designed. These assumptions seem to be one 
reason why Stotland and Sherman do not notice that their 
questions are leading. 
One assumption concerns the nature of the relation 
between seeing another person and imagining how 
another person feels. The assumption seems to be that 
when we see another person we see, so to say, merely the 
person’s bodily surface. Therefore, in order to understand 
how another person feels when he is in pain we must use 
our imagination. The idea that we always have a deeper 
understanding of people when we imagine how they feel 
than when we look at them might seem natural against the 
background of a dualistic way of thinking about human 
beings. The researchers do not themselves say that they 
have a dualistic conception of human beings. Nevertheless 
one can see a tendency towards a dualism in their way of 
distinguishing between simply watching bodily 
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movements and, on the other hand, imagining another 
person’s thoughts and feelings. The dualism gets 
constructed in the experimental design, in the very 
instructions given to the test persons. One can also see 
such a tendency towards dualism in the earlier quote 
where Stotland concludes that “A ‘superficial’ set of just 
watching him does not lead to empathy.” According to 
Stotland, watching another person is more superficial than 
imagining how the other person feels. However, the 
character of watching that takes place in the watch-him 
condition is actually a very sophisticated form of seeing. It 
is not the normal, basic or the only way of seeing others. It 
is, as I have already argued, something the persons are 
instructed to do. In the “Watch-him condition” in the 
experiment the test-subjects are exhorted to adopt a 
fragmented way of looking at another person. The subjects 
are asked to look at leg movements, arm movements, etc. 
This fragmented way of looking at the movement of bodily 
parts in the “Watch-him condition” affects the test-subjects’ 
capacity to perceive the other person’s pain.   
Ordinarily when we see that another person is in pain 
we see the human being’s behaviour as a meaningful 
whole and as part of a meaningful context. This way of 
seeing other people is immediate. From such a perspective 
the most apparent way of describing a person who is in 
pain would be to say that he is grimacing in pain or that he 
is writhing in pain. Normally our seeing others is also 
inseparable from the ways they engage us. Think, for 
instance, about the way you look into the other person’s 
eyes while laughing at a joke, or you look angrily at 
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someone, or you see that a person on a bike falls and you 
instantly go to help him, ask him if he hurt himself etc. 
None of these forms of looking or seeing have to do with 
observing bodily parts that are moving in certain ways; 
they are responses to the other person in a meaningful 
situation and as such also expressions of understanding.  
However, there are also certain situations in real life 
where we can adopt a fragmented way of looking at others. 
For instance, if I have a bad knee and visit the doctor she 
might study the movement of my leg in a clinical way. In 
this sense there is a resemblance between certain medical 
contexts and the way in which the subject in the 
experiment is asked to observe bodily movements. 
However, a medical context is a special context, it is not a 
situation that reflects how we generally look at each other 
or how we ordinarily recognize that another person is in 
pain. The doctor’s capacity to observe my leg movements 
is expressive of her skill as a doctor, and this skill is 
dependent on the fact that she already understands that 
my knee hurts. That is, the focused way of looking that a 
doctor can sometimes adopt is not opposed to the doctor’s 
capacity to care for the other person’s suffering but 
expressive of one form her care for the other person’s 
suffering may take. 
It seems to be the case that Stotland and Sherman are 
influenced by a natural scientific conception of 
experimental research. The idea is that we ought to make 
the experimental situation as restricted and controlled as 
possible in order to gain as clear results as possible. The 
problem with a reduction of context is that it becomes 
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unclear what it means to understand that the person is in 
pain. 
Wittgenstein writes in Philosophical Investigations:  
But isn’t it absurd to say of a body that it has pain? —
And why does one feel an absurdity in that? In what 
sense is it true that my hand does not feel pain, but I in 
my hand? 
  What sort of issue is: Is it the body that feels pain? 
—How is it to be decided? What makes it plausible to 
say that it is not the body? —Well, something like this: 
if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does 
not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort 
the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face. 
(Wittgenstein [1953] 2001, §286) 
Wittgenstein criticizes here a conception of the human 
body as something that is separable from what we mean 
by a person. Contrary to this idea, Wittgenstein argues that 
it is central for what we mean by a human body, and then 
also for what we mean by the concept of pain, that we 
address the person who is in pain. He says “one does not 
comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face”. 
The assumption that it is comprehensible to talk of the 
human body as if it was a purely physical object that we 
observe is reflective of the tendency to assume that 
sensations are a kind of inner states. The meaning of such a 
state is assumed to be independent of the person’s larger 
life context. This is also an idea that Wittgenstein questions. 
He writes, “The concept of pain is characterized by its 
particular function in our life.” (Wittgenstein [1967] 1981, 
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§532) I have a headache that makes me grumpy. He has 
bad knees that makes him unable to dance. In the 
experiment on the other hand the persons that are 
subjected to the heat treatment are not affected by it in 
their ordinary life. After the experiment they go home and 
continue living as usual. The subjects who observe the 
treatment have also been informed that it is not dangerous. 
Stotland treats pain, and our understanding of it, as a 
contextfree momentary inner state, not as something that 
affects our life in various ways. There is also a difference 
between watching a person who has freely volunteered for 
a painful experiment, or seeing someone severely ill or 
badly injured and in pain because of it. Usually pain is not 
something we can freely choose to be or not to be subjected 
to, and it is usually not something we can walk away from 
when we want to. If one wants to understand how another 
person’s pain feels, one important thing is to try to 
understand how this pain is a part of his life.  
Let us take stock of what I have said so far. I have 
argued that there are several problems with Stotland and 
Sherman’s experiment. First, the exhortations given by the 
experimenters seem to steer the participants to respond in 
certain ways. Stotland and Sherman do not acknowledge 
that ordinarily when we tell a person to use his 
imagination we use this expression as a specific moral 
reminder. We do not use the word “imagine” neutrally. 
That is, we do not offer the person a choice to think in any 
way he likes about the situation. Second, Stotland’s and 
Sherman’s experiment rests on a problematic division 
between seeing and imagining. They take for granted that 
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seeing is more “superficial” than imagining. The 
impression that there is a clear division between seeing 
and imagining rests on the fact that the context is reduced 
to a minimum in the experiment. This creates the 
impression that experiences of pain are “inner” states that 
we only understand by using an analogical form of 
imagination. Further, since the connection with real life 
situations of suffering is unclear this affects the 
participant’s ability to really understand the person’s 
suffering in a normal way. It becomes unclear what their 
compassionate or non-compassionate responses mean. This 
also makes it difficult to consider the results of the research.  
4.4 Batson’s experimental research on empathy 
Another researcher who has conducted experimental 
research on the relation between empathy and altruism is 
C. Daniel Batson. In his book The Altruism Question (1991) 
Batson reflects on whether helping has egoistic or altruistic 
motives. According to him, a person’s altruistic motivation 
to help depends on the capacity to feel empathy. Batson 
discusses extensively psychological experimental 
investigations where the relation between empathy and 
altruism has been studied. In these psychological 
experiments the results indicate, according to him, that 
there is a connection between empathy and the inclination 
to help. One of the studies he refers to is the experiment by 
Stotland, which I discussed above. According to Batson, 
Stotland’s experiment reveals in a clarifying way how the 
difference in perspective can affect a person’s capacity to 
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feel empathy. Batson concludes: ”The combined evidence 
from these studies indicates that there is indeed an 
empathy-helping relationship; feeling empathy for a 
person in need increases the likelihood of helping to 
relieve that need.” (Batson 1991, p. 95)  
Batson has also conducted a large amount of 
experimental research himself in order to prove the 
relationship between empathy and altruism. Among other 
things, he constructed further experiments with Stotland’s 
experiment as a model. Batson describes one of his 
experiments in the following way: 
In the first two studies, female undergraduates 
observed a young woman named Elaine, whom they 
believed was receiving uncomfortable electric shocks. 
They were then given an unanticipated chance to help 
by volunteering to take the shocks in her stead. (Batson 
1991, p. 113)  
This experimental situation is, to a large degree, designed 
in a similar manner as Stotland’s experiment. The test-
subjects observe another person who receives painful 
treatment in a laboratory setting. In this sense the meaning 
of the experience of pain is, in a similar manner as in 
Stotland’s experiment, made obscure by reducing the 
experience of pain from any normal situation such as 
injury or illness. My main objection to this experiment is 
similar to my objection to Stotland’s experiment. If one 
reduces the normal context of how we experience pain it 
will also become unclear what it means to understand that 
the person is in pain. 
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However, Batson would probably not consider my 
critique of the experimental research method to hit the 
target. He is well aware of criticism directed at 
experimental research, suggesting that such research is too 
abstract or too restricted in character. According to Batson, 
there are two forms of empirical research methods; one 
that he calls the Aristotelian method and another that he 
calls the Galilean method. These two methods are, 
according to him, often taken to be in opposition to each 
other. According to Batson, proponents of the Aristotelian 
method often criticize experimental research methods for 
lack of “ecological validity” (Batson 1991, p. 71) Batson 
writes:  
Aristotelian criticisms are often made of laboratory 
experiments in psychology today, including 
experiments conducted to test whether the motivation 
to help is altruistic or egoistic. If, for example, we set 
up a laboratory experiment in which we confront 
introductory psychology students with an opportunity 
to help another student in need under conditions that 
systematically vary the relationship between benefiting 
the other and benefiting themselves, we may be 
bombarded with Aristotelian questions like: ‘Would 
non-students respond in the same way to the student in 
need?’ ‘Would people from another culture?’ ‘What if 
the person in need were not a student?’ [...] And, most 
often, ‘Would this need situation ever occur in real life?’ 
  From an Aristotelian perspective, questions like 
these are central; they concern the historical frequency, 
universality, and representativeness of the 
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phenomenon. From a Galilean perspective such 
questions are quite beside the point. [...] 
 The Galilean scientist is concerned with a very 
different matter from ecological validity; he or she is 
testing hypothesized invariant relations among 
underlying constructs. [...] 
 From a Galilean perspective, laboratory experiments 
can be criticized as lacking validity only to the degree 
that they either (a) fail to include the variables involved 
in the hypothesized relation or (b) fail to exclude 
potential confounding variables. Whether they involve 
frequently observed or unusual events, naturally 
occurring or artificially created situations, is totally 
irrelevant. (Batson 1991, pp. 71-72) 
Batson suggests that if we criticize the experiment for 
being too restricted in character, we will have missed its 
point. A few lines later he continues:  
If we are to understand the motivation underlying [...] 
helpfulness, then it seems necessary to employ 
conditional-genetic motivational concepts such as force, 
goal, and conflict—concepts that refer to the dynamics 
that lie beneath and behind the phenotypic 
manifestations of helpfulness. We must adopt a 
Galilean approach. (Batson 1991, p. 72) 
According to Batson, there is a difference between 
studying the frequency of a phenomenon (such as, for 
instance, the frequency of acts of helpfulness) or, on the 
other hand, studying the causal motivational factors 
behind helpful behaviour. He is not interested in studying 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
224 
 
how helpfulness can vary depending on circumstances. He 
maintains therefore that it is irrelevant to criticize his 
experimental research for not having any connection with 
real life situations.  
The question then is whether my critique of Stotland, 
Sherman and Batson’s experiments misses the point? 
Partly my critique of the experiments is that they lack what 
Batson calls “ecological validity”. However, even if I have 
argued that the experiments are too distanced from real life 
situations my aim with this criticism differs from what 
Batson calls the Aristotelian perspective. I have not wanted 
to claim that Stotland and Batson ought to study the 
frequency of helping. Rather, by pointing at the great 
discrepancy between the experimental situation and real 
life, I have suggested two main problems. First, if we 
reduce all normal life context we also loose the meaning of 
human responses. Second, the test subjects are exhorted to 
take certain attitudes towards the persons who are 
suffering. That is, the questions are leading.  
Since the responses in the experiments are so far 
removed from ordinary circumstances of suffering, it is not 
clear what the responses mean. In real life suffering has 
real consequences, but in the experimental situations this is 
largely not the case. In real life we also often stand in some 
form of relationship to the one who suffers, but in the 
experimental situations there are no close relationships 
involved. In real life we can also consider a person 
responsible for helping. But there is no question of 
responsibility involved in the experiments. When such 
aspects are reduced away in the experiments it also 
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becomes unclear how the compassionate responses to 
suffering should be understood.  
However, not all experiments that Batson discusses are 
as reductive in their character as the one described above. 
Batson also describes several experiments that have a more 
realistic character. One such experiment is the following.50 
In the experiment there are two groups of people both of 
which are asked to listen to a story where a young woman 
is in a desperate situation. The woman called Katie Banks 
is “a university senior whose parents had recently been 
killed in a tragic automobile accident. [...] Mr. Banks did 
not have life insurance, and Katie was struggling to take 
care of her surviving younger brother and sister, ages 8 
and 11, while she finished her last year of college.” (Batson, 
Sager, Gast, Kang Runchinsky, Dawson 1997, p. 499)  The 
first group is asked to:  
Try to be as objective as possible about what has 
happened to the person interviewed and how it has 
affected his or her life. To remain objective, do not let 
yourself get caught up in imagining what this person 
has been through and how he or she feels as a result. 
Just try to remain detached as you listen to the 
broadcast. (Batson et al. 1997, p. 499) 
The second group is asked to: 
                                                          
50 The experiment was first conducted in 1978 by Jay S. Coke, Daniel 
Batson, and Katherina McDavis. Since then Batson has conducted the 
experiment a number of times in slightly varying forms.  
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Try to imagine how the person being interviewed feels 
about what has happened and how it has affected his 
or her life. Try not to concern yourself with attending 
to all the information presented. Just concentrate on 
trying to imagine how the person interviewed in the 
broadcast feels. (Batson et al. 1997, p. 499) 
After the official experiment the test persons are asked if 
they would like to help the woman practically for a few 
hours by posting envelopes with letters for pleas for 
money. This suggestion to help Katie Banks was presented 
as a spontaneous idea by the experimenter, and as not 
being part of the experiment itself. The test persons also 
seem to believe that the request is sincere and that it is not 
part of the experiment.  
An important difference between on the one hand 
Stotland and Sherman’s experiment with pain and on the 
other hand Batson et al.’s experiment described above is 
that Batson et al.’s experiment is not as abstracted from real 
life. The story about the woman called Katie Banks sounds 
like something that could happen for real. In this sense it is 
a story that the test-subjects do understand to be a tragedy 
with very difficult life circumstances as a consequence in 
the woman’s life. Also the request to post envelopes with 
letters for pleas for money is a request for a meaningful 
action in the circumstances. This also means that the test 
subjects’ responses can more easily be seen as reflecting 
how we also might behave in real life. However, despite 
the realistic character of the experiment there remain some 
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problems with the experiment, which I shall describe 
below.  
The result of the experiment was that the persons who 
were asked to imagine were more inclined to help while 
the ones who were asked to observe were not as strongly 
inclined to help. 51  Since the experiment has a realistic 
character it might seem that Batson et al.’s experiment, and 
the results, ought to be accepted. Nussbaum (2001) 
comments on Batson et al.’s experimental research on 
empathy:  
[...] there is sufficient material in the experimental 
reports to see that there is also a strong relationship 
between empathy (or, alternatively, the judgment of 
similar possibilities) and compassionate emotion. If 
empathy is not clearly necessary for compassion, it is a 
prominent route to it. (Nussbaum 2001, p. 332) 
According to Nussbaum, Batson’s experimental research 
indicates a “strong relationship” between empathy and 
compassion. I argue that the experiments are problematic. 
Even if Batson et al.’s experiment is not as abstracted 
from human life as Stotland and Sherman’s experiment, 
they still have basically the same problematic idea about 
empathy being a mental imaginative technique we can use 
in order to understand others. The general form of the 
experiment as well as the result of the experiment is also 
                                                          
51 For a description of the difference in the degree of helping between 
the low-empathy condition and the high-empathy condition see Batson 
et al. (1997) pp. 500-501.  
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basically the same as in Stotland and Sherman’s 
experiment. The people who are asked to remain “objective” 
and “detached” do not respond as emotionally and 
“compassionately” as the people who are asked to imagine 
how the woman feels. According to Batson et al., this 
proves that our moral engagement is dependent on our 
using or not using a mental technique of imagination when 
trying to understand others. But, as in Stotland and 
Sherman’s experiment, in this experiment, too, the 
researcher’s instructions are not necessarily understood in 
a neutral way. The instructions seem to entail a certain 
attitude. It appears that the “objective” group is urged not 
to become engaged while the groups that are exhorted to 
imagine appear to be exhorted to engage morally in the 
other person’s life. That is, even if the researchers might 
have intended to give certain neutral instructions it is not 
evident that this is how the instructions were understood 
by the test persons. We do not usually talk in a neutral 
spirit about other people’s suffering, and this can also 
affect how we understand a researcher’s instructions. This 
complicates how the researcher’s instructions are to be 
understood. If the participants did not understand the 
instructions as requests to use a neutral cognitive 
technique it is also likely that it affected their responses. 
The results can therefore be seen as an outcome of flaws in 
the ways the experiment is conducted in roughly the same 
way as Stotland and Sherman’s experiment. 
Another problem is that it is unclear what sort of 
objective stance the test persons are actually exhorted to 
take. For instance, ordinarily when we talk about a judge 
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or a doctor being objective, we mean that the person tries 
to be fair and considerate. It does not mean that the judge 
or doctor should merely look at technical details. Trying to 
be fair to others also involves caring about others, not 
being inhuman or cold or callous. In this sense one can say 
that the exhortation to be “objective” means something 
different in the experiment than what we ordinarily mean 
by the word. 
To sum up so far. I have tried to question experimental 
research that is considered to prove that there is a link 
between empathy and compassion. I have indicated that 
there are several problems with these experiments. Both in 
Stotland and Sherman’s experiments, and in Batson et al.’s 
experiments, the researchers do not seem to notice that 
their uses of expressions are ambiguous. Their instructions 
are leading, and this also reflects the results of the tests. 
Another problem is that the context in the experimental 
situations, especially in Stotland and Sherman’s 
experiment, is so strongly reduced that it becomes unclear 
how the test-subjects’ responses reflect anything about 
how we understand and respond to other people’s 
suffering in real life. In Batson et al.’s experiment with the 
story about Katie Banks the context is more realistic but I 
have claimed that the questions are still leading.  
4.5 Cognitive conceptions of empathy and 
conceptual confusion  
There are some further conceptual problems with Stotland, 
Sherman and Batson et al.’s experiments on empathy. The 
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problem is not only that the questions in the experiments 
are leading or that the contexts are too reduced so that the 
meaning of the situation becomes obscure. The 
experimental research also rests on the assumption that the 
second-person perspective (where I understand how you 
feel) is dependent on the first person perspective (where I 
feel something), when we talk of understanding. This 
assumption also affects Stotland’s and Batson’s research on 
the relation between empathy and compassion. The idea 
behind both Stotland’s and Batson’s explanations seem to 
be that I am able to care for another person by actively 
trying to imagine how it would feel to be this other person 
myself. In order for me to understand you I imagine that I 
have your thoughts and your feelings. In this sense the 
first-person perspective is considered basic for what we 
mean by understanding. Such a conception shapes 
Stotland, Sherman and Batson et al.’s experiments on 
empathy. Clearly it can sometimes be an important aspect 
of our capacity to understand another person’s suffering 
that we have experienced something similar. But the 
problem arises when it is assumed that similar experiences, 
or the capacity to imagine oneself in the other’s situation, 
would be a general cognitive function or method that enables 
us to understand other people’s suffering.  
However, Batson’s and Nussbaum’s conception of 
empathic imagination is not purely analogical. Both point 
out that it is an important aspect of empathy that I am 
aware that the suffering person’s situation is not the same 
as mine. Batson notes that it is an important part of 
empathy that it is an other-directed emotion that is 
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“distinct from personal distress”, but he still describes this 
as a “vicarious” emotion. Nussbaum concludes that 
empathy “involves a participatory enactment of the 
situation of the sufferer, but is always combined with the 
awareness that one is not oneself the sufferer.” (Nussbaum 
2001, p. 327) From this one can get the impression that 
Batson and Nussbaum actually see the difference between 
a first-person perspective and a second-person perspective. 
Still I think they do not really see the character of this 
difference. Even though they point out that it is an 
important part of empathic imagination that I am aware 
that the suffering person’s perspective is different from my 
own, they tend to describe this difference in perspective as 
cognitive. That is they do not see that the difference 
between the first-person perspective and the second-
person perspective is a moral difference.  
In an article, on the role of imagination in philosophy 
and the humanities (2002)52, Lars Hertzberg says that when 
we talk about someone being able to imagine another 
person’s suffering we use the word “imagine” in a moral 
sense, we say something about his being attentive to others, 
or fair-minded, of his being neither sentimental nor cynical. 
(Hertzberg 2002, pp. 8-9) One is not here talking about 
what goes on inside his mind or what he feels. One 
describes his ways of being with others, his ways of acting 
and paying attention to others in difficult situations. 
                                                          
52 Hertzberg’s paper is written in Swedish. The title is: ‘Om inlevelsens 
roll i filosofi och humaniora’. In English the title means: On the role of 
imagination in philosophy and in the humanities. 
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Hertzberg gives the example of a man who is severely ill 
and tells a doctor that he wants to die and that his 
treatment should be stopped. A doctor can feel that it is 
difficult to know how to relate to the man’s words. This 
does not mean that there is one right answer to be found if 
we managed to see through him. It is not even certain that 
the person himself actually knows whether he really means 
what he is saying. Hertzberg’s point is that it is because the 
situation is of such a serious character that one may 
become uncertain how to relate to the suffering person’s 
words. The reason we do not constantly find it difficult to 
know what other people feel or what they mean by their 
words is not a matter of our usually having more 
information about others but rather of the situations being 
harmless and ordinary. The way one attaches importance 
to the person’s words as well as the way one can be 
uncertain about how to take his words, is an expression of 
one’s sense of the serious character of the situation. This 
reaction in itself is a form of moral awareness of the other, 
which also shows in how one acts, in how one listens to the 
person, how one might be sensitive to his gestures etc. The 
way questions and uncertainty about the meaning of the 
other person’s words can come in here is in itself an 
expression of a compassionate attitude towards the 
suffering man.  
In Totality and Infinity ([1961] 1969) Emmanuel Levinas 
writes: “The face in its nakedness as a face presents to me 
the destitution of the poor one and the stranger [...]” 
(Levinas [1961] 1969, p. 213). A bit further he continues; 
“To hear his destitution which cries out for justice is not to 
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represent an image to oneself, but is to posit oneself as 
responsible [...]” (Levinas [1961] 1969, p. 215). A bit further 
Levinas continues: 
The Other who dominates me in his transcendence is 
thus the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom 
I am obligated. These differences between the Other 
and me do not depend on different ‘properties’ that 
would be inherent in the ‘I,’ on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, in the Other, nor on different 
psychological dispositions which their minds would 
take on from the encounter. (Levinas [1961] 1969, p. 215)   
Levinas here talks of a difference in perspective that does 
not lie in the different properties of the two individuals’ 
minds, but in the other person appealing to my 
responsibility, I am obligated to help the other. That is, 
according to Levinas, my awareness of there being a 
difference in perspective when I am confronted by “the 
orphan or the widow” is in itself expressive of a sense for 
the seriousness of the other’s life situation; it is expressive 
of a sense of responsibility of caring for the other.  
Hertzberg and Levinas suggest two aspects of what we 
mean when we talk of understanding another person’s 
suffering. First, Levinas suggests that our awareness of 
another person’s suffering is integral to the fact that we are 
responsible for the other and thus that we respond to the 
other, by for instance trying to help him or her. Second, 
Hertzberg suggests that questions that may arise about 
how the suffering person feels are in themselves expressive 
of our sense of care and responsibility for the other person. 
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In this sense questions about the other person’s perspective 
are not neutrally cognitive but moral.  
However, it can often be the case that we do not really 
know how another person feels or thinks about her or his 
situation. In this sense our failure to understand another 
person’s suffering can sometimes partly be of 
epistemological character. However, Batson and 
Nussbaum consider such differences in perspective as a 
general cognitive problem that ought to be solved by the 
use of a general cognitive method of imagination. I think it 
would be better to consider such differences in perspective 
as specific to certain life situations and certain relationships 
rather than as a general cognitive epistemological problem 
of other minds. Further, as Levinas and Hertzberg suggest, 
the way we can feel that the suffering person has a 
different perspective, the way we can worry and feel that 
we do not know how he feels, is often in itself expressive of 
our care for the other.  
Batson and Nussbaum’s emphasis on imagination as a 
cognitive tool that enables us to understand the suffering 
person is also connected with a tendency not to 
acknowledge that it is a central aspect of compassion that 
we talk with the suffering person. Compassion has a 
mutual character in how one acknowledges one’s presence 
to the other by talking. One might, for instance, say 
worriedly to a sick friend “How are you feeling?” This way 
of talking is one of the more central ways of showing 
compassion towards another person; it is a way of 
acknowledging the other person’s suffering, a way of 
expressing respect, warmth and of caring for the other. 
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One shows that one cares about the other person, one lets 
him know. Bodily expressions can also in this sense, as 
Wittgenstein suggests 53 , be of great importance as 
expressions of compassion; that one looks into another 
person’s eyes, that one does not leave a suffering person 
alone, that one holds the person’s hand. Knowledge comes 
into compassion very much as something one shares with 
the other, in one’s attentiveness towards the other.  
The central form of the relation between compassion 
and knowledge here is not that we first need to know 
exactly what the other person is feeling, which again 
makes us care for the other person, but that our care for the 
other can show in that we may worry about how the 
person feels and that we also then may ask the person how 
he or she feels. The way we consider the suffering person’s 
first-person perspective to have special significance, 
including the way we may feel that we do not know how 
he feels unless we ask him, is in itself expressive of our care 
and respect for the person. The concept of knowledge is, in 
this sense, relational and moral. 
Compassion also often takes the form of a respectful 
acknowledgement that one does not have the authority to 
say how things are for the other. C.S. Lewis writes in 
Letters to Malcolm ([1964] 1991)54 about the difficulty of his 
grief after having lost his wife. “You wrote; ‘I know I’m 
outside. My voice can hardly reach you.’ And that was one 
reason why your letter was more like the real grasp of a 
                                                          
53 See the earlier quote from Wittgenstein, ([1953] 2001, §286). 
54 Malcolm is generally considered to be a fictional character.  
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real hand than any other I got.” (Lewis [1964] 1991, p. 41) 
Lewis illustrates here how a friend’s expression of 
compassion can show in a respectful and honest 
acknowledgement of how grief can be a lonely struggle.  
4.6 Imagination, involvement and responsibility 
I have argued so far that the idea that empathic 
imagination causes compassion is reflective of a conceptual 
confusion between the first-person perspective and the 
second-person perspective. I have also claimed that there is 
a tendency not to see that this difference is not cognitive 
but relational and moral.  
However, even if the concept of empathy entails 
conceptual confusions there are cases in real life that can 
seem to reflect the theories on empathy. In the following I 
shall quote some passages from Gösta Karf’s book En 
junisöndag kvart över tolv55. In this book Gösta Karf tells 
about his grief after his five-year old son Markus is killed 
in a fire. Markus had been playing alone in the family’s car 
when the car suddenly, without any obvious reason, 
started to burn. Markus didn’t manage to get out of the car 
and was killed in the fire. Several years after the accident 
Gösta Karf wrote a book about the family’s grief. The book 
contains many descriptions of how people acknowledge or 
fail to acknowledge the family’s grief. Karf writes as 
follows about the moments when Markus is brought out of 
the burning car.  
                                                          
55  Karf’s book is written in Swedish. In English the title means: A 
Sunday in June a quarter past twelve. 
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Suddenly something is about to happen. The rescue 
personnel are preparing something. [...] A blanket is 
placed on the ground behind the bushes, at a little 
distance from the car. The curious onlookers that have 
come to satiate their hunger for sensation are driven 
away. The firemen are standing respectfully still, some 
with their gaze lowered to the ground. I cannot see 
what is happening inside the car, but I begin to realize 
what is going on. Then the fireman comes out with 
little Markus in his arms. Carefully and tenderly he is 
placed on the blanket that has been brought from the 
burned car’s boot. One of the firemen places one of 
Markus’ teddy bears beside him. Markus’ body is taken 
to the ambulance. A fireman sits beside him and then 
the ambulance drives to the hospital. The atmosphere 
is tense to the breaking point. I can see that some of the 
firemen have a difficult time struggling with their tears. 
[...] One of the firemen does not manage to hide his 
curiosity but asks Marita: ‘Was it a girl or a boy?’ Then 
we realize how badly burnt Marcus was. This insight 
was given us too soon. It hurts incredibly to be 
informed of the fact that the person one loves so much 
and who one only a few hours ago held in one’s arms, 
now is so severely injured that one cannot see whether 
it is a girl or a boy. For the relatives of a severely 
injured person it can be of essential importance to be 
given the chance to live with the illusion and belief that 
the victim is perhaps not so deformed, even if deep 
inside one suspects the opposite. (Karf 1999, pp. 19-20, 
my translation)  
One can here see a variety of responses. The firemen 
struggle with their tears. They also handle Markus’ body 
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very tenderly (even though it is clear that he is already 
dead). They place him carefully on a blanket and one 
fireman puts Markus’ teddy bear beside him. The firemen 
act with compassion. However, a bit later in the quote 
above, one of the firemen asks an insensitive question. He 
asks the parents whether the dead child was a boy or a girl. 
The fireman surely did not want to offend these parents. 
What was it that happened then? One could say that the 
fireman’s question was expressive of an inability to 
imagine the parents’ perspective; i.e. an inability to 
imagine the effect of his question. However, it might be 
that he actually tried to say something kind. Sometimes we 
are clumsy when we try to be kind. Perhaps the fireman’s 
question was partly expressive of inexperience. Still one 
could say that he lacked a capacity to imagine the effect of 
his words. Here is another description by Karf.  
The foreman of the fire squad comes and offers us his 
condolences. From now on none of us is left alone, not 
for a second. The foreman keeps us all under his 
watching eye. With every step my wife takes he walks 
beside her and he also follows me with his eyes. It feels 
safe that someone at last takes responsibility of the 
situation. (Karf 1999, p. 21, my translation) 
The foreman’s behaviour here brings to mind what Levinas 
talks about when he says that the other person’s suffering 
poses me as responsible. The foreman takes responsibility 
for the situation. Karf continues with the following 
description:  
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Our ambulance stops in front of the entrance to the 
emergency ward. The doctor on duty and a nurse stand 
ready to meet us. The doctor seems insecure and 
nervous. When we step out of the ambulance he comes 
to meet us and says briefly and formally: ‘I looked at 
the boy but there was nothing to do.’ He then leaves 
quickly without saying anything more. Then we are led 
to a room that is meant for patients who need to lie 
down. We are asked to wait. ‘the doctor will come 
soon.’ the nurse says. [...] The doctor approaches us 
quickly. Now we shall finally get time to talk, I think 
and I put all my trust and responsibility on the doctor. 
He continues to give his brief information: ‘In case you 
will be transferred to the hospital I will take care of you, 
but then you must first get a referral.’ Again he leaves 
as quickly as he came. Speechless I stand and look 
when he leaves. He appears to completely have lost his 
composure, and I can barely believe what I see and 
experience. [...] I do not know whether I should laugh 
or cry. (Karf 1999, pp. 22-23, my translation) 
Here Karf describes the doctor as if he was completely 
unable to acknowledge their grief. The doctor’s behaviour 
is in some sense reminiscent of the “technical” or 
“objective” perspective that some of the experimental 
subjects are asked to take in Stotland and Sherman’s and 
Batson et al.’s experiments. One might also say that the 
doctor seems incapable of imagining the grieving parents’ 
perspective. Such a description can tempt one to think that 
there is after all something correct in Stotland and 
Sherman’s and Batson et al.’s experiments. The thought 
would then be that if the doctor had been capable of 
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imagining the parents’ grief, he would have been more 
compassionate in his behaviour. However, such an 
explanation appears odd. Nothing could be more evident 
in the situation than the fact that the parents are struck by 
grief. Another way to put it could be to say that it is as if 
the doctor is scared and hides his inability to approach the 
grieving parents under the clinical instructions. The doctor 
is not neutral in his clinical way of behaving. On the 
contrary, his way of sticking to purely clinical instructions 
is highly emotional. From Stotland and Sherman’s and 
Batson et al.’s experiments one might get the impression 
that a capacity to observe technical details is something 
neutral, something that does not express our involvement 
with the other person. I have maintained that this is not the 
case in the example above. A bit further on Karf continues 
with the following description: 
News about the accident has spread fast and has 
reached out to the circle of friends and acquaintances, 
who one after another come to express their 
condolences and to offer some words of consolation. I 
can see how incredibly difficult it is for many of them 
to find any words that can express what they feel. The 
words are not important. No words can shatter or even 
ease our grief but their presence gives us comfort. One 
of the visitors tries to lighten up the atmosphere and to 
break the silence by saying something funny. Someone 
shouts several times: ‘Markus is all right now, Markus 
is all right!’ The words are well meant, but regardless 
they remain incomprehensible. How could he be all 
right when he cannot be together with his family, I 
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think. How can he be all right when we are suffering? 
A few hours ago he was all right, when he was lying in 
Marita’s and my arms with his cherished milk bottle. 
 Where are the words that have meaning and depth 
in the situation, I wonder. What words would I most 
like to hear? That question is not easy to answer. (Karf 
1999, pp. 33-34, my translation) 
When several of the friends of the family visit they cannot 
find any words to say. Does this mean that they cannot 
imagine the Karfs’ grief? Several of the guests also behave 
a bit awkwardly even if they want to offer consolation; 
they try to lighten up the atmosphere, they say things that 
Gösta Karf experiences as incomprehensible. At the same 
time he notes that the words do not matter. It does not 
matter that some expressions are somewhat awkward or 
that some even sound unintelligible, but the friends’ 
presence is comforting. Karf also notes that he himself does 
not know what words of consolation he would like to hear. 
He does not know what words could help and console. 
Some time later Gösta and Marita Karf have to visit the 
funeral parlour to buy a grave. 
A woman asks us kindly to sit. From her appearance 
one can see that she knows why we have come. [...] It is 
quiet for a long time, finally I say that we want to buy a 
grave. The woman looks at us and then she turns her 
eyes down towards the desk and begins to cry. 
Embarrassed she apologizes for her emotional outburst. 
For the first time we experience a person with a strong 
capacity to imagine, who dares to show what she feels. 
(Karf 1999, p. 45, my translation) 
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This description of the woman’s reaction seems to 
resemble the situations in Stotland and Sherman’s and 
Batson et al.’s experiments where the subjects become 
emotionally moved when imagining the other person’s 
suffering. It is also clear from Karf’s description that they 
deeply appreciate the woman’s reaction. However, there is 
still a difference between the woman’s reaction and the 
suggestion that we use an empathic method of imagination 
in order to feel compassion. In the case above the woman 
has not decided to imagine how the parents feel. Rather, 
when suddenly meeting the grieving parents the child’s 
death and the parents’ grief becomes so present to her that 
she cannot help crying. The woman’s reaction reflects 
Levinas’ thoughts about the ethical meaning of the other 
person’s face. It is when the woman meets the parents that 
she begins to cry. At the same time her reaction is not 
merely a spontaneous emotional outburst, Karf describes 
her reaction as courageous and honest. However, how a 
person is moved by another person’s suffering can also 
show in other ways. Consider the following passage in 
which Karf describes how they meet the owner of the 
funeral parlour. 
The owner of the funeral parlour asks us to join him in 
his office. To me it feels better like this. I do not have to 
face all the coffins and urns. He takes the initiative in 
the conversation and it feels relaxed. He practices his 
profession with great dignity. It is unusual to meet a 
man with such good intuition. He observes us carefully 
without being intrusive. I get the impression that he is 
aware that he should be very cautious and gentle. He 
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asks carefully: ‘Do you know where Markus is now?’ 
Since no one has informed us of where he has been 
taken and where and when the autopsy will take place, 
we get a precise description of the formalities. The 
owner of the funeral parlour is well informed of 
everything that happens now [...]. His considerate and 
dignified manner is warming. Every time Markus is 
mentioned in some context he says his name instead of 
‘the boy’, ‘the deceased’ or something else impersonal 
and cold. [...] There is a warmth in his whole 
demeanour and we get unlimited time to talk. All the 
descriptions and practical advice we get are well 
thought through and useful. In passing he asks how 
tall Markus is. I realise that he needs this information 
for the coffin. [...] I have to admit I feel some discomfort 
about the requested information about Markus’ length. 
The question is unavoidable, but if the conversation 
had started with that question our presence at the 
funeral parlour would have had a very sudden ending. 
(Karf 1999, pp. 48-49, my translation) 
The owner of the funeral parlour has obviously had much 
experience in meeting people in grief. This has apparently 
made him very considerate and sensitive. The fact that he 
gives Gösta and Marita Karf much time to talk, and the fact 
that he uses Markus’ name when he talks about him, are of 
great importance for them. Here one could say that the 
man has learned to imagine the grieving person’s 
perspective. He is also very good at informing the Karfs 
about practical details. In contrast to the previous example 
with the doctor whose manner of giving brief practical 
information was expressive of his own fear, the owner of 
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the funeral parlour’s detailed practical knowledge about 
the procedures of the autopsy is expressive of his care and 
respect for the grieving parents. In this sense there is not 
here the kind of division between a capacity to observe 
technical details and on the other hand a capacity to 
imagine how the suffering person feels, that Stotland and 
Sherman’s and Batson et al.’s experiments presuppose. The 
undertaker is clearly skilled at sensing the importance of 
certain details. His sense for details shows, for instance in 
how he mentions Markus by name and not in an 
impersonal sense as “the boy” or as the “deceased”. It also 
shows in his careful way of waiting with the question 
about Markus’ length. Karf also says that the man has an 
unusually good intuition. But does this mean that he has 
learned to use a general mental technique of imagination? 
It would, I think, be problematic to say this. Surely the 
owner of the funeral parlour has reflected much on what it 
means to meet people in grief. But the way he has reflected 
and the fact that he senses that certain details are 
important, is expressive of his character as well as of his 
professionalism. His whole demeanour is expressive of his 
respect and care for Gösta and Marita Karf’s grief.  
According to Hertzberg (2007) philosophers tend to take 
for granted that the word “think” refers to a neutral 
cognitive process. Hertzberg claims that philosophers have 
tended to make a dichotomy between thinking as an 
intellectual process and a person’s character.  
The grammar of the verb ‘to think’ leads us to suppose 
that our ability to perform in a thoughtful manner must 
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be based on some activity that we carry out, some 
effort we undertake or some process that takes place 
within us. […] we assume that this is a neutral, inert, 
mechanical, impersonal procedure by which 
conclusions are deductively or inductively derived 
from premises independently supplied. It is taken to be 
‘impersonal’ in the sense that it is routinely accessible 
and yields the same results to anyone willing to make 
the effort […] In fact, some of the most emphatic uses 
of that word [think] are ones that involve a reflection 
on a person’s character as when we blame someone for 
thinking only of himself, or when we praise a person’s 
thoughtfulness, say, in choosing the perfect gift for 
someone else’s birthday. (Hertzberg 2007, pp. 68-69)  
What details the owner of the funeral parlour sees as 
important, how he reflects, is in itself expressive of his care 
and respect for the Karfs as well as of his capacity to 
assume responsibility in the situation. When the Karfs 
leave the funeral parlour and walk home they see an 
acquaintance: 
A few blocks further away we see another 
acquaintance who works in the healthcare. She flees 
quickly over to the other side of the street happily 
presuming that she has not been noticed. (Karf 1999, p. 
50, my translation)  
Is the woman here unable to imagine the Karfs’ grief? Or is 
it rather the case that she is so much aware of their grief 
that she becomes afraid to confront them. In several of 
Karf’s descriptions one can see how people become afraid 
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and avoid the Karfs. It is as if people become unable to 
meet them because of their enormous loss. These are not 
reactions of callousness, nor are they expressive of a 
cognitive inability to imagine what has happened. 
However, Karf also describes several situations where 
people do acknowledge their grief and show compassion.  
To sum up so far, I have claimed that it is problematic to 
think of compassion as if it was dependent on a general 
method of imagination. I have also questioned the 
assumption that our difficulties to understand other 
people’s suffering consists in a general cognitive difficulty 
to imagine the suffering person’s perspective. However, by 
this I have not meant to say that we have no difficulties in 
imagining a suffering person’s perspective. Severe 
suffering can affect a person’s life so fundamentally that it 
can, for other people, be very difficult to really 
comprehend and acknowledge the character of such 
suffering. This can make us clumsy when meeting such a 
person. We might, for instance, as in the case with the 
fireman mentioned earlier, say things that would sound all 
right in an ordinary situation but that can be devastating 
for the suffering person. However, these difficulties to 
imagine the consequences of one’s words cannot be solved 
by the use of a general cognitive method of imagination. 
The difference between the persons who acknowledge the 
Karfs’ grief and the ones who do not is not a difference in a 
general cognitive capacity, it is a difference in how they 
handle certain situations, how they assume or do not 
assume responsibility, how they are, or are not, careful 
with their words, how they are experienced or not etc. 
EMPATHIC IMAGINATION AND COMPASSION 
247 
 
4.7 Solipsism, body-mind dualism and 
experiences of suffering 
Earlier I criticized especially Stotland and Sherman’s 
experiment for being problematic in that it presupposes a 
body-mind dualism. This does, however, not mean that 
body-mind dualism is merely a philosophical hang-up. 
Body-mind dualism is often referred to as having its 
origins in René Descartes’ philosophy. However, as I 
mentioned in the introduction, one could also say that 
body-mind dualism partly has its roots in medical science, 
by which Descartes was strongly influenced. In medical 
science the body becomes a physical object to be observed. 
Similarly, in medical science pain becomes a state one can 
observe and test in a clinic. It appears to be such a medical 
and anatomical conception of the body as something to 
observe, and also such a medical conception of pain as a 
momentary state of a certain magnitude, that Stotland and 
Sherman’s experiment is based on. The problem arises 
when such medical ways of looking are dislodged from the 
context of ordinary human life, a life where the pain 
bothers us, where it can go on for days or weeks, where it 
is something we can’t get rid of, where it affects our eating, 
sleeping, walking, talking etc. The problem appears when 
the medical perspective is thought to be “purer” or more 
“basic” than the fact that pain bothers us in real life in 
many ways. From this idea of the pain in a medical 
situation being “purer” than the pain in real life it is not a 
big step to beginning to think of pain as a private sensation.  
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However, pain also has other traits that in a sense can 
explain why it is considered to be something private or 
inner. In The Absent Body (1990) Drew Leder describes 
several patterns in experiences of pain. He points out that 
pain makes us self-aware in a sense in which we are 
usually not. But this self-awareness can at the same time 
constrict our ability to think, reflect and sense ourselves as 
having a life. The body becomes the center of our focus, 
while the ordinary life surrounding disappears.    
With chronic suffering there is nowhere to go, nothing 
to do, no escape. Space loses its normal directionality as 
the world ceases to be the locus of purposeful action.  
Physical suffering constricts not only the spatial but the 
temporal sphere. As it pulls us back to the here, so 
severe pain summons us to the now. [...]  
 This temporal constriction is characteristic of chronic 
pain as well. While the body in well-being can explore 
the far reaches of time through memory and 
imagination, such possibilities constrict when we are in 
pain. (Leder 1990, p. 76) 
Pain as an experience can overwhelm us so that it alienates 
us from life. This Leder sees as partly explaining why we 
tend to think of body and mind as separate entities. Strong 
pain grabs our consciousness in a way that makes us 
unable to engage in ordinary life, as well as to concentrate 
on things, to reflect, to think, to remember, and to pay 
attention to others. Pain constricts our being into a forced 
awareness of the body. Karen Fiser (1986) writes: 
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Pain sometimes suffuses the person’s world, so 
everything is stained with it. Sometimes the world is 
charged with energy and well-being, one’s eyes sparkle 
and one’s body feels alive. And then, on a different day, 
the world drops away. (Fiser 1986, p. 8)  
In this sense one can say that there are two kinds of body-
mind dualism; one that rests on philosophical confusion 
concerning interpersonal understanding (and that seems to 
be influenced by a conception of the human body that is 
common in modern medical science), and another that 
reflects certain experiences in real life of suffering. Leder 
writes: 
Thus, the sense of the body as an alien thing does not 
arise solely in the objectifications of the modern 
physician. Prior to visiting the doctor’s office, the pain 
and disability of the patient have already laid the 
groundwork for a distanced perspective. Plügge,56 the 
German physician and philosopher, has discussed this 
phenomenon eloquently. He argues that the sheer 
‘thinglike’ nature of the body, as reified in Cartesian 
metaphysics, first surfaces in life-world experiences of 
effort, fatigue, disease, and the like. (Leder 1990, p. 77) 
Pain can also isolate us from others. In his book Must we 
Mean What we Say? ([1969] 2002)57 Stanley Cavell draws a 
parallel between solipsism and the loneliness one can 
experience in severe suffering. Even if Cavell does not 
                                                          
56 Leder refers here to Plügge (1967). 
57 Chapter “Knowing and Acknowledging” in Cavell ([1969] 2002).  
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think that all our feelings are private inner experiences 
such that no one else can know how they feel, he still sees a 
feature of this thought that is important to take into 
account when one talks about suffering. According to 
Cavell, there is a character of loneliness and exposedness in 
serious suffering that makes us talk of it as private and as 
something others cannot understand. It is true that 
compassion is an important expression of our 
understanding of another person’s suffering, but when 
suffering is really difficult we often can’t help the one who 
suffers, or our help cannot give much relief. This, 
according to Cavell, is one explanation why we can talk of 
pain as something inner and private. Tito Colliander writes 
in his book Samtal med smärtan (1956),58 about the pain he 
has when he is suffering from a severe disease. 
Sometimes you look up from a hole in the ice, you stick 
your head up and take a deep breath and smile 
towards the sun. But a moment later you have again 
been swallowed by suffocating water. [...] And more 
and more clearly you realize that no human being, how 
ever close she may be to you, can carry any of the pain 
in your limbs. It is totally and fully only your own. 
(Colliander 1956, pp. 17-18, my translation) 
Colliander describes his intense pain as an experience of 
loneliness and alienation from life, as if he were suffocating, 
and as something others can’t help him with. It is 
                                                          
58 Colliander’s book is written in Swedish. In English the title means: 
Conversations with pain. 
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important to see that this sense of the pain being 
something “fully your own” is a description of the 
unbearable character of the pain; it is not a philosophical 
statement about the private character of all our sensations. 
A difference between the philosophical idea of pain as 
inner and the loneliness in suffering is that the 
philosophical conception of pain as inner is a calm 
conclusion; it is not an expression of a desperate experience 
of helplessness. From the philosophical point of view, the 
reflections on pain as something inner is often made with 
the view that all our feelings are private inner states, it can 
equally much concern the fact that my foot itches or that I 
like the taste of chocolate. The private character of pain 
then becomes a general problem of knowledge that 
concerns all our feelings rather than the sense of isolation 
being seen as integral to suffering. Leder also points out 
that the whole idea of our feelings all having a similar 
character of privacy distorts what it can mean to feel 
something. Many of our pleasurable feelings unite us with 
others and gain their meaning through our being together 
with others.  
Pleasures, as more tied to a common world, also tend 
to maintain our intentional links with other people. We 
feast and drink with friends, making of our enjoyment 
a common bond. It is our means of connection, not, as 
Updike59 writes of pain, a ‘filthy window’ interposed 
between us. The primal image of pleasure, that of the 
infant feeding, depends upon a caretaker’s presence. In 
                                                          
59 Leder refers to Updike (1983). 
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adulthood many pleasures, such as the sexual, are still 
secured primarily with and through others. [...] 
  Thus, as Buytendijk60 discusses, pleasure and the 
happiness with which it is often accompanied is 
naturally ‘expansive’. We fill our bodies with what they 
lack, open up to the stream of the world, reach out to 
others. In contrast, pain tends to induce self-reflection 
and isolation. It effects a spatiotemporal constriction. 
(Leder 1990, p. 75) 
The problem is that intense pain as an experience of 
separateness and alienation from life is, in philosophical 
discussions, easily misconstrued as a question of all our 
sensations being inner in the sense that they can only be 
directly and fully understood from a first-person 
perspective.  
Another difference between philosophical conceptions 
of pain as inner (in the sense that all our sensations are 
considered to be something inner) and how suffering can 
be a lonely experience is that in philosophy pain is reduced 
to a context free and timeless inner state. But in real life the 
isolating character of suffering can usually only be 
understood by seeing the whole life context. Important 
then, as I have argued before, is that strong pain is often 
connected with serious illness, disability and death. Not 
only is pain frightening because of how it feels (which 
already means that it can be immensely frightening), but it 
is also frightening because it often means death. Being in 
difficult pain also often means that you have to enter 
                                                          
60 Leder refers to Buytendijk (1962). 
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places that you normally do not enter, such as a hospital. 
Such aspects as having to spend weeks or months in 
hospital can have an alienating effect on the person who is 
ill. On the one hand you are seriously ill and you are 
scared and worried about your future, perhaps you also 
know you are dying. Often you are also so tired that you 
do not have the strength to pay attention to ordinary daily 
matters, not even the strength to try to get distracted by 
looking at TV, or the strength to plan, reflect on or worry 
about ordinary matters (bills to pay, work problems, the 
family etc.). In a hospital you are also in a kind of non-
place, together with people you do not know, and also 
usually not left alone. Further, even though the hospital 
staff is often kind and of tremendous help these are still 
people you do not know very well. Lying in hospital stops 
you from living a normal life, stops you from sharing daily 
joys and worries with your family and friends. One loses 
the spontaneous daily contact and daily routines with 
others that largely form and give meaning to our life, but 
that also enable us to think of other things than ourselves. 
There is, in a sense, a loss of an ordinary engaged 
perspective and a forced awareness of one’s own state. In 
such a situation it can be of immense importance that close 
ones visit and call and tell about ordinary things that are 
going on; it can bring back a sense of being part of life, and 
it can momentarily make one forget oneself.  
However, even if strong, long-lasting pain or illness can 
be a very lonely experience, it does not have to mean that 
one can’t tell others how it feels, or that others can’t see or 
understand how it feels, or that one necessarily thinks 
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others are no support in one’s suffering. Rather, for the one 
who has to witness another person’s strong pain it can be 
obvious that the pain is a lonely experience, and one can 
show this by, for instance, holding the suffering person’s 
hand and by not leaving him or her alone. At the same 
time, however, the one who is in pain can sometimes 
experience a gulf between his life and the life of people 
who are well. This sense of separateness can partly be due 
to the severity of the pain itself, but it can also have to do 
with a sense of inability to really explain or talk about 
one’s pain. Fiser (1986) talks about how a patient 
sometimes can feel bewildered about the pain, not 
knowing really how to describe it to the doctor.    
In the article ”Night” (2010) Tony Judt writes about the 
illness ALS, which he was suffering from. This is a difficult 
illness that slowly makes a person completely paralyzed 
and eventually leads to death. Tony Judt suffered from 
ALS for two years and finally died from it in 2010. For Judt 
the long nights were most difficult to bear.  
In the early stages of my disease the temptation to call 
out for help was almost irresistible: every muscle felt in 
need of movement, every inch of skin itched, my 
bladder found mysterious ways to refill itself in the 
night and thus require relief, and in general I felt a 
desperate need for the reassurance of light, company, 
and the simple comforts of human intercourse. (Judt 
2010, p. 3) 
The sense of isolation, especially during night, was very 
strong. Judt further notes:  
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[...] it is hard to resist the thought that even the best-
meaning and most generously thoughtful friend or 
relative cannot hope to understand the sense of 
isolation and imprisonment that this disease imposes 
upon its victims. (Judt 2010, p. 4) 
Judt’s reflection above might be understood as if he gave a 
cognitive statement about the privacy of our feelings. But 
this is, I think, not what he is saying. On the contrary he is 
expressing by his words the extreme sense of isolation that 
he experiences in his illness. It was apparently a form of 
isolation that he felt was difficult for others to truly 
acknowledge and comprehend, despite the fact that people 
were thoughtful and considerate. 
In another article, “Tony Judt: A Final Victory” (2012) 
written by Judt’s wife Jennifer A. Homans, she also tells 
about her husband’s life when he was suffering from ALS. 
She describes how Judt’s illness made them both live in a 
kind of “bubble”, separated from ordinary life.  
At some point—it is hard to say exactly when, but it 
was about the time he began Thinking the Twentieth 
Century—we entered what we came to call the bubble. 
The bubble was a closed world, an alternate reality, a 
place that we lived in and peered out of. It had walls—
transparent, filmy walls—but they were like one-way 
mirrors: we could see out, but no one could really see 
in, or at least that is how it felt from the inside. We 
knew our world was strange and apart, governed by 
the rules of illness and dying rather than the rules of 
life. I could pierce through, sometimes, by taking a 
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walk and seeing the sky, but Tony could not—and 
increasingly would not. (Homans 2012, p. 4) 
Homans’ description here of their living in a “bubble” is 
one way of describing a sense of estrangement from 
ordinary life. At the same time this “bubble” is something 
they share; they are both in this bubble. Homans describes 
the “bubble” as both a refuge and a prison. “He took grim 
refuge in his study, his sickroom, his closed, safe prison-
cocoon that would house his deteriorating body and 
entrapped mind.” (Homans 2012, p. 4) In this bubble Judt 
found comfort in close ones and friends, but at the same 
time he also felt he had lost his old self.  
His private life at home and with friends was his 
greatest comfort but it was also deeply sad: he couldn’t 
be the things he wanted to be and he was haunted and 
humiliated by his ‘old’ self—what he called ‘the old 
Tony,’ who was lost to him forever. (Homans 2012, p. 4) 
Judt’s illness did not only distance him from the ordinary 
life of others but also made him unable to be the person he 
had once been. So he found even meeting close friends 
saddening. However, for Judt intellectual work had always 
been central in his life, and it was also through such work 
that he was able occasionally to be himself again and find 
some relief from his illness. One way to get away from the 
illness was the internet. By emailing others who could not 
see him, and people who did not know him, he was 
momentarily able to get away from the illness. 
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With the help of his family and friends and especially 
his extraordinary assistant, Eugene Rusyn, who had a 
way of effacing himself and could type at the speed of 
thought and speech, Tony could sit at the computer 
and we could act as his hands, typing his words and 
opening his view electronically out onto the world. 
And so he took more and more writing, more and more 
e-mail and electronic interviews; anything where 
people could hear or read but not see. (Homans 2012, p. 
4)  
Through the help of others with typing among other things, 
Judt was able to leave his embodied self and engage in 
conversations so that his illness was momentarily lost in an 
unseen background. Through the help of others he was 
able to gain his former intellectual independence. Homans’ 
description of Judt’s situation reveals how much our 
experience of illness can be dependent on how other 
people acknowledge us. Both Judt’s awareness of his own 
illness, his depression over not being able to be “his old 
self”, as well as his capacity to occasionally forget his 
illness was largely formed through his relationship to other 
people. This also goes against the idea that pain is 
something that we have access to from a first-person 
perspective where other people have no role for the 
character or meaning of this first-person perspective. 
Rather, it seems that Judt’s first-person perspective in 
many ways was integral to his relationship to other people. 
Another thread back to life was his work on the book.  
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Memory was Tony’s only certainty and he clung to it as 
a lifeline. It was the thing the disease could not take 
from him. It was another way out of the bubble and the 
only form of independence he had, and kept, to the 
very end. (Homans 2012, p. 4)  
Judt worked on the book with the help of his friend 
Timothy Snyder.  
For Tony the incentive behind the book—and it had to 
be a powerful one to overcome the discomfort and 
depression that were his constant companions—was 
primarily intellectual, a matter of clarification. Tim 
knew this, and when their dialogue worked, as it 
usually did, Tony was transformed. Sick Tony, 
frustrated and anguished Tony, unable to eat or scratch 
or breathe properly, his body aching from inactivity, 
was able, with Tim and through sheer mental and 
physical exertion, to find some relief and exhilaration 
in the life of the mind. (Homans 2012, p. 4)  
Judt’s illness was of a very severe type, and there are of 
course many different kinds of illnesses and people 
experience illness in many different ways. However, 
Homan’s description of Judt’s illness suggests that some 
aspects of the way we experience pain and illness in real 
life can seem to resemble the philosophical temptation to 
think of our experiences as solipsistic. From the 
perspective that strong pain and illness can alienate us 
from our capacity to think, as well as also alienate us from 
our own body, the thought of the human being as 
consisting of two parts, mind and body can seem 
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understandable. Likewise, from the fact that illness and 
pain can isolate us from life and from others, the idea of 
sensations as inner and private can seem understandable. 
But that these philosophical perspectives can seem 
understandable if one thinks of illness, does not mean that 
pain and illness prove the philosophical body-mind 
dualistic thinking or solipsism to be correct. The 
philosophical solipsistic and dualistic perspectives get 
problematic when the human life context is forgotten and 
pain is thought of as exemplifying any kind of “inner 
sensation” in itself and thus also as exemplifying 
something “inner” in the sense of something unattainable 
that we can only understand indirectly by analogical 
imagination. Such assumptions are reflected in the 
experiments that I discussed earlier in this chapter. 
From Judt’s and Homans’ descriptions above one also 
sees that the experience of illness is constantly entwined 
with our relationships to other people. In this sense, even if 
experiences of illness sometimes have a dualistic or a 
solipsistic character, this ought to be understood as integral 
to how illness can affect a person’s experience of himself as 
well as his relationships to other people. The dualism and 
solipsism are not here something that can be understood in 
a general cognitive sense but must be seen as integral to 
the experience of the illness.  
In experiences of violence one can also see dualistic and 
solipsistic traits while these experiences cannot be 
understood as dualistic or solipsistic in a general, 
philosophical and epistemological, sense. The experiences 
reflect the person’s traumatized relationship to other 
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people as well as to him or herself. In Aftermath, Violence 
and the Remaking of a Self  (2002) Susan J. Brison, a victim of 
rape and attempted murder, discusses what it means to 
experience violence. She writes: 
When the trauma is of human origin and is 
intentionally inflicted [...] it not only shatters one’s 
fundamental assumptions about the world and one’s 
safety in it but also severs the sustaining connection 
between the self and the rest of humanity. [...] the self 
exists fundamentally in relation to others. (Brison 2002, 
p. 40)  
According to Brison, a victim of violence largely loses his 
or her former sense of being alive; something which affects 
the victim’s sense of thinking, remembering, feeling joy or 
grief. She also comments on how the experience of violence 
affected her sense of self. 
I was no longer the same person I had been before the 
assault, and one of the ways in which I seemed 
changed was that I had a different relationship with my 
body. My body was now perceived as an enemy [...] as 
a site of increased vulnerability. But rejecting the body 
and returning to the life of the mind was not an option, 
since body and mind had become nearly 
indistinguishable. My mental state (typically, 
depression) felt physiological, like lead in my veins, 
whereas my physical state (frequently one of 
incapacitation by fear and anxiety) was the incarnation 
of a cognitive and emotional paralysis resulting from 
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shattered assumptions about my safety in the world. 
(Brison 2002, p. 44) 
Victims of violence often suffer from vivid nightmares and 
from various kinds of over-sensitivity to sounds or to 
certain situations. Fear of attack might make the person 
unable to go outside alone for walks. Fear as well as 
physical injury can affect the victim’s ability to continue 
the job she or he had before, thus isolating the victim from 
former work mates. The person might also be unable to 
stand any sort of physical touch even by loved ones. In this 
sense experiences of violence create boundaries between 
the victim and the victim’s former relationship to other 
people, including close ones. Brison also recounts how she 
after the assault experienced a loss of language. 
After my assault, I had frequently had trouble speaking. 
I lost my voice, literally, when I lost my ability to 
continue my life’s narrative. I was never entirely mute, 
but I often had bouts of what a friend labeled ‘fractured 
speech,’ in which I stuttered and stammered, unable to 
string together a simple sentence without the words 
scattering like a broken necklace. [...] For about a year 
after the assault, I rarely, if ever, spoke in smoothly 
flowing sentences. (Brison 2002, p. 114) 
Various aspects of shame may also be involved in 
experiences of violence. This makes it difficult for the 
victim to talk about his or her experiences, but it also 
makes it difficult for other people to ask. Brison writes:  
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During the first few months after my assault, my close 
friends, my sister, and my parents were supportive, but 
most of the aunts, uncles, cousins, and friends of the 
family notified by my parents almost immediately after 
the attack didn’t phone, write, or even send a get well 
card, in spite of my extended hospital stay. These are 
all caring, decent people who would have sent wishes 
for a speedy recovery if I’d had, say, an appendectomy. 
[...] In the case of rape, the intersection of multiple 
taboos-against talking openly about trauma, about 
violence, about sex—causes conversational gridlock, 
paralyzing the would-be supporter. [...] When, on 
entering the angry phase of my recovery period, I 
railed at my parents: ‘Why haven’t my relatives called 
or written? Why hasn’t my own brother phoned?’ They 
replied, ‘They all expressed their concern to us, but 
they didn’t want to remind you of what happened.’ 
Didn’t they realize I thought about the attack every 
minute of every day and that their inability to respond 
made me feel as though I had, in fact, died and no one 
had bothered to come for the funeral? (Brison 2002, pp. 
12-13) 
The friends’ and relatives’ inability to understand Brison’s 
situation did not have to do with a lack of information 
about what had happened; it was more a question of a 
misdirected concern as well as of an inability to approach 
her. These reactions were connected with the fact that she 
was the victim of a sexual assault. As she concludes, had 
she been in hospital because of an appendectomy, many of 
her relatives and friends would have expressed their 
concern to her. What made the lack of response especially 
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hard to bear was that it was her close relatives and good 
friends that failed to respond; people she had had 
confidence in and whom she liked and knew well. One 
could think that this was a situation where empathic 
imagination was needed. But it was not so much 
imagination as the courage to be honest, to visit, talk with 
and listen that was lacking. Brison is not saying that she 
was disappointed with her relatives because they lacked 
the ability to imagine what it might mean to be the victim 
of a sexual assault. It was not an expert capacity to imagine 
details that she longed for, but simply the presence of close 
ones and an honest acknowledgement of what had 
happened to her.61  
Brison further reflects on the importance of being 
listened to and of being able to talk about one’s experiences. 
She notes: “Saying something about a traumatic memory 
does something to it.” (Brison 2002, p. 56) 
By constructing and telling a narrative of the trauma 
endured, and with the help of understanding listeners, 
                                                          
61 The stigmatizing effects of suffering that is connected with sexuality 
can also be seen in how AIDS victims have been treated. In the article 
“The Happy and the Hopeless” (2013), Jerome Groopman reflects on his 
time as a doctor working with gay men with AIDS. “From much of 
society, there was scant sympathy for these suffering men. 
Fundamentalist preachers thundered that the malady was deserved, a 
manifestation of God’s wrath visited upon sodomites. Many in 
government expressed no interest in a rare disorder striking what they 
viewed as a marginal group. And some health care workers shunned 
the patients, not just out of fear for their own health, but disdain for 
homosexuals.” (Groopman 2013, p. 8) 
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the survivor begins not only to integrate the traumatic 
episode into a life with a before and an after, but also to 
gain control over the occurrence of intrusive memories. 
When I was hospitalized after my assault I experienced 
moments of reprieve from vivid and terrifying 
flashbacks when giving my account of what had 
happened—to the police, doctors, a psychiatrist, a 
lawyer, and a prosecutor. Although others apologized 
for putting me through what seemed to them a 
retraumatizing ordeal, I responded that it was, even at 
that early stage, therapeutic to bear witness in the 
presence of others who heard and believed what I told 
them. (Brison 2002, pp. 53-54) 
4.8 Imagination as a lack of understanding 
Throughout this chapter I have questioned the idea that 
there would be a causal link between a cognitive function 
or method of imagination, or in other words “empathy”, 
and our capacity to feel compassion. Even though I do 
think that imagination is an important aspect of 
compassion, I have argued that it is problematic to assume 
that there is a general cognitive function of analogical 
imagination that enables us to understand other people 
and to care for them. I have also argued that some of the 
empirical research on empathy rests on body-mind 
dualistic assumptions.  
In this last part of the chapter I shall discuss one more 
aspect concerning empathy that is suggested by some 
theorists. I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that 
Martha Nussbaum claims that empathy is a morally 
EMPATHIC IMAGINATION AND COMPASSION 
265 
 
neutral imaginative technique that can be used for both 
good and evil purposes. This is an idea that follows from 
the assumption that empathy is a cognitive function. It is 
also an idea that can seem to explain certain forms of 
cruelty. I shall quote Nussbaum again, but now more at 
length: 
In short, empathy is a mental ability highly relevant to 
compassion, although it is itself both fallible and 
morally neutral.  
  Does empathy contribute anything of ethical 
importance entirely on its own (when it does not lead 
to compassion)? I have suggested that it does not: a 
torturer can use it for hostile and sadistic ends. On the 
other hand, it does involve a very basic recognition of 
another world of experience, and to that extent it is not 
altogether neutral. If I allow my mind to be formed into 
the shape of your experience, even in a playful way 
and even without concern for you, I am still in a very 
basic way acknowledging your reality and humanity 
[...] Consider Hannibal Lecter’s treatment of Clarice 
Starling in The Silence of the Lambs. Although Lecter’s 
intentions toward Clarice are entirely malign, and 
although he might easily be imagined eating her, 
nonetheless, in his very effort to reconstruct the 
workings of her mind there is a basic human respect. 
The evil of utter dehumanization seems worse: for Jews, 
or women, or any other victim to be treated as mere 
objects whose experience doesn’t matter may perhaps 
involve a more profound evil than for them to be 
tortured by an empathetic villain who recognizes them 
as human. (Nussbaum 2001, pp. 333-334) 
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In one sense Nussbaum’s reflections on cruelty can seem to 
be correct. No doubt people can sometimes use their 
imagination in order to hurt other people. Clearly cruel 
persons can also sometimes be smart. However, 
Nussbaum’s reflections on empathetic torturers are, I think, 
still problematic. These problems are on several levels. To 
begin with, Nussbaum is too uncritical of the film The 
Silence of the Lambs (Tally, 1991). Hannibal Lecter is 
portrayed as handsome, intelligent and cruel. To portray a 
murderer as uncommonly intelligent is one way of making 
cruelty appear exotic. This can be seen in films such as The 
Silence of the Lambs. Nussbaum, however, does not notice 
that the portrayal of Lecter as highly intelligent and 
sophisticated is a way of mystifying cruelty and making it 
appear fascinating and deep in an obscure sense. One way 
of making sadism exotic is to make out the figure having 
the lead role in the film, as a hero. Another is to portray 
him as uncommonly intelligent and handsome, or as 
uncommonly ugly. My point here is not to say that cruel 
people are never smart; cruel people can be as smart or as 
stupid as anyone else. However, we are sometimes 
seduced to think that cruel persons are “deep” or 
especially intelligent.  
The problem, however, is not merely that Nussbaum is 
too uncritical of the film, but she takes the film as an 
example of her ideas of empathy. Nussbaum’s reflections 
on the film are an expression of her cognitive theory about 
empathy being a neutral imaginative technique that we can 
use for good or evil purposes. In the quote above 
Nussbaum distinguishes between a cruel person who 
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imagines the victim’s perspective and a cruel person who 
treats the victim as an object. She assumes that this is a 
distinction in a cognitive capacity. At the same time she 
oddly assimilates the cruel person’s capacity to imagine the 
suffering person’s perspective with respect, merely because 
the person imagines “another perspective”. I cannot see 
how her examples of “empathetic torturers” have anything 
to do with respect. Talking about respect in this sense 
distorts the meaning of the word.  
However, the problem is not only Nussbaum’s strange 
use of the word “respect”. My impression is that 
Nussbaum confuses a moral way of speaking with a 
cognitive function. Sometimes when people hear about 
violence they might say such things as “I can’t 
understand”. However, when people say so they do not 
necessarily mean that the cruel person is unusually 
intelligent or that the cruelty is of a sophisticated character. 
Nussbaum does not see that when we say that certain cruel 
acts are impossible to understand we express a moral 
stance towards what is being done. We are not necessarily 
describing the cruel person’s intelligence. Similarly 
Nussbaum confuses the moral expression “treating 
someone like an object” for a cognitive description of how 
the cruel person is unable to see that other people have 
minds. 
In his essay “Can We Understand Ourselves?” (1997) 
Peter Winch remarks that he finds it impossible to 
understand that someone can find football so important 
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that he is ready to kill for it. 62  Winch discusses this in 
connection with questions of how we can understand other 
cultures. His point here is that our difficulty understanding 
certain actions may concern things that happen in our own 
culture, and things that in a way are not complicated. He is 
not here saying that if he could get more psychological 
information he might understand such football fanaticism 
better. Neither is he saying that the football freak is 
unusually intelligent and that it is therefore difficult to 
understand his way of reasoning. His saying that he cannot 
understand is not an expression of a lack of information or 
a lack of some psychological skill. By saying that it is 
impossible to understand he is expressing his horror over 
such a person. Cruelty can have a very simple form and 
still be impossible to understand. In his paper “The Limits 
of Understanding” (2005) Hertzberg writes:  
                                                          
62  Winch refers here to the murdering of Andrés Escobar. Escobar 
unfortunately made an own goal during the 1994 FIFA World Cup. It is 
believed that he was murdered because the goal caused gambling losses 
among drug lords. It seems that Winch was not aware of the underlying 
reason for the murder when writing his article. He does not refer to 
these drug lords but describes the case as if it was a murder committed 
by football fanatics, which it apparently was not. This can of course be 
seen as making Winch’s point weaker since the murder had a more 
complex background. Nevertheless, I think his philosophical point is 
correct and that the example of football suits his point well. Even if 
Winch was wrong about the real reason for the murder, there is a great 
deal of fanaticism surrounding football, and because of this violence is 
not uncommon. It is also a sport that is part of Winch’s own culture and 
thus in no way strange or unfamiliar.  
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My specific point is this: if I call the activity of the 
snipers who were shooting the children of Sarajevo 
incomprehensible, or if I say I do not understand it, this 
is not like saying that I do not like it, or that I find it 
abhorrent. In fact, I think it would be strange if 
someone said he did not ‘like’ the sniping, or that he 
‘found it abhorrent’. It is as if the distance he is 
expressing were not deep enough. I should like to say 
that there is a form of distancing which is the most 
directly expressed by using words like 
‘incomprehensible’ or ‘I don’t understand.’ It is a 
reaction to certain forms of evil. (Hertzberg 2005, p. 5) 
The sense in which people in wars or in other cases of 
brutality are treated as if they were not human beings is 
similar to the sense in which these acts of cruelty may be 
said to be impossible to understand. These expressions do 
not necessarily mean that the cruelty is of a very 
sophisticated psychological character. Nor do these 
expressions have to do with describing some sort of 
cognitive-epistemological problems of the cruel person not 
seeing that the other person has a consciousness.  
I claimed earlier that Nussbaum has an exotic 
conception of cruelty which is connected with her 
conception of empathy. Exotism is also connected with a 
distanced conception of violence. C. S. Lewis writes in his 
Letters to Malcolm ([1964] 1991): 
[The Crucifixion] did not become a frequent motive of 
Christian art until the generations which had seen real 
crucifixions were all dead. As for many hymns and 
sermons on the subject—endlessly harping on blood, as 
INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEORY OF MIND 
270 
 
if that were all that mattered—they must be the work 
either of people so far above me that they can’t reach 
me, or else of people with no imagination at all (some 
might be cut off from me by both these gulfs). (Lewis 
[1964] 1991, p. 86)  
According to Lewis, one can see a difference between how 
persons who witnessed real crucifixions portrayed it and 
how it has been portrayed later on when crucifixions have 
become a historical curiosity. He suggests that a certain 
kind of detailed imagination of things such as torture is not 
necessarily an expression of insightful understanding or an 
expression of a true ability to imagine what suffering 
means. This kind of detailed imagination about certain 
forms of suffering may rather reflect a lack of imagination. 
It can be reflective of a lack of imagination in the sense that 
it is a lack of ability to be truly moved by human life; a 
curiosity about abhorring details.63  
One might also say that Lewis’ here distinguishes 
between two forms of what we mean when we say that a 
person has imagination. On the one hand a person can 
have a detailed imagination. On the other hand we can also 
sometimes say that such a person lacks imagination. The 
former way of talking about imagination could be 
described as a cognitive capacity. The latter could again be 
described as a moral stance. However, Lewis does not 
merely distinguish between these two meanings of how we 
talk of imagination. He suggests that the cognitive capacity 
                                                          
63  An example of such lack of imagination would for instance be 
Fitgerald et al.’s film The Passion of the Christ (2004). 
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is not neutral in kind but can in itself be expressive of our 
attitude to what is being done. Our ability to think shows 
itself in how we react to cruelty: in our finding it difficult 
to talk about, but also in our trying to acknowledge cruelty 
by talking about it, as well as in our trying to help others. 
And sometimes being able to imagine and talk about all 
the gruesome details of torture with ease can be seen as an 
expression of a superficial attitude towards life, a lack of 
imagination. Even if the detailed imagination of suffering 
is not an expression of contempt or hate or any other 
clearly destructive attitude, the interest in picturing the 
suffering as exactly and vividly as possible may be an 
expression of blindness. Susan Sontag writes in her book 
Regarding the Pain of Others (2003):  
It seems that the appetite for pictures showing bodies 
in pain is as keen, almost, as the desire for ones that 
show bodies naked. For many centuries, in Christian 
art, depictions of hell offered both of these elemental 
satisfactions. (Sontag 2003, p. 41) 
Sontag further notes that images of violence and suffering 
tend to have an especially shocking character when it 
comes to reporting about war or famine in Asia or Africa.  
Generally, the grievously injured bodies shown in 
published photographs are from Asia or Africa. This 
journalistic custom inherits the centuries-old practice of 
exhibiting exotic—that is colonized—human beings. 
(Sontag 2003, p. 72)   
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These images of suffering people in Asia and Africa are 
generally combined with compassionate descriptions. 
However, these compassionate descriptions have an 
ambiguous character. Sontag further argues that the 
frequent portrayals of conflicts in Africa and Asia do not 
mean that these conflicts actually get the attention they 
ought to get. Rather the abundance of images of violated 
people may feed an attitude of passivity, a feeling that this 
is simply how it is there and how it will always be in those 
parts of the world. We might feel compassion for the 
people suffering in these countries, but it can be an empty 
passive form of compassion, a compassion that does not 
bother us in our sleep. This attitude of passive compassion 
is not very far from curiosity. It is compassion as a form of 
entertainment. 
In Elizabeth Costello (2003), J.M. Coetzee also reflects on 
the relation between imagination and cruelty. The book 
tells about an aged writer named Elizabeth Costello.  
Costello reflects, among other things, on how we can 
become seduced by literature which is seeped in detailed 
descriptions of torture. Costello’s suggestion is that simply 
reading such things will, in a sense, make us part of this 
evil. I think Coetzee in this novel says something 
important about imagination. He makes us think about 
imagination not merely as a way of reflecting which does 
not touch on who we are, and which does not have any 
moral relevance. The way we imagine things, and also the 
way we can be seduced into imagining things, expresses 
and shapes who we are. This does not mean that it would 
be wrong to reflect on cruelties in war or other forms of 
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cruelty. That would be an absurd consequence. But, as 
Sontag notes, the difficulty lies in being able to describe 
such atrocities without being seduced by them. Sontag also 
reflects on her earlier work, On Photography (1977) where 
she discusses how news reports on sufferings in war have 
become a form of entertainment.  
The question [in On Photography] turns on a view of the 
principal medium of the news, television. An image is 
drained of its force by the way it is used, where and 
how often it is seen. Images shown on television are by 
definition images of which, sooner or later, one tires. 
What looks like callousness has its origin in the 
instability of attention that television is organized to 
arouse and to satiate by its surfeit of images. [...] The 
whole point of television is that one can switch 
channels, that it is normal to switch channels, to 
become restless, bored. Consumers droop. They need 
to be stimulated, jump-started, again and again. 
(Sontag 2003, pp. 105-106) 
Sontag argues that the news reports on television media 
are designed so as to appeal to a kind of light attention; a 
form of attention that can be turned on or turned off or 
changed whenever one feels like it. Here knowledge 
becomes something we can choose freely to reflect on or to 
forget. In this sense it becomes a kind of entertainment.  
Sontag also notes that whether a conflict becomes 
something we think about and remember depends on the 
larger political impact of the conflict as well as on its 
proximity. She names the Spanish civil war, the Serb and 
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Croat wars in Bosnia and the Israeli - Palestinian conflict as 
examples of wars that have got a lot of attention. However, 
she continues:  
In the meantime, far crueller wars in which civilians are 
relentlessly slaughtered from the air and massacred on 
the ground (the decades-long civil war in Sudan, the 
Iraqi campaigns against the Kurds, the Russian 
invasions and occupation of Chechnya) have gone 
relatively underphotographed. (Sontag 2003, pp. 36-37) 
Often war and devastation go on for many years and 
slowly we tend to loose our interest in them. Slowly the 
news reports also fade away because there are no “news”, 
everything goes on as usual, villages are bombed and 
people are killed and slaughtered as usual. Conflicts fall 
out of our daily reflections and worries even though we 
know they continue. This is of course only a reaction to 
suffering that is possible if you are at a safe distance.  
However, Sontag is also critical of a tendency today to 
claim that all reality has become mere entertainment 
because of media.  
According to a highly influential analysis, we live in a 
‘society of spectacle.’ Each situation has to be turned 
into a spectacle to be real—that is, interesting—to us. 
[...] There are only representations: media. (Sontag 2003, 
p. 109)  
She further comments:  
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To speak of reality becoming a spectacle is a 
breathtaking provincialism. It universalizes the 
viewing habits of a small, educated population living 
in the rich part of the world, where news has been 
converted into entertainment [...] It assumes that 
everyone is a spectator. It suggests, perversely, 
unseriously, that there is no real suffering in the world. 
(Sontag 2003, p. 110)  
As Sontag points out, the thought that media per se distort 
all of reality into a mere spectacle is expressive of cynicism. 
Cynicism is also one form of attitude towards knowledge, 
an attitude closely connected with passivity.  
4.9 Conclusion 
I began the chapter by discussing some psychological 
experiments on the relation between empathic imagination 
and compassion. The experimental research on empathy is 
taken to prove that there is a causal link between the two. I 
questioned the experiments on basically two accounts. 
First, the experimental context is so strongly reduced that it 
is unclear in what sense the participants can be said really 
to understand that another person is suffering. Thereby it 
also becomes unclear how one should understand their 
compassionate responses. Second, the instructions that the 
experimenters give to the test subjects are leading. Thereby 
it also becomes unclear how the responses should be 
understood.   
However, the experiments are not merely problematic 
because they lack a meaningful context or because the 
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questions are leading. The character of the experiments is 
also reflective of a conceptual confusion. The experiments 
reflect the assumption that compassion depends on the 
capacity to use our imagination in an analogical sense. This 
idea is expressive of a tendency to consider the second 
person perspective as dependent on a first-person 
perspective, when we talk of understanding. A tendency to 
describe interpersonal understanding in a body-mind 
dualistic manner is also evident in the experiments.  
Another assumption that shapes the theories on the 
relation between empathy and compassion is the idea that 
other people have separate perspectives in some general 
cognitive sense. The assumption then is that we need to 
use our imagination in order to bridge this mental gap. In 
contrast to this, Emmanuel Levinas and Lars Hertzberg 
argue that the question of separateness ought to be 
understood in a moral sense, not in a cognitive sense. I 
have a responsibility to care for the suffering person. As 
Hertzberg argues, the way we can reflect and worry about 
a suffering person, and the way we can feel that we do not 
know what he experiences, is in itself expressive of our 
sense for the seriousness of his situation. The difference in 
perspective is not a general cognitive and epistemological 
dilemma that can be solved by a method of imagination. 
By discussing several biographical descriptions of 
suffering as well as of compassion I have tried to bring 
forth how experiences of suffering affect interpersonal 
relationships in many ways. The descriptions suggest that 
our difficulties in understanding another person’s 
suffering, including our sense of separateness and 
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estrangement, are of a quite different (relational and moral) 
character than the general cognitive obstacles that are 
taken for granted in the psychological and philosophical 
theories on empathy.  
In the last part of the chapter I discussed the idea that 
empathic imagination can be used for both good and evil 
purposes. The assumption that we can do so rests on a 
conception of interpersonal understanding as a neutral 
cognitive device. I argued that such a conception of 
understanding is problematic. Knowledge, or vivid 
imagination, is not necessarily always expressive of 
understanding. Our ways of knowing all the details of 
certain forms of suffering can sometimes be an expression 
of shallow curiosity. There is, so to say, no general neutral 
way of understanding other people’s suffering. The ways 
we think about suffering, the ways we understand things, 
are expressive of our attitude towards the suffering person. 
In this sense our understanding of suffering cannot be 
separated from the fact that we are responsible for each 
other’s life. 
 
  
Concluding remarks 
 
A main theme of this thesis has been to look at the relation 
between theory-of-mind theories and empirical research. 
Theories on theory of mind often lean heavily on empirical 
research and observations within psychology, psychiatry, 
as well as within other scientific fields. There are also many 
observations in real life that can seem to support theory-of-
mind theories. This connection with empirical research and 
real life observations makes theory-of-mind theory 
influential within both philosophy and psychology. 
However, I have argued that this relation between theory 
and empirical observations is not as clear as it can seem. 
Much of the empirical research is built on certain 
theoretical assumptions that shape the research and that 
also shape the results. I have argued that theory-of-mind 
theories rest on the assumption that interpersonal 
understanding is a cognitive matter. The cognitive 
conception of understanding is further connected with the 
assumption that interpersonal understanding basically is 
epistemological in kind. That is, it is assumed that to 
understand another person means to have knowledge 
about the person. These assumptions are reflected in 
several more specific (problematic) forms of explaining 
interpersonal understanding.  
First, there is the tendency to consider a third-person 
perspective as basic for what it means to understand other 
people. This can be discerned in how the researchers tend 
to talk of interpersonal understanding as, for instance, a 
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matter of predicting, explaining or attributing mental 
states to other people. That is, a distanced, observing 
perspective, is assumed to be basic for interpersonal 
understanding. I have also argued that the third-person 
perspective forms how psychological empirical research 
that is connected with theory-of-mind theory is built up 
and how results are intepreted.   
Second, I have argued that there is a tendency to 
consider interpersonal understanding as based on an 
analogical mechanism of imagination or as an analogical 
bodily reaction. This is a central assumption in theories 
concerning altruism, infant imitation, mirror neurons and 
empathy. The idea that interpersonal understanding is 
based on an analogical mechanism of imagination (or 
based on analogical bodily reactions), is problematic 
because it is assumed that we can only understand other 
people indirectly, while it is assumed that we have 
privileged access to our own feelings. I also claim that 
these assumptions form the empirical research. 
Further, there is a tendency to consider the human 
being in body-mind dualistic terms. Since interpersonal-
understanding is assumed to consist in a third-person 
perspective, also the human body is described from a 
third-person perspective, as something we observe. A body-
mind dualistic perspective can also be discerned in 
connection with the assumption that interpersonal 
understanding consists in analogical imagination. If one 
assumes that interpersonal understanding takes an 
analogical form, it becomes important that we have 
physically similar bodies. However, body-mind dualism 
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also reflects the fact that psychology has a history of 
influence from physiology.  
I claim that these three above described features; a 
third-person perspective, the idea that interpersonal 
understanding consists in analogical imagination and 
body-mind dualistic perspectives, are central in theory-of-
mind theories.  
In the first chapter, on altruism, I contrasted a 
rationalistic perspective with emotivistic perspectives on 
altruism. According to the rationalistic perspective, which 
is represented by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, human 
social life is based on a nonconscious algorithmic reasoning 
mechanism by which we calculate how to act in order to 
maximize fitness when dealing with others. According to 
the emotivistic perspective, on the other hand, which is 
represented by Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Edward 
Westermarck and Frans de Waal, human social life is based 
on a capacity for analogical imagination and an analogical 
emotional responsiveness. Both perspectives lean on 
convincing empirical observations about human and 
animal behaviour. Still, I argue that both theoretical 
perspectives are based on philosophical confusions. These 
problems can be summed up as reliance on a transactional 
model of interpersonal relationships on the one hand, and 
the view of interpersonal understanding as consisting in an 
ability for analogical imagination on the other hand. Even 
though human reasoning often has a transactional, 
calculating character I have argued that it is problematic to 
assume that human social life and interpersonal 
understanding are in some general sense based on a 
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transactional manner of reasoning. Further, even though 
human beings often respond to other people in a kind of 
analogical emotional manner, and even though our ways 
of imagining can take an analogical form, it is problematic 
to assume that interpersonal understanding in a general 
sense is based on an analogical mechanism of emotional 
responsiveness. The argument from analogy also rests on 
conceptual confusion. It is assumed that the second-person 
perspective is dependent on the first-person perspective.  
Further, I have claimed that even though the 
rationalistic and the emotivistic perspectives can seem to 
be opposites, they basically share certain cognitive and also 
epistemological conceptions of interpersonal 
understanding. Cosmides and Tooby’s perspective on 
human social life as based on a nonconscious transactional 
reasoning mechanism, does not necessarily contradict the 
theories involving empathy.  
Both perspectives also share the assumption that human 
social life originates in a need to cooperate. Clearly 
cooperation (and transaction) is a central aspect of human 
life. However, I have argued that the idea that human 
social life originates in a need for cooperation (or 
transaction) does not show what it means for human 
beings to stand in personal relationships, relationships that 
cannot merely be defined as having an instrumental 
meaning. I have also claimed that it is problematic to 
suggest that our emotional responsiveness to each other 
has evolved because it enhances cooperation. The natural 
aspects of human social life, such as our caring for our 
children and our also caring for our loved ones when they 
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are dying, cannot be understood if one does not 
acknowledge the ways in which our long-term close 
personal relationships, and accordingly also language, give 
meaning to our actions. In this sense the concepts of 
cooperation or transaction that the rationalistic and 
emotivistic theorists work with rest on a reductive image 
of the natural character of human social life.  
In chapter two I dealt with certain psychological 
experiments concerning imitation that have been made 
with young children. Psychologists have shown that new-
born infants have a capacity to imitate other people’s facial 
expressions. These findings have been taken to imply that 
children have an innate theory-of-mind function by which 
they learn to decipher other people’s facial expressions and 
thereby also eventually to understand other people’s 
intentions. One of my aims in this chapter was to discuss 
and question how these empirical tests concerning 
imitation have been constructed. My aim was not to deny 
the empirical findings per se. It seems clear that infants do 
occasionally tend to imitate other people’s facial 
expressions. Rather I have claimed that the researchers 
give this feature a too dominating importance when it 
comes to interpersonal understanding. Since the imitation 
test is so highly restricted in its focus it creates the 
impression that imitation is a specifically important 
response that eventually enables the child to learn to 
understand others. This creates, again, the impression that 
there is some such thing as a theory-of-mind function. I 
have claimed that it is problematic to regard the infant’s 
occasional imitation as the only or the main factor that leads 
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to interpersonal understanding. In contrast I have argued 
that it is important to regard the child’s responsiveness 
(including occasional tendencies to imitate facial 
expressions) as part of a broader dialogical relationship 
between parent and child.  
I have also argued that the experiments concerning 
imitation are constructed in a one-directional manner. The 
adult tries to elicit certain imitative responses in the infant, 
but the adult is not responding to the infant. Nor is it clear 
that the adult is trying to engage with the child in a 
meaningful way. Bronfenbrenner maintains that the strong 
influence of natural scientific research methods on 
psychology have formed experimental research practice so 
that it takes a one-directional form. However, I also argue 
that the one-directional character of the psychological 
experiment fits well with an epistemological conception of 
understanding which theory-of-mind theory is based on. It 
is because the researchers have an epistemological and also 
analogical conception of interpersonal understanding that 
they give so much importance to infants’ capacity to 
imitate facial expressions. I further argued that a similar 
inclination to construct empirical studies on interpersonal 
understanding in a one-directional manner can be seen in 
Paul Ekman’s studies on facial expressions as well as in 
research on mirror neurons.   
Certain themes come up both in chapters one and two. 
In both chapters I claim that there is a close, and 
problematic, relation between certain empirical 
observations and philosophical theory. In chapter one I 
contrasted a cognitive rationalistic perspective on altruism 
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with a cognitive emotivistic perspective on altruism as 
consisting of analogical imagination. Both these also rest 
on an epistemological conception of understanding. I 
further claimed that both the rationalistic and the 
emotivistic theories rest on an instrumental conception of 
human relationships. Also in chapter two I addressed the 
idea that interpersonal understanding is based on an 
analogical responsiveness.  
In chapter three, on autism and theory of mind, I 
discussed the claim that autism is due to a so called theory-
of-mind deficit or, in other words, “mindblindness”. The 
fact that persons with autism generally have large 
difficulties in understanding other people and the fact that 
they often seem to be unaware of other people, seems to 
imply that they lack a theory-of-mind function. 
Researchers who support the theory that persons with 
autism lack a theory-of-mind function have focused on 
certain specific aspects concerning autism. First, it is 
claimed that children with autism are aware of objects but 
unaware of people. Second, since children with autism are 
not good at pretend play it is claimed that this points to an 
inability to use an analogical method of imagination, which 
is reflective of a lack of a theory-of-mind function. Third, 
since children with autism fail in the so called “false belief 
task” this is assumed to indicate that they cannot see that 
other people have intentions, or in other words, that they 
lack a theory-of-mind function. Fourth, it is claimed that 
the fact that people with autism can have a tendency for 
echolalia when talking also indicates that they lack a 
theory-of-mind function. Fifth, it is claimed that since 
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children with autism are not good at understanding humor 
and irony it implies that they lack a theory-of-mind 
function. In this sense there is much empirical evidence 
that seems to point to the absence of a theory-of-mind 
function. 
In the chapter I discuss the above mentioned aspects of 
autism that theory-of-mind theorists take to imply that 
autism can be explained as mindblindness. Even though 
the features described above are often present in autism, it 
is problematic to take these as evidence for mindblindness 
or for the absence of a theory-of-mind function. 
Furthermore I argue that there is a tendency, among 
proponents of the theory-of-mind view, to focus merely on 
certain forms of behaviour, while ignoring other forms. By 
discussing Clara Claiborne Park’s biographical books (1967) 
(2001), I have tried to present a more varied picture of 
autism.  
In this chapter I also, once again, addressed the 
tendency to consider interpersonal understanding as an 
epistemological tool. Much of the empirical observations, 
including certain psychological tests, are shaped by the 
assumption that our understanding of other people is a 
matter of learning to predict and explain behaviour. In this 
sense an epistemological third-person perspective largely 
shapes the empirical observations concerning autism. I 
have argued that this is a problematic assumption 
concerning what it means to understand other people. 
Further, the emphasis on pretend play reflects the 
assumption that we learn to understand other minds by 
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the use of analogical imagination. This idea comes up for 
discussion in all of the chapters in some way or other. 
However, the problem is not merely that the theory-of-
mind theorists give a one-dimensional picture of autism 
but also that they give a problematically intellectualistic 
picture of normal understanding, something that, among 
other things, is reflected in the conception of irony that the 
theorists work with. In this sense the aim of this chapter is 
twofold. One aim has been to discuss and question the 
claim that the problems in understanding that persons 
with autism struggle with, can be defined as a lack of a 
theory-of-mind function or that they are “mindblind”. By 
this I have not meant to say that persons with autism have 
no problems in understanding. The other aim has been to 
question the assumption that normal forms of 
interpersonal understanding could be defined as consisting 
of a well-functioning theory of mind.  
In the fourth, and last, chapter I have discussed certain 
theories claiming that there is a relationship between 
empathy and compassion. I began the chapter by 
discussing and questioning some psychological 
experiments on the relation between empathic imagination 
and compassion. The experimental research on empathy is 
taken to prove that there is a causal link between the two. I 
have questioned the experiments on basically two accounts. 
First, the experimental context is so strongly reduced that it 
is unclear in what sense the participants can be said really 
to understand that another person is suffering. Thereby it 
also becomes unclear how one should understand their 
compassionate responses. Second, the instructions that the 
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experimenters give the test subjects are leading. Thereby it 
also becomes unclear how the responses should be 
understood.   
However, the experiments are not problematic merely 
because they lack a meaningful context or because the 
questions are leading. The experiments also reflect a 
conceptual confusion. They reflect the assumption that 
compassion depends on the capacity to use our 
imagination in an analogical sense. This assumption is 
connected with the assumption that the second-person 
perspective is dependent on the first-person perspective. 
This makes the researchers think that I can only 
understand another person’s feelings if I imagine that I 
have that feeling myself.  
In this sense certain problematic patterns of explaining 
interpersonal understanding are apparent in these theories; 
patterns that I have also argued can be discerned in the 
other chapters. Further, a tendency to describe 
interpersonal understanding in a body-mind dualistic 
manner can be seen in the experiments. Body-mind 
dualistic explanations of interpersonal understanding have 
also come up for discussion in earlier chapters. 
Another assumption that shapes the theories on the 
relation between empathy and compassion is the idea that 
other people have different perspectives in some general 
cognitive sense. The suggestion then is that we need to use 
our imagination in order to bridge this cognitive gap. In 
contrast to this, Emmanuel Levinas and Lars Hertzberg 
argue that the question of difference in perspective ought 
to be understood in a moral sense, not in a cognitive sense. 
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I have a responsibility to care for the suffering person. As 
Hertzberg argues, the way we can reflect and worry about 
a suffering person, and the way we can feel that we do not 
know what he experiences, is in itself expressive of our 
sense of the seriousness of his situation. It is not a general 
cognitive dilemma that can be solved by a method of 
imagination. 
By discussing several biographical descriptions of 
suffering as well as of compassion I have tried to bring 
forth how experiences of suffering affect interpersonal 
relationships in many ways. The descriptions suggest that 
our difficulties in understanding another person’s 
suffering, including our sense of separateness and 
estrangement, are of a quite different (relational and moral) 
character than the general cognitive epistemological 
obstacle that is taken for granted in the psychological and 
philosophical theories on empathy.  
In the last part of the chapter I have discussed the idea 
that empathic imagination can be used for both good and 
evil purposes. This idea rests on a conception of 
interpersonal understanding as a neutral epistemological 
device. I have argued that such a conception of 
understanding is problematic. Knowledge, or vivid 
imagination, is not necessarily always expressive of 
understanding. There is no general neutral way of 
understanding other people’s suffering. The ways we think 
about suffering, the ways we understand things, are 
expressive of our attitude towards the suffering person.  
To conclude then, I have in this thesis discussed quite a 
variety of topics ranging from evolutionary theories of 
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altruism, to theories concerning infant imitation, to 
theories about autism, to theories of empathy. I have 
argued that there are certain problematic patterns of 
theoretical thinking that tend to recur in the varying fields 
of research. I have also claimed that theory-of-mind 
theories are influential in many areas of scientific 
discussion. Theory-of-mind theories influence empirical 
research. I have, however, argued that the empirical 
research is often more ambiguous than might appear at 
first sight. A further reason why theory-of-mind theories 
are influential is because the theories reflect certain 
classical philosophical ideas. The empirical research is 
often formed in a one-directional and reductive way that 
fits well with a cognitive and epistemological conception of 
interpersonal understanding. Epistemological conceptions 
of interpersonal understanding can take many forms such 
as an emphasis on a third-person perspective, the 
argument from analogy and body-mind dualism; ideas 
which all have a long history within philosophy. Further, 
the empirical research as well as the theoretical 
assumptions are supported by many real life observations.  
A central aim of the thesis has been to discuss and 
question the impression that theory-of-mind theories 
describe a basic underlying cognitive function of 
interpersonal understanding. I have questioned this 
impression by pointing at certain conceptual confusions 
that shape the theories as well as the empirical research. 
The impression that theory-of-mind theories describe basic 
underlying cognitive functions of understanding is created 
by a recurring tendency towards certain kinds of 
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conceptual confusions, combined with carefully made and 
convincing empirical research that, despite this, is formed 
by these conceptual confusions, combined with the fact 
that certain real life descriptions of human life seem to fit 
well with the theories.  
 
  
Swedish summary - Sammanfattning 
 
En populär idé inom dagens filosofiska och psykologiska 
forskning om interpersonlig förståelse, är idén att vi 
använder en kognitiv funktion (eller metod) för att förstå 
andra människor, en så kallad ”theory of mind” funktion. 
Denna idé förekommer inom ett brett vetenskapligt fält så 
som inom evolutionspsykologi, inom teorier om barns 
utveckling, inom teorier om autism, samt inom 
emotionsfilosofi och moralfilosofi.  
Avsikten i denna studie är att se närmare på vissa 
inflytelserika filosofiska och psykologiska teorier om 
interpersonlig förståelse, som också har en stark koppling 
till empirisk forskning. I arbetet hävdar jag att teorierna 
ifråga avspeglar vissa klassiska, problematiska filosofiska 
antaganden. Dessa antaganden bestämmer hur teorierna 
byggs upp, de formar hur exempel beskrivs samt också hur 
empiriska undersökningar byggs upp och hur resultat 
tolkas.  
Ett genomgripande antagande i teorierna ifråga är att 
interpersonlig förståelse i grundläggande mening är av 
epistemologisk karaktär. Det vill säga, man tänker sig att 
vår förståelse av andra (i grunden) handlar om att försöka 
få information om den andras tankar och känslor. Detta 
epistemologiska perspektiv på interpersonlig förståelse 
bygger på ytterligare tre klassiska filosofiskt problematiska 
tankegångar.  1. Forskningen utgår från att ett 
tredjepersons perspektiv är grundläggande för vår 
förståelse av andra människor. D.v.s. man utgår från att då 
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vi förstår andra människor så betraktar vi dem som neutrala 
observatörer på avstånd och tänker på dem. 2. Forskningen 
utgår från att vår förståelse av andra människor bygger på 
en generell kognitiv förmåga till analogiskt tänkande, eller 
en förmåga att reagera kroppsligen på ett analogt sätt. 
Denna idé präglar både teorier om altruism, teorier om 
spädbarns förmåga att imitera ansiktsuttryck, teorier om så 
kallade spegelneuroner, samt teorier om empati. 3. Det 
finns en återkommande tendens i forskningen ifråga att 
beskriva människan i dualistiska, kropp/själ, termer. Trots 
en omfattande, och övertygande, empirisk forskning, 
hävdar jag att denna ofta på ett missledande sätt bestäms 
av de ovan nämnda perspektiven.    
Avhandlingen består av en längre introduktion samt 
fyra kapitel. I det första kapitlet ”Rationalistic and 
Emotivistic Theories of Altruism”, kontrasterar jag två 
evolutionsteoretiska perspektiv på altruism. Jag inleder 
med att diskutera psykologen Leda Cosmides och 
antropologen John Toobys idé att altruism grundar sig på 
en algoritmisk tankefunktion. Med hjälp av denna 
tankefunktion antas vi omedvetet kalkylera hur vi bör 
handla för att maximera vår egen vinning då vi umgås 
med andra människor. I kontrast till denna idé lyfter jag 
fram primatologen Frans de Waals evolutionsteoretiska 
teori om altruism som något som bygger på en emotionell 
empatisk förställningsförmåga. Jag hävdar att Cosmides 
och Toobys liksom de Waals perspektiv bygger på två 
slags problematiska antaganden. För det första bygger de 
på antagandet att interpersonliga relationer i 
grundläggande mening kan beskrivas som transaktionella 
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relationer. För det andra bygger de på antagandet att vår 
förståelse av andra människor i en generell mening 
grundar sig på en kognitiv förmåga att föreställa oss själva 
i den andras situation (det så kallade analogiargumentet).  
I det andra kapitlet, ”Theory of Mind and Infant’s 
Imitation of Facial Expressions”, diskuterar jag ett 
perspektiv på den mänskliga kroppen som finns inom så 
kallad simulationsteori. Enligt simulationsteori bygger vår 
förståelse av andra människor på en analogisk 
föreställningsförmåga, vilken å sin sida är beroende av en 
förmåga att simulera andra människors kroppsliga 
beteende. I kapitlet diskuterar jag vissa psykologiska 
experiment där man studerat spädbarns förmåga att 
imitera andra människors ansiktsuttryck. Experimenten 
påvisar att spädbarn har en förmåga att imitera andra 
människors ansiktsuttryck. Enligt psykologen Andrew N. 
Meltzoff visar dessa resultat att spädbarn har en kognitiv 
analogisk föreställningsförmåga att förstå andra. Med hjälp 
av denna kognitiva funktion lär sig barn att förstå andra 
människors ansiktsuttryck och så småningom då också att 
förstå andra människors avsikter. I kapitlet diskuterar jag 
hur dessa experiment skall förstås. Min avsikt är inte att 
bestrida de empiriska resultaten i sig. Däremot hävdar jag 
att teorin och också experimenten reflekterar vissa 
klassiska, problematiska, filosofiska antaganden om 
interpersonlig förståelse. Dessa antaganden styr hur 
experimenten byggts upp samt hur resultaten tolkas. 
I kapitel tre, ”Autism and Theory of Mind”, diskuterar 
jag tanken att autismspektrumtillstånd beror på avsaknad 
av en så kallad ”theory of mind” funktion. 
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Autismspektrumtillstånd (härefter autism) är en 
genomgripande utvecklingsstörning som påverkar en 
människas liv på många vis. Det mest slående draget i 
autism är avsaknaden av social responsivitet. I kapitlet 
diskuterar jag antagandet att autism beror på en avsaknad 
av en ”theory of mind” funktion. Jag betraktar närmare ett 
flertal empiriska studier som verkar stöda denna teori. I 
kontrast till de empiriska studierna diskuterar jag också 
Clara Claiborne Parks (1967), (2001) biografier om sin 
autistiska dotter. Även om de empiriska studierna pekar 
på olika former av social dysfunktion, hävdar jag att 
resultaten av de empiriska undersökningarna ifråga är mer 
mångtydiga än vad forskarna uppmärksammar. Min 
avsikt är inte att förneka att barn med autism har olika 
slags svårigheter att förstå andra människor. Jag hävdar 
dock att dessa svårigheter inte kan förstås från synvinkeln 
att människors förståelse av varandra skulle bygga på 
en ”theory of mind” funktion. 
I kapitel fyra, ”The Relationship Between Empathic 
Imagination and Compassion”, diskuterar jag idén att det 
finns en kausal relation mellan en så kallad empatisk 
föreställningsförmåga och medlidande (vår vilja att hjälpa). 
Jag inleder med att diskutera vissa psykologiska 
experiment som anses visa att det finns en kausal koppling 
mellan en empatisk förmåga att föreställa sig själv i den 
andras situation och medlidande. Å ena sidan hävdar jag 
att de experimentella situationerna är så starkt reducerade 
att det blir oklart på vilket vis försökspersonernas 
reaktioner kan sägas vara uttryck för medkänsla (eller vara 
uttryck för avsaknad av medkänsla). Vidare hävdar jag att 
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instruktionerna som ges åt försökspersonerna är ledande. 
Detta innebär att resultaten blir ytterligare mångtydiga.  
Genom att lyfta fram ett antal biografiska beskrivningar 
av lidande hävdar jag att våra svårigheter att förstå andra 
människors lidande är av en annan karaktär än vad 
forskarna tar för givet i experimenten och i teorierna om 
empati. Samtidigt finns det dock vissa drag i vårt liv och i 
hur vi kan reagera på andra människors lidande, som 
delvis kan förklara varför de kognitiva teorierna om 
empati är lockande.   
Min avsikt i avhandlingen är således att 
undersöka ”theory of mind” teorier och deras relation till 
empirisk forskning samt också relationen mellan dessa 
filosofiska teorier och iakttagelser av vardagslivet. Jag 
hävdar att vissa klassiska filosofiska antaganden ofta 
reflekteras både i den empiriska forskningen liksom även i 
iakttagelserna av vårt vardagsliv, utan att forskarna ifråga 
är medvetna om detta. Även om jag undersöker, och också 
ifrågasätter, den empiriska forskningen som berör 
forskning kring ”theory of mind”, är min avsikt inte att 
bidra med ny empirisk forskning. Mitt syfte är att påvisa 
återkommande begreppsliga förvirringar vilka bestämmer 
teorierna ifråga samt vilka också påverkar hur den 
empiriska forskningen byggs upp och hur resultaten tolkas. 
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